OBIRIOLEMGBE & ORS v. NWAMOBI & ORS
(2020)LCN/15316(CA)
In The Court Of Appeal
(AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION)
On Thursday, June 11, 2020
CA/AW/28/2013
Before Our Lordships:
Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme Justice of the Court of Appeal
Rita Nosakhare Pemu Justice of the Court of Appeal
Bitrus Gyarazama Sanga Justice of the Court of Appeal
Between
1. MR. KENNETH OKIWE OBIRIOLEMGBE 2. DR. LEONARD NSOANYA 3. MR. BERNARD UGWUMADU APPELANT(S)
And
1. CHIEF LIVINUS NWAMOBI 2. CHIEF R. B. OGWOH RESPONDENTS 3. HON. FRIDAY UMUNNA 4. AMORKA DEVELOPMENT UNION (For Themselves And On Behalf Of AMORKA Council Of Chiefs) 5. EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN, IHIALA L.G.A 6. THE A.G. ANAMBRA STATE 7. THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNOR, ANAMBRA STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO SERVE A PARTY WITH COURT PROCESSES IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Pertinent to note that the Appellants were all along not served with processes indicating an intention that the 1st set of Respondents are seeking a transfer of the Suit. This contravenes the provisions of Order 37 Rule 2(3) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2006.
That provision mandatorily requires that certification and endorsement of a copy of the processes be served on the adverse party.
Failure to avail the Appellants of these processes were an infringement of his Constitutional Right to fair hearing, CRAIG Vs KANSSEN (1943) K. B. 256, SKENCONSULT NIG LTD & ANOR Vs UKEY (1981) LPELR – 3072 SC. These decided authorities state that the issue of service and indeed proper service is fundamental. OKOYE & ANOR V CENTREPOINT. MERCHANT BANK LTD (2008) LPELR – 2505 SC.
It is the service of a process that grants the Court the competence to entertain and determine a case. Non service strips the Court of jurisdiction and where it does without the service of the notice on the opposing party, the entire proceedings including the Courts’ decision shall ex debito justitiae on application of the disadvantaged party be set aside. PER PEMU, J.C.A.
THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE OF JUDICIAL PROCESSES
The concept of abuse of judicial processes is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. It’s one common feature is the improper use of the judicial processes by a party to litigation to interfere in the due administration of justice.
But the employment of judicial process is only regarded generally as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, and the efficient and effective administration of justice. This will arise in instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues SARAKI & ORS V KOTOYE (1992) LPELR – 3016 S.C.
Thus the multiplicity of actions on the same matter, between the same parties, even where there exists a right to bring the action, is regarded as an abuse. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right per se.
The abuse consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary, and interfere with the administration of justice: such as instituting different action between the same parties, simultaneously in different Courts, even though on different grounds. PER PEMU, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXPRESSION OF A JUDGE MUST BE TAKEN WITH REFERENCE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE HE IS DECIDING
The expression of a Judge in a judgment must be taken with reference to the facts of the case which he is deciding, the issues calling for decision and the answers to those issues. These are what should be looked for in any judgement – U.T.C (Nig) LTD Vs PAMOTEI (1989) NWLR (Pt 103) 244 @ 293. Therefore, the reading of a judgement portrays whether the judge who conducted the trial had a full grip of the facts in a matter. It must be a full grip and not opinion based on conjecture, or personal opinions and feelings which falls short of the facts before the Court. PER PEMU, J.C.A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISCRETION OF THE COURT MUST BE GUIDED BY LAW
Discretion, when applied to a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not be humour. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.
Discretion means equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances, or a liberty, or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is fair and equitable under the peculiar case, provided by the principles of law ONOVO & ORS V MBA & ORS (2014) LPELR – 23035 S.C.
In the instant case, the Court below had exercised its discretion in transferring the matter which has been struck out by a Court of coordinate jurisdiction about 10 months back. This was erroneous, and the Appellate Court is duty bound to disrespect that exercise of discretion in the interest of justice. The exercise of discretion must be not only judiciously but judicially carried out. Where a trial Judge exercises its discretion wrongly, then that exercise of discretion is fettered, and an Appellate Court can set aside such wrongful exercise of discretion. ECHAKA CATTLE RANCH LTD Vs. NIGERIA AGRIC & CORPORATIVE BANK LTD (1998) LPELR – 998 SC. PER PEMU, J.C.A.
RITA NOSAKHARE PEMU, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the Ruling of the High Court of Anambra State, holden at Ihiala in Suit No. HIH/11/2001, delivered on the 15th of June, 2010, in which he relisted the said Suit HIH/11/2001 which was struck out on the 19th day of July 2007.
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
The facts as put forth by the Appellant are as follows:
That the 1st set of Respondents sued the Appellants and the 2nd and 3rd Respondents vide writ of Summons, challenging the nomination of the 1st Appellant as the Traditional Ruler of Anambra in Ihiala Local Government Area of Anambra State.
After pleadings were filed and exchanged, the 1st set of Respondents became tardy and as a result the suit was struck out four consecutive times. Before the fourth striking out, the 1st set of Respondents stated that they had applied to the Hon. Chief Judge of Anambra State, for the transfer of the case. The application was not served on the Appellants.
Another application was purportedly made in 2008.
The suit was transferred to the Nnewi Judicial Division from the Ihiala Judicial Division and assigned to another Judge in 2008, notwithstanding that there was no longer any suit, as same had been struck out.
The 1st set of Respondents have now brought an application to relist the suit while he did not give reasons for the delay in not giving any reasons.
The Appellants are dissatisfied with the decision of the Court below and have appealed it.
The 1st-3rd Appellants (the Appellants on record) filed the initial Notice and Grounds of Appeal on the 28th of June 2010 (pages 102-106 of the Record of Appeal).
The Notice and Grounds of Appeal was however amended, having been filed on the 29th of September 2016, with four (4) Grounds of Appeal, by order of Court made on the 26th of September 2016.
The Appellants’ amended brief of argument was filed on the 8th of March 2016. It was settled by Chief (Dr.) E.E. Egbunonu.
The 1st-4th Respondents filed their brief of argument on the 5th of June 2017. It is settled by Ikem Nwanegbo Esq.
The 5th-7th Respondents filed no brief of argument.
On the 23rd March, 2020 the parties adopted their respective briefs of argument.
The Appellant distilled three issues for determination from the Grounds of Appeal. They are:
1. WHETHER AT THE TIME OF TRANSFER OF SUIT NO HIH/11/2001 THE SUIT WAS VALIDLY PENDING IN COURT.
2. WHETHER THE 1ST SET OF RESPONDENT ADVANCED SUFFICIENT AND SUBSTANTIAL REASON FOR THE DELAY IN BRINGING THEIR APPLICATION FOR RELISTING OF SUIT NO HIH/11/2001.
3. WHETHER APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER WAS NOT IN BREACH OF ORDER 30 RULE 4 AND 10 OF THE ANAMBRA STATE HIGH COURT (CIVIL PROCEDURE) RULES 2006 AND THUS INCOMPETENT.
The 1st-4th Respondents proffered four (4) issues for determination in their brief of argument. They are:
1. WHETHER THERE IS A COMPETENT APPEAL.
2. WHETHER THE ORDER OF COURT STRIKING OUT THE SUIT NO HIH/11/2001 WAS VALIDLY MADE DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER.
3. WHETHER THE ORDER RELISTING THE ABOVE SUIT WAS VALIDLY MADE.
4. WHETHER THIS APPEAL DOES NOT AMOUNT TO AN ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF COURT.
The Appellants filed a Reply brief in answer to the 1st – 4th Respondents brief of argument on the 8th of March 2016, but same was deemed filed on the 5th of April 2017.
It seems to me that the issues raised in the respective briefs of argument coalesce as they stand on a similar plank. The gravamen of the matter being whether a matter which had been struck out, can subsequently be transferred and entertained by a Court of coordinate jurisdiction.
I shall consider this appeal, based on the Appellants’ issues for determination.
Let me quickly restate the Rules as it affects the intention of a Respondent relying on a Preliminary objection to the hearing of an Appeal.
By virtue of the provisions of Order 10 Rule 1 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2016, it says viz:
“A Respondent intending to rely upon a Preliminary Objection to the hearing of the appeal shall give the Appellant three clear days’ notice thereof before the hearing, setting out the grounds of objection and shall file such notice together with twenty copies thereof with the Registry within the same time”.
Argument of Preliminary Objection can still be incorporated in a Respondent’s brief.
In the case at hand, there was no notice of Preliminary Objection filed by the 1st – 4th Respondents, neither was any Preliminary Objection incorporated in their brief of argument. But curiously the 1st – 4th Respondents attempted to encapsulate whatever Preliminary Objection they had into their issues for determination. This is unacceptable and such cannot be entertained. I hereby in the circumstances discountenance the purported Preliminary Objection put forth by the 1st – 4th Respondents, as same is incompetent.
ISSUE NO. 1
The Appellants submit that the trial judge who had struck out the Suit for want of diligent prosecution was no longer in control of the Suit as at the time of the transfer of the Suit to Nnewi Judicial Division.
That on the 19th of July 2007 the Ihiala trial Court struck out the Suit of the 1st set of Defendants for the fourth time for want of diligent prosecution.
That on the 20th of July 2007 the 1st set of Respondents wrote directly to the Chief Judge of Anambra State complaining about the striking out of the first. The letter/petition was not copied to the Appellants – Page 52 of the Record of Appeal.
An affidavit of Service and hearing notice was served on the 1st set of Respondents on the 16th of July 2007 – Pages 20 and 25 of the Record of Appeal. That the Chief Judge of Anambra State had previously informed the 1st set of Respondents’ application for transfer of the Suit – Refer to page 60 of the Record of Appeal.
That on the 29th of June 2007, the 1st set of Respondents filed another application for transfer – Pages 62 – 63 of the Record of Appeal. Another similar application was filed on the 27th of June 2007 – Pages 58-59 of the Record of Appeal. Another letter for transfer emanated for the Respondents on the 7th May 2008. That all these processes were never served on the Appellants, thereby robbing the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain it. It also amounted to the infringement of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing.
They submit that the last two applications i.e. of 29th June 2007 and 9th May 2008 constituted abuse of Court process and touched on the jurisdiction of the Chief Judge to act on them because the transfer order was issued without jurisdiction hereby amounting to a nullity – UWAGBA V FRN 2009 5 KLR (Pt 267) Page 1437@1451.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO. 1
The Provisions of Order 30(4) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules
Rules are instructive. It has this to say,
30 (4) “Where a cause is struck out under Rule 1 of this order either party may apply that the cause be replaced on the cause list on such terms as the judge may deem fit.
2. Any judgment obtained where any party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the judge upon such terms as he may deem fit.
3. Any application to re-list a cause struck out or set aside a judgment shall be made within 6 days after the order or judgment or such other larger period as the judge may allow.”
The Suit, the subject matter of this appeal was struck out on the 31st of July 2003; 14th November 2005, 30th of October 2006 and 19th of July 2007.
It was transferred from the Ihiala High Court to Nnewi High Court on the 17th of July 2008 almost a year after it was struck out on the 19th of July 2007 by the Court at Ihiala. Before the striking out of the Suit on the 19th of July 2007, affidavit of service and hearing notice (from record) were served on the 1st set of Respondents on the 16th of July 2007. Pages 20-25 of the Record of Appeal.
Pertinent to note that the Appellants were all along not served with processes indicating an intention that the 1st set of Respondents are seeking a transfer of the Suit. This contravenes the provisions of Order 37 Rule 2(3) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2006.
That provision mandatorily requires that certification and endorsement of a copy of the processes be served on the adverse party.
Failure to avail the Appellants of these processes were an infringement of his Constitutional Right to fair hearing, CRAIG Vs KANSSEN (1943) K. B. 256, SKENCONSULT NIG LTD & ANOR Vs UKEY (1981) LPELR – 3072 SC. These decided authorities state that the issue of service and indeed proper service is fundamental. OKOYE & ANOR V CENTREPOINT. MERCHANT BANK LTD (2008) LPELR – 2505 SC.
It is the service of a process that grants the Court the competence to entertain and determine a case. Non service strips the Court of jurisdiction and where it does without the service of the notice on the opposing party, the entire proceedings including the Courts’ decision shall ex debito justitiae on application of the disadvantaged party be set aside.
From records, another application for transfer was filed by the 1st set of Respondents dated 29th June 2007 – Pages 62-63 of the Record of Appeal, while there was an existing similar application filed on the 27th of June 2007 – Pages 58-59 of the Record of Appeal.
There was another application for transfer dated the 7th of May 2008, (ten months after the Suit was struck out.) This application was not filed neither was it served on the Appellants.
Learned Counsel submits that the last two applications of 29th June 2007 and 7th May 2008 constituted abuse of Court process.
The concept of abuse of judicial processes is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. It’s one common feature is the improper use of the judicial processes by a party to litigation to interfere in the due administration of justice.
But the employment of judicial process is only regarded generally as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent, and the efficient and effective administration of justice. This will arise in instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter, against the same opponent, on the same issues SARAKI & ORS V KOTOYE (1992) LPELR – 3016 S.C.
Thus the multiplicity of actions on the same matter, between the same parties, even where there exists a right to bring the action, is regarded as an abuse. The abuse lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right per se.
The abuse consists in the intention, purpose and aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary, and interfere with the administration of justice: such as instituting different action between the same parties, simultaneously in different Courts, even though on different grounds.
In the instant case, the incessant application brought by the 1st – 4th Respondent which again were struck out constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.
More so, that the Chief Judge had no jurisdiction to transfer, as his issuing the transfer order was without jurisdiction.
In UWAGBA Vs. FRN (2009) 5 KLR. (Pt 267) Page 1439 @ 1457, the Apex Court made a pointed pronouncement thus:
“Where an Order is made by a Court without jurisdiction that Order is a nullity AB INITIO.”
I am in total agreement with this. The 1st set of Respondents (Plaintiffs at the Court below) vide Writ of Summons sued the Appellants for declaratory Reliefs and injunction – Pages 2-3 of the Record of Appeal.
The Suit having been struck out severally, the 1st set of Respondents brought a motion on notice to relist Suit No HIH/11/2001.
Order 37 7(1) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) 2006 has this to say;
“An application for transfer under Rules 1, 2 and 4 operates from the date thereof as a stay of proceeding in the High Court or the Magistrates Court where the suit was pending and renders any proceeding after such date and such Court null and void”.
I shall relate this provision to the case at hand.
The Suit, the subject matter of the appeal was struck out severally because of lack of diligent prosecution by the plaintiffs. This is on record. More so, no good reasons were proffered for the delay in prosecuting their matter.
The matter had been handled by the Court at Ihiala where the suit which the application for transfer was predicated upon was struck out of the 19th of July 2007. Therefore, the matter was no longer pending.
What was the Court in Nnewi expected to do? To turn water into wine? The first set of Respondents should have continued his mischief by applying to relist the case. Thereafter they would apply that the matter be transferred to another Court. They cannot apply for a transfer of a non-existence suit. You cannot put something on nothing both will collapse.
The transfer made was in violation of the provisions of Order 37 Rule 2(3) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) 2006, requiring the Appellant to be served to enable them react.
There was no subsisting application for relisting when the Order of transfer was made. A Court cannot upturn the decision of another Court of coordinate jurisdiction. All that the 1st set of Respondents should have done was to appeal the decision.
It is on record that the reason for the number of time the matter was struck out was due to lack of diligent prosecution by the 1st set of Respondents.
When the Court below stated that the pendency of any application for transfer operates as a stay of proceedings, it was in error and misconceived. The transfer sought was almost a year after the matter was last struck out. There was no application for transfer pending.
In fact, the Court below observed that the applicant did not satisfactorily explain their delay since 19/7/2007 till 30/5/2008, a period of about of ten months. Page 97 of the Record of Appeal.
Decidedly, where a party to a suit has been accorded a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and in the manner prescribed under the law, and for no satisfactory explanation he fails or neglects to attend the sitting of the Court, the party cannot thereafter be heard to complain of lack of fair hearing. KADUNA TEXTILES LTD V. UMAR (1994) 1 NWLR 143 @148 ratio 13. In answer to the first issue for determination, it is my view that as at the time of transfer of suit No. HIH/11/2009, the suit the subject matter of this appeal was no longer in existence.
ISSUE NO. 2
The Appellant submit that the provision of Order 30 Rule 4(3) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) 2006 provide in effect that before a cause struck out could be relisted, the applicant must come within six (6) days or such other time the Court may allow. He must give substantial reason explaining why he did not come within the time allowed by the Rules- WILLIAMS V. HOPE RISING VOLUNTARY SOCIETY (1982)1 All NLR (Pt 2) Page 1
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO. 2
At page 97 of the Record of Appeal, the finding of the Court can be gleaned with regard to this issue. The Court observed thus:
“… the 1st set of Respondent did not satisfactorily explain their delay since 19/7/2007 till 30/5/2008”.
The Court continued thus:
“…Nevertheless, I have taken into consideration the various controversies surrounding this case, especially the various complaints and the petitions made by the Plaintiffs to the Honourable Chief Judge against the Presiding Judge. I have particularly taken into consideration the fact that this suit involves the entire Amorka community, and the need that the dispute be resolved as passionately as possible rather than giving one party an apparent technical victory. I shall therefore allow this application on the above grounds…”
With respect, the reasons proffered by the Court below, after agreeing that the applicant proffered n reasonable explanation for the delay since 19/7/2007 till 30/5/2008 (a period of about ten months,) in applying for transfer after the striking out of the suits, are far from reasonable and leaves much to be desired.
The matter was hitherto struck out on the 19th of July 2007 in the absence of the parties, although in the 1st Respondents affidavit in support of their application, they deposed in Paragraph 6 of the supporting affidavit to the application to relist filed on the 30th of May 2008, that no hearing notice was served on them to enable them appear in Court â Pages 23-24 of the Record of Appeal.
The answer to issue No 2 is in the negative and same is hereby resolved in favour of the Appellant and against the 1st set of Respondents.
ISSUE NO 3
The Appellant submits that the trial Court which was in control of the Suit as at the time of transfer severally struck out the suit for want of diligent prosecution. From record, the 1st set of Respondents (as Plaintiffs in the Court below) showed so much tardiness in the prosecution of their care that the matter was severally struck out. On the 15th of August 2007, the matter was struck out, as they were not in Court. Page 34 of the Court of Appeal.
On the 14th March 2005, the matter was struck out for lack of diligent prosecution. Page 36 of the Record of Appeal.
Again on the 30th of October 2006, the matter was struck out for same reasons – Page 38 of the Record of Appeal.
The Appellants submit that in a situation where parties are not served with processes, the provisions of Order 37 Rule 7(1) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2006 cannot apply. That Order 37 Rule 7(1) can only apply if the applicant complied with the provisions of Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution. That the application for relisting should have been made available to the trial Court, by forwarding a copy to the Registry of the Court and also by serving the adverse party a copy of the application.
That the application of 7th May 2008 was not filed at the Registry of the Ihiala High Court, or any other Court in Anambra State for that matter – Page 74 of the Record of Appeal. – Refers to Order 37 Rule 1(3) and 2(3) and Order 37 Rule (4) which requires the Registrar to transmit the application from the Registry of the lower Court to the Chief Judge.
That the application was devoid of payment of filing fees. That it should not have been considered at all by the Court. That the fact that the 1st set of Respondents filed in the Registry for the Registrar to transmit to the Chief Judge was wrong, and contravened the provisions of Order 45 Rule 15(1) and Order 37 Rule 1(3) and (4) of the Anambra State High Court (Civil procedure) Rules 2006.
Submits that the Chief Judge failed to act on the application of 27th of June 2007 and that of 29th of June 2007 (filed) but on that of 7th May 2008 which was not filed.
That all these constitute gross abuse of Courts process as they were all pending at the same time over the same issue.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO 3
It is apparent that the application of the 7th of May 2008, upon which the Chief Judge acted was not before the Chief Judge when the trial Court struck out the matter on 19/7/2007.
The 1st set of Respondents had immediately after the striking out of the suit on 19th July 2007; and who wrote a petition against the striking out on 20th July 2007, waited from the 19th of July 2007 to 20th May 2008 (a period of about 10 months) before bringing the application for relisting.
The Appellants were not served with the motion for relisting until 22nd October 2008; about six months of the filing of the motion, and after the Chief Judge had purportedly granted the application for transfer.
I find that the non-service of the application for transfer, coupled with that of motion for relisting was an infringement of the Appellants constitutional right to fair hearing under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution.
Failure to serve process is fatal to the suit -WIMPEY LTD V. BALOGUN (1986)2 NWLR (Pt 28) Page 324 OKE V. AIYEDUN (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt 23) 548 @ 558. The expression of a Judge in a judgment must be taken with reference to the facts of the case which he is deciding, the issues calling for decision and the answers to those issues. These are what should be looked for in any judgement – U.T.C (Nig) LTD Vs PAMOTEI (1989) NWLR (Pt 103) 244 @ 293. Therefore, the reading of a judgement portrays whether the judge who conducted the trial had a full grip of the facts in a matter. It must be a full grip and not opinion based on conjecture, or personal opinions and feelings which falls short of the facts before the Court.
Discretion, when applied to a Court of justice means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule not be humour. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.
Discretion means equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances, or a liberty, or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is fair and equitable under the peculiar case, provided by the principles of law ONOVO & ORS V MBA & ORS (2014) LPELR – 23035 S.C.
In the instant case, the Court below had exercised its discretion in transferring the matter which has been struck out by a Court of coordinate jurisdiction about 10 months back. This was erroneous, and the Appellate Court is duty bound to disrespect that exercise of discretion in the interest of justice. The exercise of discretion must be not only judiciously but judicially carried out. Where a trial Judge exercises its discretion wrongly, then that exercise of discretion is fettered, and an Appellate Court can set aside such wrongful exercise of discretion.
ECHAKA CATTLE RANCH LTD Vs. NIGERIA AGRIC & CORPORATIVE BANK LTD (1998) LPELR – 998 SC.
One of the issues raised by the 1st – 4th Respondent is whether this appeal is competent. This was not one of the Grounds of Appeal set out by the Appellant. It is a new issue and such cannot be introduced without leave of Court. More so, it was incumbent on the 1st – 4th Respondents to cross- appeal in the circumstances, and this they did not do.
This issue is resolved in favour of the Appellants and against the 1st set of Respondents.
The Appeal succeeds and same is hereby allowed.
The Ruling of the High Court of Justice Ihiala delivered on the 15th of June 2010, is hereby set aside as being null and void.
No order as to costs.
CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I had the honour of reading in advance the judgment pronounced by my Learned Brother, R. N PEMU, JCA, with which I agree and adopt as mine.
I endorse the conclusion in the lead judgment that the Ruling of the High Court of Justice Ihiala delivered on the 15th of June, 2010, be set aside as being null and void. I abide by the order as to costs in the lead judgment.
BITRUS GYARAZAMA SANGA, J.C.A.: I am privileged to have read a draft of the judgment Just delivered by my brother PEMU, J.C.A.
I agree with and adopt the finding and decision in the lead judgment that this appeal is meritorious and is hereby allowed. The ruling by the lower Court delivered on 15th June, 2010 is set aside by me. I also abide by the order as to cost.
Appearances:
Chief (Dr.) E.E. Egbunonu FCIDA (GHANA), with him, I.C. Nsofor Esq. and G.O. Oraekie Esq. For Appellant(s)
I.T. Nwanegbo Esq. For Respondent(s)
