UMAR v. FRN & ORS (2021)

UMAR v. FRN & ORS

(2021)LCN/15786(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Wednesday, April 14, 2021

CA/YL/33CN/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Chidi Nwaoma Uwa Justice of the Court of Appeal

Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal

Jamilu Yammama Tukur Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED UMAR APPELANT(S)

And

1. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 2. SAHABO IYA HAMMAN 3. MRS. DIEZANI ALISON MADUEKWE (NOW AT LARGE) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

THE POSITION OF LAW IN DETERMINING WHETHER A COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND ENTERTAIN A CRIMINAL CHARGE

In determining whether a Court has jurisdiction to hear and entertain a criminal charge brought before it, the first port of call is the charge sheet containing the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused person. See ONWUDIWE vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2006) LPELR – 2715 (SC), NWOLISA vs. STATE (2015) LPELR – 24371 (CA) and SULEIMAN vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2018) LPELR – 46813 (CA). PER UWA, J.C.A.

THE CRIMINAL OFFENCE OF CONSPIRACY

The offence of conspiracy is often hatched in utmost secrecy. It occurs where two or more people agree to carry out the act, the plot is an act itself, and taken as the act of each of the parties, an act capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means/purpose. In ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (2001) 1 SC (PART 1) 1 at 6-7 on proof of criminal conspiracy his lordship Achike, JSC held that:
“A conviction for conspiracy is not without its inherent difficulties . . . . a successful conviction for conspiracy is one of those offences predicated on circumstantial evidence which is “evidence not of the fact in issue but of other facts from which the fact in issue can be inferred . . . . Evidence in this connection must be of such quality that irresistibly compels the Court to make an inference as to the guilt of the accused.”
See PATRICK NJOVENS vs. THE STATE (1973) 5 SC 17; DABOH & ANOR vs. THE STATE (1977) 5 SC 22; KAZA vs. THE STATE (2008) 1–2 SC 151 at 164 – 165, ONYENYE vs. THE STATE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 643) 1810, SHURUMO vs. STATE (2010) LPELR – 3069 (SC) PP. 32 – 34, PARA. A, YAKUBU vs. STATE (2014) LPELR – 22401 (SC) PP. 13 – 144, PARAS. C-A, SA’ADU vs. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44709 (CA) PP. 26 – 28, PARAS. B-F, PHILIP vs. STATE (2019) LPELR – 47388 (SC) P. 38, PARAS. B-F and OGU vs. C.O.P (2017) LPELR – 43832 (SC) at 34 – 36, PARAS. F-B. PER UWA, J.C.A.

CHIDI NWAOMA UWA, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein was the 1st Defendant before the Adamawa State High Court presided over by his Lordship Nathan Musa, J (hereafter referred to as the trial Court) while the 1st Respondent was the complainant. The Appellant with the 2nd Respondent were tried for the three count charge of conspiracy, to corrupt public officers, contrary to and punishable under Section 26 (1) (c) and (d) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. (ICPC ACT, 2000). Corruptly Procuring Monetary Benefit, contrary to and punishable under Section 9 (1) (a) and (b) of the same Act and Receipt of Monetary Benefit contrary to and punishable under Section 10 (a) (i) and (ii) of the same ICPC Act, 2000. At the trial the 1st Respondent called fourteen (14) witnesses and tendered several documents while the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent called three (3) witnesses which included a witness (DW3) summoned on subpoena of the trial Court issued on the Resident Electoral Commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Yola in respect of which the legal officer with the commission appeared, through whom documents were tendered and admitted in evidence.

At the close of the trial, the Appellant was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to seven (7) years imprisonment on each of the three (3) counts which were to run concurrently having found that the Appellant corruptly collected the sum of N362,000,000.00 (Three Hundred and Sixty Two Million Naira) for himself and others to get monetary benefit.

The Appellant who was dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court appealed to this Court. The following issues were formulated for the determination of the appeal thus:
i. “Whether the trial Court was right to have assumed jurisdiction over the case. This relates to Ground Two of the Appellant’s Notice and Grounds of Appeal.
ii. Whether from the totality of evidence elicited before the trial Court and by Law, the trial Court was right in convicting and sentencing the Appellant for the offences contained in the three count charge against the Appellant dated 10/7/2017.” This relates to Grounds 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Appellant’s Notice and Grounds of Appeal.

The 1st Respondent on her part formulated the following three issues:
ISSUE NO. 1
“Whether by the combined provisions of Sections 61 (3) of the ICPC Act, 2000, Sections 124 (1), 138 (1)(b), 149 and 150(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Sections 19, 7(1)(2) of the EFCC Act, 2004, the lower Court has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges of Conspiracy, Bribery and Corruption in charge No. ADSY/56C/2017. (Ground 2 of the Appellant’s grounds of Appeal)
ISSUE NO. 2
Whether the lower Court was right to have tried and convicted the Appellant on charges of Conspiracy, Bribery and Corruption under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. (Grounds 6 and 7 of the Appellant’s grounds of Appeal)
ISSUE NO. 3
Whether based on the facts, evidence and circumstances of this case, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant.” (Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the Appellant’s grounds of Appeal)

The 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not file any brief of argument and had nothing to urge this Court.

In arguing the appeal, the learned counsel to the Appellant M. P. Atsev Esq., with W. N. Bello (Mrs.) adopted and relied on his brief of argument filed on 29/5/2020 but deemed filed on 10/11/2020. In arguing his issue one, it was submitted that jurisdiction is very fundamental in adjudication and that where it is lacking the proceedings and judgment of the Court cannot stand, no matter how well conducted. See MBAH vs. STATE (2014) ALL FWLR (PT. 735) PAGE 206 at 226, PARAS. A-D, OBEM vs. C.O.P (2013) ALL FWLR (PT. 688) PAGE 940 at 963 – 964, PARAS. F-A. It was contended that the offences being electoral offences, the trial Court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain same. It was argued that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to have tried the matter, reference was made to part VIII of the Electoral Act, 2010, Section 124(1). It was submitted that the allegations for which the Appellant stood trial and was convicted fall within Electoral Offences, reference was made to FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA vs. ENWENED SOLOMON & ORS (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) PAGE 2018. It was argued that the trial Court was in error when it assumed jurisdiction over offences that fell within Electoral Offences.
In arguing his issue two, it was submitted that the alleged offences were said to have been committed in 2015, the three count charge was dated 10/7/2017. The learned counsel posed the question as to which Law would be applicable, whether the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2015 or 2017? It was submitted that the extant Law as at 2015 is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003 and not the non-existing Act of 2000 under which the Appellant was arraigned. Further, that the Appellant could only be arraigned, tried and convicted under an existing Law. See HARB vs. F.R.N. (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 430) PAGE 705 at 723 PARAS. C-E. It was argued that as at the time of the election in 2015, there was no Law known as the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 but, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2003. On the other hand, without conceding that the information at the trial Court was meant to be in the year 2003, it was argued that there is no Section 26 (1) (c) and (d) as contained in count one of the offence, also that Section 9 (1) (a) and (b) in count two under which the Appellant was tried, convicted and sentenced is non-existent in the 2003 Act. It was argued that Section 10 (a) (i) and (ii) is also non-existent. Further, that the trial Court was wrong to have convicted and sentenced the Appellant for offences under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. It was the contention of the learned counsel that the 1st Respondent did not prove the offences said to have been committed by the Appellant. It was argued that there was nothing on record to establish that the Appellant conspired with the 2nd or 3rd Respondents to Corrupt Public Officers, Corruptly Procuring Monetary benefit or received for himself monetary benefit contrary to Section 26 (1) (c) and (d), 9 (1)(a) and (b), 10(a) (i) and (ii) respectively of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 or 2003. It was argued that all that the Appellant knew about the money in question was that the money was from an NGO meant for logistics for the INEC staff. Also, that the Appellant was not seen in any meeting with the 3rd Respondent or had knowledge of any criminal act to be done with the money even though his identity card was used at Fidelity Bank for the purpose of withdrawing the money, reference was made to the evidence of the PW5 (Daniel Okorie) who testified at page 439 of the printed records of appeal. Further, that the Appellant was not one of those that opened the account for the purpose of the money received. It was submitted that the 1st Respondent did not discharge the burden placed on her to prove the offence of conspiracy to corrupt public officers against the Appellant as required by Law. See OMOTOLA vs. STATE (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 464) PAGE 1490 at 1600, PARA. G.

It was the contention of the learned counsel that the prosecution did not prove that sharing of the money to the INEC ad-hoc staff was meant to achieve any political gain or advantage in favour of any person or party, further, that the money was meant to aid logistics and not illegality, reference was made to the evidence of the DW1 at page 477, lines 12 – 14 of the printed records to the effect that the Appellant believed the money was from a genuine source and meant for a legal purpose, on the assumption of the legality of the money, reference was made to Exhibit J2, page 620 of the records, also page 625, the list of INEC retirees who were to participate in the electoral process. Also, that the DW2 testified that he was engaged by INEC to participate in the election process, page 479, lines 1 – 21 of the printed records. It was concluded that from the evidence of the DW1 and DW2 doubt was created as to whether the appellant’s actions were intended to commit any offence and that the doubt should be resolved in favour of the appellant. See STATE vs. AZEEZ (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 424) PAGE 1423 at 1463, PARAS. A – D.

When the appeal was argued, the learned counsel to the 1st Respondent who had been served with the hearing Notice against the hearing date was absent from Court despite the hearing Notice served on him on 5/1/2021. The 1st Respondent’s brief of argument was settled by Abubakar Aliyu Esq., filed on 8/9/2020 but deemed properly filed and served on 10/11/2020. In the absence of learned counsel, the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument was deemed adopted and argued pursuant to Order 19 Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2016.

As contained in the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument, in arguing issues one and two which seem to have been argued together, it was submitted that Section 124 of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) provides for electoral offences of bribery and corruption committed with the purpose of returning a candidate as the winner of an elective office, thus, provided a latitude for an election petitioner to prove as a ground for invalidating the election. See Sections 138 (1) (b), 149, 150 (1) and 150 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010. It was submitted that in interpreting a statute, words should be given their ordinary meaning where the words are clear and unambiguous. See AWETO vs. F.R.N. (2018) LPELR – 43901 and ADEREMI vs. F.R.N. (2018) LPELR – 44282 (CA) PP. 13 – 32, PARAS. E-A. It was argued that by Section 150 of the Electoral Act the High Court of the States, FCT High Court and the Magistrates Courts have the jurisdiction to hear and determine the prosecution of offenders under INEC’s Electoral Act, 2010. It was submitted that there is no provision in the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) that made it mandatory or condition precedent that the prosecution of any crime arising therefrom must not be tried by the High Courts, reference was made to Section 7 (1) and (2) of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Act, 2004 (EFCC Act 2004) and the case of OLUESE vs. F.R.N. & ANOR. (2013) LPELR – 22016 (CA) which defined the powers of the EFCC. It was submitted that there is no time frame and circumstance within which the EFCC can investigate and prosecute an act or omission on Financial Crimes/Corruption. The case of F.R.N. vs. SOLOMON (SUPRA) was distinguished to the effect that Delta State made a specific provision (Delta State Local Government Law, 2004, Cap. D27, Laws of Delta State) in respect of the conditions under which Local Government Elections could be questioned in Tribunals set up by the State. See Sections 129 (1) and 132 (1)(a) (b) (c) of the Delta State Law. It was submitted that the complaint in Solomon’s case is that election did not hold, while the present case is on bribery, committed after the 2015 Presidential election, the result was not in issue. Further, that the EFCC Act and the ICPC Act are the specific legislations on bribery and corruption not the INEC Electoral Act which is meant to regulate elections without defining an offence or providing punishment thereafter, cannot take precedent. It was submitted that by the combined effect of the provisions of Sections 61 (3) of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, Sections 124(1), 138(1) (a), 149 and 150(1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), 7 (1) (2) and 19 of the EFCC Act, the lower Court had the jurisdiction to have heard and determined the charges for which the Appellant was convicted and sentenced. It was submitted that Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 remain the current valid Law and not the 2003 Act. See NWANKWOALA vs. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43891 (SC) PP. 8 – 14, PARAS. E-C.

On her issue three, it was submitted that conspiracy is never proved by direct evidence, it is usually drawn by inference and circumstances of the case. See AWOSIKA vs. STATE (2018 LPELR – 44351, PP. 61 – 62, PARAS. D-A, OKASHETU vs. STATE (2016) LPELR 40611 PP. 14 – 15, PARA. E (SC). It was argued that the appellant as the DW1 agreed that he is a civil servant and that he accompanied the 2nd Respondent to Fidelity Bank where he tendered his identity card, signed Exhibit C1 and collected the money which was taken to his house where he locked it up, pages 474 – 478 of the records of appeal. It was argued that the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent prosecuted a common unlawful purpose and were rightly deemed to have conspired to carry out an unlawful purpose. See OSETOLA & ANOR. vs. STATE (2012) LPELR – 9348, PP. 36, PARAS. D-F, Section 10(a)(i) and (ii) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, also Section 9 of the same Act, which laid down the ingredients of the offences created by Section 10 above. Further, that by Exhibit ‘C1’, the evidence of the Appellant, the 2nd Respondent, PW2, PW3, PW4, PW8 and PW9 showed that the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent Corruptly Procured money and shared to the above witnesses individually. See pages 435 – 437, 441 – 445 of the printed records of appeal. It was concluded that the proof of every criminal offence is not by proof beyond reasonable doubt but, where such doubt could be dismissed easily with a fling of the finger, proof is established.

As I stated earlier in this judgment that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents did not file any brief of argument and had nothing to urge this Court. When the appeal was argued there was also no appearance for the 2nd and 3rd Respondents.

The issues formulated by the Appellant are similar to the issues distilled by the 1st Respondent, the Appellant’s issue two covered the 1st Respondent’s issues two and three which borders on evaluation of evidence. I would utilize the Appellant’s two issues in resolution of the appeal. Under issue one, the learned counsel to the Appellant M. P. Atsev Esq. had contended that the offences for which the Appellant was tried and convicted are Electoral Offences, therefore that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to have entertained the matter which was alleged to be within the offences under Section 124 (1)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) hereafter referred to as the Electoral Act. Section 124 of the Electoral Act covers electoral offences of bribery and corruption committed in the process of election, in view of returning a candidate as winner of the elective office which is a ground for challenging and/or invalidating the election, it has nothing to do with the prosecution of offenders for the violation of the Electoral Act. An Election Petition Tribunal may recommend (for the purpose of prosecution) to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for the prosecution of offenders under the Act but, INEC could initiate such proceedings especially where the election in question was not challenged. Section 149 provides thus:
149. “The commission shall consider any recommendation made to it by a Tribunal with respect to the prosecution by it of any person for an offence disclosed in any election petition.”
The above provision makes it mandatory for the commission to consider any recommendation made to it by an election tribunal for the prosecution of offenders under the Act, this is only when and where a recommendation is made, by the clear wordings of Section 149 of the Act. This does not mean that the commission cannot initiate proceedings where a recommendation is not made, for instance where the election is not contested as in the present case. The above Section did not limit the investigation and prosecution to only cases where a recommendation has been made by an election petition Tribunal. The appropriate agency or body may investigate and prosecute in appropriate cases without a recommendation from an election Tribunal.

Where the words in a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their natural and ordinary meaning. See GANA vs. SDP & ORS (2019) LPELR – 47153 (SC) P. 43, PARAS. B-E where his Lordship Sanusi, JSC on guiding principles on interpretation of statutes held thus:
“It must be stressed here and it is even trite, that in the process of interpretation of statute, a Court must not give an interpretation which would defeat the intention and purpose of the Law makers and should rather adopt a holistic approach and interpret the provisions dealing with a subject matter together so as to give true intention of the Law makers. See AYODELE vs. STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (PT. 1243) 309, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FEDERATION vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LAGOS STATE (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1380) 249; OJOKOLOBO vs. ALAMU (1987) 3 NWLR (PT. 61) 377 at 402.”
See also OJI vs. QUEEN (1961) LPELR – 25123 (SC) P. 6, PARAS. B-D, ELABANJO & ANOR vs. DAWODU (2006) LPELR – 1106 (SC) P. 52, PARAS. B-D, WHITE DIAMONDS PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LIMITED vs. TRADE WHEELS LIMITED (2018) LPELR – 44572 (CA) LPELR – 44572 (CA), SUNDAY GABRIEL EHINDERO vs. FRN & ANOR (2018) 5 NWLR (PT. 1612) 301 at 320, PARAS. C-E and UNIPETROL vs. ESBIR (2006) ALL FWLR (PT. 317) 413 at 423; (2001) 10 NWLR (PT. 720) 167.

On the other hand, Section 150 of the Electoral Act, provides as follows:
150 (1) “An offence committed under this Act shall be triable in a Magistrate Court or a High Court of a State in which the offence is committed, or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
(2) A prosecution under this Act shall be undertaken by Legal Officers of the commission or any Legal Practitioner appointed by it.”
From the above provision, it is clear that the High Court of the States and FCT, and the Magistrate Court have jurisdiction to hear and determine the prosecution of offenders under the Electoral Act.

As I stated above in this judgment, it is trite that in interpreting a statute, the duty of a Court is to discover the intention of the Law maker by considering the words used in order to discover their ordinary meaning in respect of the subject matter and apply same accordingly. See ELELU-HABEEB vs. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1318) 12, MADUMERE vs. OKWARA (2013) 12 NWLR (PT. 1368) 303, OPARA vs. AMADI (2013) 12 NWLR (PT. 1369) 512.

In determining whether a Court has jurisdiction to hear and entertain a criminal charge brought before it, the first port of call is the charge sheet containing the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused person. See ONWUDIWE vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2006) LPELR – 2715 (SC), NWOLISA vs. STATE (2015) LPELR – 24371 (CA) and SULEIMAN vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2018) LPELR – 46813 (CA).

By virtue of Section 150 of the Electoral Act above, the offences for which the appellant stood trial and convicted were triable by the State High Court that heard the matter. There is nothing in the charge that ousted the jurisdiction of the trial Court. The learned counsel to the Appellant had erroneously argued that before the lower Court could exercise its jurisdiction to hear and determine the offences for which the Appellant stood trial, there ought to have been a recommendation made to INEC for the prosecution of the offences by an Election Petition Tribunal because they were offences committed in the course of an election. If this were to be the position, it would have been specified in Sections 149 and 150 of the Electoral Act, what is not specifically provided for cannot be read into the above Sections. See ATTORNEY GENERAL, LAGOS STATE vs. DOSUNMU (1989) 3 NWLR (PT. 111) 614. The plain and ordinary meaning of the Sections 149 and 150 (1) and (2) of the Electoral Act must be given their ordinary interpretation rather than strain to ouster the jurisdiction of a Court. See MILITARY GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE vs. ADEWUMI (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 82) 280, NWOSU vs. IMO STATE ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION AUTHORITY (1990) 2 NWLR (PT. 135) 688, NIGERIAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD vs. DENAP LTD (2001) NWLR (PT. 746) 726, IBRAHIM vs. FRN (2019) LPELR – 50341 (CA).
In the present case, the offences for which the Appellant stood trial was committed during the 2015 election, it did not arise from an election petition. The Appellant was charged for Corrupt Practices, therefore, the need to fulfill the condition of a recommendation from an Election Petition Tribunal before charging and prosecution did not arise. Section 61 (3) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 has provided for the powers and jurisdiction of the State High Courts and the FCT High Court to hear and determine matters relating to fraud, bribery and corruption, it provides thus:
61(3) “The Chief Judge of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall, by order under his hand, designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud or other related offences arising under this Act, or any other Laws prohibiting fraud, bribery or corruption, a Court or judge so designated shall not, while being so designated, hear or determine any other cases provided that all cases of fraud, bribery, or corruption pending in any Court before the coming into effect of this Act shall continue to be heard and determined by that Court.”
See KOMOLAFE vs. FRN (2018) LPELR – 44496 (SC) PP. 4 – 9, PARAS. F – B, AWETO vs. FRN (2018) (SUPRA); FRN vs. NWATALARI (2017) LPELR – 43782 (CA) and AMSHI vs. FRN (2019) LPELR – 48392 (CA).

The Appellant was rightly charged under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. See BELLO vs. FRN (2019) LPELR – 48398 (CA).
In addition, Sections 7 (1) and (2), and 19 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004 (EFCC Act) conferred jurisdiction on the trial Court. The above Sections provide thus:
7(1) “The commission has power to
(a) Cause investigations to be conducted as to whether any person, corporate body or organization has committed an offence under this Act or other Law relating to economic and financial crimes
(b) . . . .
(2) In addition to the powers conferred on the commission by this Act, the commission shall be the coordinating agency for the enforcement of the provisions of –
. . . . . .
(f) any other Law or regulation relating to economic and financial crimes, including the criminal code and penal code.”
19 (1) “The Federal High Court or High Court of a State or the Federal Capital Territory has the jurisdiction to try offenders under this Act.
(2) . . . .
(3) The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court or a High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, as the case may be, shall by order under his hand, designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases under this Act or other related offences arising under this Act.”
See UGO – NGADI vs. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43903 (SC) PP. 10 – 16, PARAS. C-A and AGBOGU vs. FRN (2015) LPELR – 40696 (CA) PP. 8 – 16, PARAS. A – C. No doubt the trial Court by the clear provisions of the EFCC Act, had jurisdiction to have entertained the matter that gave rise to this appeal. By the combined effect of Sections 61 (3) of the ICPC Act, 2000, 124 (1), 138 (1)(b), 149 and 150 (1) and (2) of the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), 7 (1)(2) and 19 of the EFCC Act as rightly submitted by the learned counsel to the 1st Respondent, the lower Court had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the charges for which the Appellant was tried and convicted, the EFCC having also rightly initiated the proceedings.
The learned counsel to the Appellant cited and relied on the case of FRN vs. SOLOMON (SUPRA) in challenging the jurisdiction of the lower Court. The above case is not applicable to the present case but distinguishable in that the Delta State Local Government Law of 2004, Cap D27, Laws of Delta State had made a Law under which their Local Government Council election could be questioned. In Solomon’s case, it was alleged that no election took place in the challenged election. Sections 107 – 128 conferred special powers on the Magistrate’s Court to try the Local Government Electoral Offences in that State, therefore the High Court lacked the jurisdictional to try the offences under Sections 107 – 128 of the Law, these are criminal allegations arising from the conduct of the Local Government Election in question. See NJO vs. YUSSUF (2005) 20 WRN 1 at 86. In Solomon’s case, exclusive jurisdiction was given to the Magistrate’s Court in the Delta State Electoral Law, there is no such provision in the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended) rather, Section 150 of the Act conferred jurisdiction on the High Court to try such offences. As rightly argued by the learned counsel to the 1st Respondent, the offences were committed by the Appellant as a public servant, the fact that it was committed during or after the election does not preclude the EFCC and the ICPC to exercise its powers of investigation and prosecution of bribery and corruption allegation.
The learned counsel to the Appellant had argued that the Appellant was tried and convicted under a repealed Law, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 instead of the extant Law, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003, for this reason we were urged to set aside the entire process. By the decision of the Apex Court in NWANKWOALA vs. FRN (2018) LPELR (SUPRA) cited and relied upon by the learned counsel to the 1st Respondent, the Court per his lordship Rhodes – Vivour, JSC held thus:
“The Law in force is the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 and not Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2003. See FRN vs. WABARA (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1347) P. 331; AG ONDO vs. AG FEDERATION & 35 ORS (2002) 9 NWLR (PT. 772) P. 222; EGHAREVBA vs. FRN (2016) SC (PT. iii) P. 166.”
Therefore, I cannot fault the decision of the lower Court at page 500 of the printed records of appeal, that it had jurisdiction to have heard and determined the matter at the lower Court. I affirm same as I agree with the view of the trial Court. I resolve issue one against the appellant.

On the second issue, the learned counsel to the Appellant re-argued the point on the inapplicability of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 which I have resolved under issue one.

Section 26 (1) (c) and (d) of the ICPC, Act, 2003 provides thus:
26 (1) Any person who –
(c) abets or is engaged in criminal conspiracy to commit any offence under this Act;
(d) commits any offence under this Act; shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to the punishment provided for such offence.

The learned counsel to the Appellant had argued that in respect of the offence of conspiracy to corrupt public officers, there was no evidence that the Appellant was in a meeting with anyone or one of those that opened the Fidelity Bank account through which the money was paid. The offence of conspiracy is often hatched in utmost secrecy. It occurs where two or more people agree to carry out the act, the plot is an act itself, and taken as the act of each of the parties, an act capable of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for the use of criminal means/purpose. In ODUNEYE vs. THE STATE (2001) 1 SC (PART 1) 1 at 6-7 on proof of criminal conspiracy his lordship Achike, JSC held that:
“A conviction for conspiracy is not without its inherent difficulties . . . . a successful conviction for conspiracy is one of those offences predicated on circumstantial evidence which is “evidence not of the fact in issue but of other facts from which the fact in issue can be inferred . . . . Evidence in this connection must be of such quality that irresistibly compels the Court to make an inference as to the guilt of the accused.”
See PATRICK NJOVENS vs. THE STATE (1973) 5 SC 17; DABOH & ANOR vs. THE STATE (1977) 5 SC 22; KAZA vs. THE STATE (2008) 1–2 SC 151 at 164 – 165, ONYENYE vs. THE STATE (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 643) 1810, SHURUMO vs. STATE (2010) LPELR – 3069 (SC) PP. 32 – 34, PARA. A, YAKUBU vs. STATE (2014) LPELR – 22401 (SC) PP. 13 – 144, PARAS. C-A, SA’ADU vs. STATE (2018) LPELR – 44709 (CA) PP. 26 – 28, PARAS. B-F, PHILIP vs. STATE (2019) LPELR – 47388 (SC) P. 38, PARAS. B-F and OGU vs. C.O.P (2017) LPELR – 43832 (SC) at 34 – 36, PARAS. F-B. The evidence relied upon must be of such quality that it irresistibly compels the Court to make an inference as to the guilt of the accused. I will examine the evidence of the Appellant as the DW1. The Appellant testified that he was a civil servant with INEC as Assistant Chief Accountant, but operated as Electoral Officer, Yola South and also State Training Officer and that he accompanied the 2nd Respondent (Sahabo Iya Hamman) to Fidelity Bank where he presented his identity card (voters card) (Exhibit ‘C1’) and in company of the 2nd Respondent the sum of N362,000,000.00 (Three Hundred and Sixty Two Million Naira) was paid to him, which he loaded into his vehicle, the vehicle of the 2nd Respondent and that of one Abdulrahman Hamman (the Assistant Electoral Officer, Yola North (PW10), the money was kept at the Appellant’s house at Jambutu from where it was distributed by himself, the 2nd Respondent (DW2) and the PW10, he also collected his share of the money at about 2.00 a.m following the date of collection. I will reproduce part of the evidence of the Appellant as the DW1, at pages 475 – 478 of the printed records of appeal, it went thus:
“On that 28/3/2015, I was in the office where I met the 2nd accused in the office of the Head of Operations, later I left them and went back to my office. The 2nd accused later called me that he is coming to meet me where he did come on 27/3/2015 a day before the election. 2nd accused told me that he was directed from the State office of INEC to meet me. 2nd accused told me that he was in Yola to make payment in respect of logistics allowances to all ad-hoc. 2nd accused told me that the money is at Fidelity Bank, Yola. He ask (sic) me to go with him to the bank as directed by the State office.
. . . .

I then decided to follow the 2nd accused to bank and we met the Bank Manager. The 2nd accused told the Manager that we are at the bank to collect INEC money.
. . . .
I was asked to give my I.D card and the Yola Assistant Electoral Officer also gave his own. At the end it was my voters card that was photocopied and used for the payment. We were taken to the back of the bank premises where we me (sic) the bullion van. The van was opened and we saw cash stashed in the van. It was counted by the bank staff where he told us that the money was N362,000,000.00. The 2nd accused was given a document to sign which he signed and I was also asked to sign. Part of the money was loaded into the vehicle of the 2nd accused, the Assistant Electoral Officer, Yola South. PW10 brought his vehicle and the money was loaded, the remaining money was loaded into my car. We moved the money to my house because INEC office was full of activities. We then left the three cars containing the money in my house and left leaving the 2nd accused behind, myself and PW10 locked our cars and left with our keys.
In the evening, I returned to my house and met the 2nd accused still in my house.
. . . .
I then asked 2nd accused to take his money and go, I removed the money from my vehicle and put it on the ground, the 2nd accused then begged me to keep the money for him so that when he return (sic) he will collect them. I agreed and kept the money at my gate room. The 2nd accused locked the room and left with the keys. 2nd accused and PW10 left with their vehicles and I also closed my gate and left.
. . .
We then left to INEC office, Yola North and met the Electoral Officer Yola North where we collect (sic) the money from the vehicle of PW10. Payments were done to all persons concerned. I was given Three Million, Three hundred and Fifty thousand Naira. I went to my local ward and effect (sic) the payment.”
Under Cross-examination, the Appellant concluded thus:
“It is true part of N362,000,000.00 was deposited into my vehicle. The money was from INEC.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>

. . . . . .
Exhibit C1 page 4 has my signature. The voters card is Exhibit C1 belongs to me. I gave it to the bank for (sic) purpose of collecting money.”

From the above, the Appellant in his evidence as the DW1 gave details of how he and the 2nd Respondent came about the money, safe keeping at his house, the purpose of it and the distribution. The Appellant also gave the amount he got in the distribution. All that is required in the offence of conspiracy is the meeting of the minds of the accused persons, who have a common intention/goal or purpose to commit a particular offence. The learned counsel to the Appellant erroneously argued that there was no evidence that the Appellant met with anyone in respect of the money, the evidence of the DW1 as to how he came about the money, his meeting with the 2nd Respondent and one Abdulrahman Hamman, the Bank Manager, the withdrawal and the distribution was not doubtful but, straight to the point. All that is required to be proved for the offence of conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by an illegal means. The evidence of the Appellant is direct, even though the evidence to prove conspiracy could be inferred. The Appellant and the 2nd Respondent acted towards the execution of a common goal. See NJOVENS vs. STATE (1973) LPELR –2042 (SC) P. 57, PARAS. A-G, MUONWEM & ORS vs. QUEEN (1963) LPELR – 25406 (SC) PP. 4 – 6, PARAS. E-A and AWOSIKA vs. STATE (2018) (SUPRA).

The evidence of the 2nd Respondent a retired civil servant from INEC as a Director, who testified as the DW2 tallied with the evidence of the Appellant, at pages 478 – 482 of the printed records of appeal. I will reproduce part of the evidence of the DW2:
“I met Bunu at INEC Headquarters. He told me that the meeting was at a place (sic) Akwa Ibom House. At the meeting, we were told that we are to monitor the election. They told us that money will be sent to us to pay some election personnel.
. . . .
I was directed to the 1st accused person as Head of Forum of Electoral Officers. I met the 1st accused in his office at Yola South. I told him my mission, that I was sent from Abuja office to come and do election observation and that money will be sent for disbursement. Later I got a call from Abuja that I should go to Fidelity Bank. I returned to 1st accused office where I told him to accompany me to the bank as directed. Myself, the 1st accused and PW10 went to the bank to collect the money.
At the bank, the bank official after taking photocopies of ID of 1st accused and PW10, we were shown the money to collect. The money was N362,000,000.00. We offload (sic) the money into our three vehicles i.e my vehicle, PW10 vehicle and 1st accused vehicle. As the INEC office was heavily guarded by military men, then 1st accused suggested we take the money to his house, where the 1st accused and the PW10 left leaving (sic) behind.
. . . .
At this point, 1st accused off loaded the money from his vehicle into a store in his compound. PW10 followed 1st accused to the office leaving all vehicles behind later 1st accused and PW10 returned, where myself and PW10 took the two vehicles with the money inside to INEC office.
. . . . . .

It was the money that was with PW10 that we shared it out to INEC staff and not the one left in the store of 1st accused.
. . .
Myself and PW10 went to the house of the 1st accused where we opened the store and found N27,000,000.00, where I handed the money to PW10, from there I left. Few days later Bunu came from Abuja to Yola where he told them i.e PW10 gave me N5,000,000.00 out of the N27,000,000.00. I collected the money and left. The N362,000,000.00 was sent to me.”
Further, under cross-examination, the DW2 testified thus:
“On 27/3/2015, I was at Fidelity Bank to cash the money. It is true myself, 1st accused and PW10 gave our ID’s at the bank before collecting the money. The three of us took the money amounting to N362,000,000.00 cash and left for 1st accused house. It is true that we shared the remaining money to Electoral and Assistant Electoral Officers. The money N362,000,000.00 was sent to me, but through my account. I have document to show that INEC employed me to be election monitor for the 2015 election after I retired.” There is no doubt that the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent had executed a common unlawful goal/purpose and as rightly argued on behalf of the 1st Respondent by their express or implied instruction are deemed to have conspired as long as their action or agreement was for an unlawful purpose. It is conclusive that there was a conspiracy between the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent to corruptly give and receive monetary benefits on account of their duties. The Appellant and the 2nd Respondent had a common intention to carry out an unlawful purpose in course of which they committed an offence, the Appellant is deemed to have committed the offence. The offence of conspiracy was proved against the Appellant. At page 512 of the printed records of appeal, the learned trial Judge in his judgment held thus:
“All the INEC staff that testified admitted collecting various sums of money from the 1st and 2nd Defendants as logistics only to later discover that the money was obtained by fraudulent means of which they had to pay back. The 1st and 2nd Defendants in their evidence admitted that the money they gave INEC staff including the ad-hoc staff were all from the said N362,000,000.00 that they cashed from Fidelity Bank Yola. Therefore from the evidence of prosecution witnesses and even the admissions made by 1st and 2nd defendants in their testimonies before this Court including exhibits admitted. It is very well established that 1st and 2nd Defendants agreed to execute a crime hatched by 3rd Defendants in Lagos.
. . . .
It is my view that all the essential ingredients of the offence in count one preferred against the 1st and 2nd Defendants have been proved as required by Law.”

I cannot fault the above view of the trial Court, it is well founded. The offence of conspiracy to corrupt public officers contrary to and punishable under Section 26 (1) (c) and (d) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 was proved against the Appellant at the trial Court and the Court was right to have convicted the Appellant accordingly.

The second arm of the Appellant’s issue two is corruptly procuring monetary benefit contrary to and punishable under Section 9 (1)(a) and (b) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. Section 9 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act provides as follows:
9 (1) Any person who corruptly –
(a) “gives, confers or procures any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a public officer or to, on or for any other person; or
(b) Promises or offers to give, confer, procure or attempt to procure any property or benefit of any kind to, on or for a public officer or any other person, on account of any such act, omission, favour or disfavour to be done or shown by the public officer, is guilty of an offence of official corruption and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven (7) years.”

From the admission and evidence of the Appellant as the DW1 and the 2nd Respondent as the DW2, both agreed that they were the recipients of the sum of N362,000,000.00 which they shared amongst INEC staff and themselves. The Appellant admitted taking N3,350,000.00 (Three Million, Three Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira) while the 2nd Respondent received N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira). In addition, Exhibit ‘F’, the written statement of the Appellant is clear, explicit and detailed as to the source of the money collected, the collection, the storage and disbursement, the amount paid to various INEC officers/officials (Collation Officers, Supervisory Presiding Officer, his former Administrative Secretary (Dominic Sambo), himself and the 2nd Respondent. Similarly, in Exhibit ‘G’, the 2nd Respondent gave details of how he and the Appellant collected and distributed the money. Exhibit ‘C’ letters from the bank to EFCC also confirmed the payments made to the Appellant in company of the 2nd Respondent and the mode of identification of the Appellant with his voters card tendered through the PW2 (Shaba Mohammed) a staff of the bank, at pages 433 – 435 of the printed records of appeal. The PW3 (Salihu Umar) a civil servant with INEC confirmed receipt of N150,000.00 (One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Naira), five other heads of departments received the same amount each he later returned his, at page 436 of the printed records of appeal. Similarly, the PW4 (Buhari Ardo) a lecturer at MAUTECH an ad-hoc staff who worked as a Supervisory Presiding Officer received the sum of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) from the Appellant which he later returned, at pages 436 – 438 of the records of appeal. The PW5 Daniel Okorie, banker, highlighted the source of the money and instruction given to the bank as to various payments from the various accounts, this was neither countered nor challenged by the Appellant, at pages 438 – 439 of the printed records of appeal. The evidence of the PW6 (Ibrahim Aliyu) also a banker with Fidelity Bank PLC was along the same line as the PW5 as to instructions on the disbursement of the funds to specific persons and the bank’s mode of receipt confirming payments with the personal details of the beneficiaries, at pages 440 – 441 of the printed records of appeal. The PW8 (Luka Jauro) also a lecturer at MAUTECH, an ad-hoc INEC staff for the 2015 election, a collation officer testified that he was given the sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) after the election by the Appellant, page 445 of the printed records of appeal. The PW9 (Salihu Mohammed Umar) a lecturer with Federal College of Education (FCE) Yola was also an ad-hoc staff who worked in Yola South LGA, at Namtari Ward as a Supervisory Presiding Officer testified that the Appellant met up with him in a motor park where he gave him the sum of N100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) which he later refunded on invitation by the EFCC, pages 445 – 446 of the printed records. PW10 (Abdulrahman Hamman) gave clear evidence that he accompanied the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent to withdraw the sum of N362,000,000.00 (Three Hundred and Sixty Two Million Naira) which was paid to various electoral officers including himself. The PW10 at pages 447 – 451 of the printed records gave details of the withdrawal and distribution of the money, the role the Appellant, himself, the 2nd Respondent and others played in the disbursement as well as the mode of disbursement. The evidence of the PW10 as to how he and the Appellant with the DW2 withdrew the money and distributed same tallied with the evidence of the Appellant as the DW1. The evidence was not countered by the Appellant in anyway. In the evidence of the PW10, each of the 21 Local Government Council was allocated N500,000.00, the three Electoral Officers in each Local Government got N150,000.00 each. Six Heads of Department in the Yola INEC office received N150,000.00 each, Supervisors got N100,000.00 each, Collation Officers got N100,000.00 each, one Tarajo received that of his office, while the Appellant took that of his office, other Electoral Officers and Assistant Electoral Officers also received money from the Appellant and the PW10 himself distributed part of the money from his car. The PW10 was given the balance of the money, he received N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira), while the 2nd Respondent received N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira). The PW11 and PW12 testified along the same line and gave details of how each of them was given money for themselves and other Electoral Officers. All the pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses at the trial Court was not dislodged by the Appellant. The learned counsel to the Appellant was wrong to have argued that there was no evidence that the Appellant corruptly procured monetary benefit contrary to and punishable under Section 9 (1) (a) and (b) of the ICPC Act 2000. I hold that it was established at the trial Court, the learned trial Judge in his judgment at page 213 of the printed records rightly held thus:
“From evidence of prosecution witnesses and the admissions made by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in their separate statement made to EFCC which are Exhibit “F” and “G”, it has been proved that the 1st and 2nd Defendants corruptly collected this N362,000,000.00 for themselves and others to get monetary benefit and actually they and other INEC staff received the said monetary benefits.”

The above view cannot be faulted, therefore the appellant’s contention of lack of evidence cannot stand as rightly submitted by the learned counsel to the Appellant. The evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial is overwhelming. The contents of Exhibit “F” (the Appellant’s statement) and the testimony of the DW1 alone were enough for the Appellant to have been convicted and sentenced and rightly so. There was no objection to the tendering of Exhibit “F” and it was not discredited. See ADENEYE OLUWAROTIMI vs. THE STATE (2020) LPELR – 50277 (CA) at P. 35, PARAS. C-D where his Lordship Bada, JCA held that:
“It is trite that confession is an admission made by an accused person stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime. See – SECTIONS 28 AND 29 (1) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 2011. An accused person can be convicted on his confessional statement alone where same is direct, positive and proved.”

The evidence adduced by the Appellant at the trial was direct, positive and proved by the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses and the DW1.

The learned counsel to the Appellant had argued that the money belonged to INEC, donated by a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and that the money was meant for logistics from INEC, for their officials and ad – hoc staff. If the payments were made at the INEC office it would have been a different thing, (Appellant was an Accountant and a staff of INEC). The beneficiaries were paid through different means and at different locations. The PW9 was paid at a motor park, while the PW10 who disbursed part of the money received his share from the booth of a car. Further, when the money was collected, it was not kept at the INEC office which was well guarded but, the huge amount of money was kept at a security house of the Appellant’s house, some in his car, the PW10’s car and the DW2’s car from where the money was being disbursement. The DW2 also testified that the money was not kept at the INEC office because it was heavily guarded by military men, the more reason why the money should have been kept at the INEC office which was a better storage. The Appellant also testified that he did not keep the money at the INEC office because it was full of activities. The Appellant knew the money did not belong to INEC from an NGO with which to pay the Electoral Officers and the ad-hoc staff. The argument of the learned counsel to the Appellant holds no water, I am not swayed by it.

On the third and last arm of issue two, receiving monetary benefit contrary to and punishable under Section 10 (a), (i) and (ii) of the ICPC Act, 2000:}
10. “Any person who –
(a) asks for, receives or obtains property or benefits of any kind for himself or any other person; or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person; on account of –
i. anything already done or omitted to be done, or any favour or disfavour already shown to any person, by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any matter connected with the functions, affairs or business of a Government department, public body or other organization or institution in which the public officer is serving as such; or
ii. anything to be afterwards done or omitted, or any favour or disfavour to be afterwards shown to any person, by a public officer in the discharge of his official duties or in relation to any such matter as aforesaid, is guilty of an offence of official corruption and shall on conviction be liable to for seven years.”
The ingredients required to be proved under the third arm of the second issue are:
(a) The offender must be a public officer.
(b) That he asked for benefit of any kind for himself or for any other person in respect of something to be afterwards done.
(c) That he asked for benefit in the course of discharge of his official duties.

In the present appeal, it has been clearly shown that the offender was a public servant, who received money for himself and other public and/or civil servants for them to influence the 2015 electoral process, money which he had disbursed and taken his share while serving as an Electoral Officer, Yola South and working as an Assistant Chief Accountant with INEC. See FRN vs. ADEMOLA (2021) LPELR – 52831 (CA) and NWANKWOALA vs. FRN (2018) (SUPRA). The learned trial judge, at page 514 of the printed records of appeal concluded as follows:
“It is therefore my view that the essential ingredients of offences contain (sic) in count two and three have all been proved by the prosecution.”

I am at one with the above decision. The third arm of issue two is resolved against the Appellant.

As a whole, issue two is resolved against the Appellant. In the final analysis, I hold that the appeal fails for being unmeritorious, it is hereby dismissed. I affirm the decision of the trial Court in respect of the Appellant, his conviction and sentence.

BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I agree.

JAMILU YAMMAMA TUKUR, J.C.A.: My learned brother CHIDI NWAOMA UWA JCA afforded me the opportunity of reading before today the draft of the judgment just delivered.

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein and join my learned brother in dismissing the Appeal for being unmeritorious.