MARAFA v. CHAWAI & ANOR (2020)

MARAFA v. CHAWAI & ANOR

(2020)LCN/13996(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Monday, March 23, 2020

CA/A/46/2019

Before Our Lordships:

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Court of Appeal

Emmanuel Akomaye Agim Justice of the Court of Appeal

Mohammed Baba Idris Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

HASSAN AHMED MARAFA APPELANT(S)

And

1. W/C PL JAMILA CHAWAI 2. MINISTER OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY

In resolving this issue It is Important for me to reproduce Section 8 of the Land Use Act and Section 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act for ease of references. Section 8 of the Land Use Act provide thus;
“Statutory right of occupancy granted under the provisions of Section 5 (1) (a) of this Act shall be for a definite term and may be granted subject to the terms of any contract which may be made by the Governor and the holder not being inconsistent with the provisions of this Act”.
While, Section 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act states that;
“Every state Grant executed after the commencement of this Act, and every instrument affecting land subject to the state Grant or whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian executed after the commencement of this Act shall, so far as it affects land, be void unless the same is registered within six months from the date (or, in the case of an instrument whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian, from the date on which it receives the minister’s consent) if executed in Nigeria, or twelve months from its date (or in the case on an instrument whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian, from the date on which it receives the minister’s consent) if executed elsewhere.”
A “State Grant” is also defined in Section 2 of the Land Registration Act as follows;
“Include a certificate of occupancy under the land Use Act; and a mining lease, mining right, water right or exclusive prospecting licence granted under the Forestry Act; and every other grant conveyance, lease or mortgage by or on behalf of the Government. (Underline mine for emphasis). PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT A DOCUMENT OF TITLE AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLES A PARTY TO OWNERSHIP OF A LAND
A document of title does not automatically entitle a party armed with it, to ownership of a land, a party’s production and reliance on such document/instrument, inevitably, carries with it the necessity for the Court to inquire into some number of questions viz:
i. Whether the document is genuine and valid;
ii. Whether It has been duly executed, stamped and registered;
iii. Whether the grant had the authority and capacity to make the grant;
iv. Whether the grantor had in fact what he purported to grant; and
v. Whether it has the effect claimed by its holder.
See the case of ROMAINE VS. ROMAINE (1992) 4 NWLR PT. 238 PG 650. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

MEANING OF THE TERM “LOCUS STANDI”

The phrase ‘locus standi’ in general parlance means a recognized position or standing. In law, it means a place of standing in Court or right to appear in Court. Locus standi or standing to sue is defined as the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a Court of law or Tribunal. The term entails the legal capacity of instituting, initiating or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. In other words, locus standi is the right of appearance in a Court of justice or before a legislative body on a given question. See the cases of;
DADA VS. OGUNSANYA (1992) 3 NWLR (PT 232) 754,
UNITED BANK OF AFRICA PLC VS. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 904) 180,
ADETONO VS. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC (2011) 18 NWLR (PT 1279) 627,
CHARLES VS. GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE (2013) 2 NWLR (PT 1338) 294.
The doctrine of locus standi was developed to protect the Court from being used as a playground by professional litigants and busybodies who have no real stake or interest in the subject matter of the litigation they wish to pursue. See the cases of;
AMAH VS. NWANKWO (2007) 12 NWLR (PT 1049) 552,
TAIWO VS. ADEGBORO (2011) 11 NWLR (PT 1259) 562. PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

FACTORS TO ESTABLISH LOCUS STANDI

The Courts have stated that a party seeking to establish locus standi must show (a) a legal or justifiable right; (b) sufficient or special interest adversely affected; and (c) a justifiable cause of action. See the cases of;
ATTORNEY GENERAL KADUNA STATE VS. HASSAN (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 8) 483,
ADEKUNLE VS. ADELUGBA (2011) 16 NWLR (PT 1272) 154,
CHARLES VS. GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE (2013) 2 NWLR (PT 1338) 294.
In other words, for a person to have locus standi, he must show that his civil rights and obligations have been or are In danger of being infringed and that he has sufficient legal interest in seeking redress in a Court of Law. In other words, there must be a nexus between the party and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations, See the cases of;
SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA VS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 358,
IMADE VS. MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EDO STATE (2001) 6 NWLR (PT 709) 478.
And a person is said to have interest in a thing when he has rights, advantages, duties, liabilities, losses or the like, connected with the thing, whether present or future, ascertained or potential provided that the connection, and in the case of potential rights and duties, the possibility, is not too remote. IMADE VS MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EDO STATE (SUPRA). PER ABOKI, J.C.A.

ABDU ABOKI, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the Judgment of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja (herein after referred to as the trial Court) delivered on 16th day of November, 2018 by C.N. Oji J.

The Appellant and the 2nd Respondent were the 1st and 2nd Defendants at the trial Court, while the 1st Respondent was the Plaintiff.

By an amended statement of claim dated the 17th day of February, 2017 and filed on 20/2/2017 the 1st Respondent as the Plaintiff at the trial Court claimed against the Defendants the reliefs as contained in pages 162-163 of the record of appeal.

The Plaintiff/1st Respondent also filed her reply to the 1st Defendant’s statement of defence and counter claim on 21/11/2017.

The trial Court in its Judgment grants all the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff/1st Respondent.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial Court the Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 21st November, 2018. The said notice of appeal contained six grounds of appeal as can be found on pages 303 – 312 of the record of appeal.

Briefs of arguments were in accordance with the

relevant rules of this Court duly filed and exchanged. When the appeal comes up for hearing on 28-01-2020 the parties adopted and relied on their respective briefs of argument.

The Appellants brief of argument dated 25th day of January, 2019 was filed on the same date, it was settled by F. R. Onoja Esq., while the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument dated 28th March, 2019 and filed on the same date, it was settled by O. C. Nwakor Esq. The Appellant’s counsel also filed a reply brief to the 1st Respondents brief of argument on 5/04/2019.

Two issues were distilled by the Appellant from the six grounds of Appeal as follows:
1. Whether the learned trial judge was not in error to have granted a declaration of title, injunction and damages for trespass in favour of the 1st Respondent by relying on a mere and unregistered letter of allocation of land which did not contain the definite terms and duration of the alleged grant? (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 of the Notice of Appeal).
2. Whether the writ of summons and a statement of claim are the only documents that a Court must look at in determining locus standi in the course

of a litigation fought on pleadings and evidence led thereon? (Distilled from Ground 5 of the Notice of Appeal).

The 1st Respondent’s counsel on its part also distilled two issues for determination In this appeal as follows;
1. Whether the Plaintiff proved her case on the preponderance of evidence/balance of probabilities entitling her to the judgment of the Court.
2. Whether the Plaintiff has the locus standi to sue.

The 2nd Respondent on its part did not file any brief of argument in this appeal.

The issues as distilled by the parties are similar; therefore, the two issues distilled by the Appellant are adopted in the determination of this appeal.

ISSUE ONE
Whether the learned trial Judge was not in error to have granted a declaration of title, injunction and damages for trespass in favor of the 1st Respondent by relying on a mere and unregistered letter of allocation of land which did not Contain the definite terms and duration of the alleged grant? (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4 & 6 of the Notice of Appeal).

Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Supreme Court In the case of ROMAINE VS.

ROMAINE (1992) 4 NWLR PT. 238 PG 650 has laid down the requirements that a document tendered in evidence must meet in order for a party seeking a declaration to succeed, and that exhibit P2 did not satisfy the requirements for the following reasons;
a. The notice of placement did not specifically allocate the land to the 1st Respondent.
b. The document did not contain the terms and duration of the grant.
c. The document is not registered pursuant to the provisions of Section 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act, Cap 515 Laws of the Federation applicable to FCT.
He referred the Court also to the case of AREMU VS. CHUKWU (2012) 3 NWLR PT. 1288 PG 587.

He argued that any document conveying an allocation of statutory right of occupancy must contain the terms and duration of the grant, and that a document that does not contain such terms of the grant is a worthless document. He referred the Court to Section 8 of the Land Use Act.

He submitted that it is the duty of the 1st Respondent to plead and tender evidence of the definite term grant and this was not shown on exhibit P2 or any other evidence before the trial Court. He added that

the only way the 1st Respondent can established the definite term of grant is by the production of the original documents pertaining to the last allocation (quoting directly from exhibit P2) which he failed to do.

He contended that in the absence of the evidence of the original document of grant/allocation, it is not lawful to rely on exhibit P2 to vest title in the 1st Respondent. The trial Court was therefore, in error to have ignored this argument. He urged the Court to correct the error by holding that exhibit P2 is not a document capable of vesting a statutory right of occupancy on the 1st Respondent.

Learned counsel added that the case of BENJAMIN & 2 ORS. VS. KALIO & ANOR (2017) 12 SC PT. 10 PG 67 did not obliterate the requirement that a document of title must be registered, while he conceded that the decision has now made it possible to plead and tender unregistered land documents in evidence, that decision did not consider the effect of failure to register the land instruments referred to as “state grants”.

He submitted further that even if the trial Court consider Exhibit P2 as a statutory right of occupancy, it falls

within the documents defined as state grants by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act, (Supra). He referred the Court to the cases of;
CORPORATE IDEAL INSUARANCE LTD VS. AJAOKUTA STEEL CO. LTD (2014) 7 NWLR PT. 1405 PG 165.
DANTATA VS. MOHAMMED (2012) 8 NWLR PT. 1302 PG 366.
He urged the Court to resolve this issue an favour of the Appellant.

The 1st Respondent’s counsel on their part submitted that the 1st Respondent proved her case at the trial Court on the balance of probabilities with evidence satisfactory to the Court by the production of exhibit P2 upon which the trial Court made a declaration in her favour.

On the Appellant’s argument that exhibit P2 did not satisfy the requirements In ROMAINE VS. ROMAINE SUPRA, learned counsel argued that exhibit P2 is made by the minister of FCT who under the law is the only authority competent to allocate land in FCT, and having issued same, it is a conclusive proof that all the requirements in ROMAINE’S CASE has been m. He referred the Court to the cases of;
MADU VS. MADU (2008) 2-3 SC PT. 11 109 AT 138.
CONSOLIDATED RESOURCES LTD VS. ABOFAR

VENTURES NIG. LTD (2007) 6 NWLR PT. 1030 AT 231.

He contended that it is erroneous for the Appellants to contend that exhibit P2 did not allocate the land to the 1st Respondent.

On the argument that exhibit P2 does not contain the terms and duration of the grant, it is submitted that under the Land use Act, acquisition of land is usually In two stages by virtue of Section 5(1) (a) and Section 9 of the Land Use Act.

He maintained that it is obviously dear from the two sections above that it is the certificate of occupancy issued by the minister and not exhibit P2 that contains the terms and conditions of the grant, and the certificate of occupancy by its nature is a deed and an instrument that is registrable by virtue of Section 14 of the Land Registration Act. He referred the Court to Sections 4 & 5 of the FCT Land Use Regulation.

It is submitted that exhibit P2 is right of occupancy allocation recognized as a precursor to issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and there is no express provision in law of its form/format. He referred the Court to the case of DABO VS. ABDULLAHI (2005) 7 NWLR PT. 923 AT 213.

He added that by exhibit

P2 issued to the 1st Respondent by the FCT Minister, the 1st Respondent acquire equitable interest over the plot in dispute which he can protect.

Learned counsel contended that the purpose of land registration Act is to protect third parties from fraud and the element of surprise likely to arise from non-registration. He referred the Court to the cases of;
OKOYE VS. DUMEZ NIG. LTD (1985) 6 SC 1 AT 35-36.
AMANKARA VS. LATEY ZAETEY (1963) 1 ALL NLR 310.
SAVANNAH BANK VS. AJILO (1986) 1 SC PT. 11 AT 117-118.

He added that if the issue of voidness of exhibit P2 for non-registration was an important issue to the Appellant, the Appellant he would have pleaded it, but it was not pleaded by either parties at the trial Court, it was raised by the Appellant in the final address of counsel. He referred the Court to the case ofLEWIS PEAT LTD VS. AKHIMIEN (1976) 7 SC 157.

He submitted assuming exhibit P2 is caught by the provision of Section 14(1) of the Land Registration Act, and the Appellant made the issue of voidness an issue in his pleading the 1st Respondent would have pleaded she was covered under Section 14 (2) of the Land

Registration Act.

He maintained that the Appellant did not object to its admissibility at the trial, hence, he cannot turn around now to complain against the use of the document by the trial Court. He referred the Court to the case of MOHAMMED VS. MUSTAPHA (1993) 5 NWLR PT. 292 AT 234.

He argued that where a purchaser with notice of the possession by a third party enters into contract with respect to land, he will not be entitled to rely on the want of registration by the third party. He referred the Court to the case of OKOYE VS. DUMEZ SUPRA.

He contended that the trial Court was correct in its holding on the issue of registration of exhibit P2.

The Appellant counsel in reply to the 1st Respondent’s brief of argument on this issue one agrees with the 1st Respondent that in an action for declaration of title, the Plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case alone. The Appellant’s counsel however disagree that the Plaintiff/1st Respondent can succeed in this case on the strength of Exhibit P2 which do not set out the terms, duration and conditions of the grant, having regard to the provisions of Section 8 of the Land

Use Act and the decisions of the Supreme Court.

He submitted that the 1st Respondent’s argument that there are two stages for acquisition of land under the land use Act is not correct. He referred the Court to Section 9 of the Land Use Act which according to the counsel shows the contrary.

With respect to the argument over non-registration of exhibit P2, it is submitted that the 1st Respondent misapprehend the Appellant’s argument on the issue. What the Appellant is contending is that exhibit P2 which according to the 1st Respondent qualities as a state grant, is void for want of registration within 6 months of the grant. That was the Appellant’s position. The Appellant according to the learned counsel did not suggest that the document is inadmissible.

He contended that the 1st Respondent conceded the point by failing to address it in her brief of argument.

of Section 5 (1) (a) of this Act shall be for a definite term and may be granted subject to the terms of any contract which may be made by the Governor and the holder not being inconsistent with the provisions of this Act”.
While, Section 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act states that;
“Every state Grant executed after the commencement of this Act, and every instrument affecting land subject to the state Grant or whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian executed after the commencement of this Act shall, so far as it affects land, be void unless the same is registered within six months from the date (or, in the case of an instrument whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian, from the date on which it receives the minister’s consent) if executed in Nigeria, or twelve months from its date (or in the case on an instrument whereby land is granted by a Nigerian to a non-Nigerian, from the date on which it receives the minister’s consent) if executed elsewhere.”
A “State Grant” is also defined in Section 2 of the Land Registration Act as follows;
“Include a certificate of

occupancy under the land Use Act; and a mining lease, mining right, water right or exclusive prospecting licence granted under the Forestry Act; and every other grant conveyance, lease or mortgage by or on behalf of the Government. (Underline mine for emphasis)
A document of title does not automatically entitle a party armed with it, to ownership of a land, a party’s production and reliance on such document/instrument, inevitably, carries with it the necessity for the Court to inquire into some number of questions viz:
i. Whether the document is genuine and valid;
ii. Whether It has been duly executed, stamped and registered;
iii. Whether the grant had the authority and capacity to make the grant;
iv. Whether the grantor had in fact what he purported to grant; and
v. Whether it has the effect claimed by its holder.
See the case of ROMAINE VS. ROMAINE (1992) 4 NWLR PT. 238 PG 650.
It is the argument of the Appellant that exhibit P2 did not satisfy the above requirements because of the following reasons;
a. The letter exhibit P2 did not specifically allocate the land to the 1st Respondent.
b. The document

did not contain the terms and duration of the grant.
c. The document is not registered pursuant to the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Land Registration Act Cap 515 Laws of the Federation applicable to FCT.
The 1st Respondent on her part contended that exhibit P2 is made by the Minister of FCT who under the law is the only authority competent to allocate land in FCT, and having issued same, it is a conclusive proof that all the requirements in ROMAINE’S CASE has been met.
The trial Court in its judgment founds that exhibit P2 is a means by which the 1st Respondent was granted Statutory Right of Occupancy to Plot 2833 Asokoro Extention TV District by the 2nd Respondent. It establish the allocation to the 1st Respondent of the plot of land in dispute, it is valid, genuine and does not require registration. See pages 267 (lines 16-18) & 275 (lines 18-21) of the record of appeal.
The said Exhibit P2 relied upon by the 1st Respondent reads thus;
“MINISTRY OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
P.M.B. 25, ABUJA, NIGERIA
Land Planning & Survey DEPARTMENT
3rd July, 2001
MFCT/L4/98/KD.2874/35
W/C pl. Jamila

Chawai,
C/o FCT Hon. Minister’s Residence, Abuja.
Re APPLICATION FOR STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY WITHIN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA.
Please refer to the above subject matter and the approval of the Hon. Minister of the Federal Capital Territory to allocate to you Plot No. 449 within Sabon Lugbe SW Ext. for which approval was conveyed to you by Right of Occupancy No. MFCT/LA/KD.2874 which was involved in a case of double allocation.
2. In its place, Plot No. 2833 within Asokoro IV Ext. District measuring approximately 1,800m2 is now reallocated to you in replacement.
3. You are requested to kindly return all original documents pertaining to the last allocation for our records.
SGD
Mallam M.S.U Kalgo
DIRECTOR LAND, PLANNING & SURVEY
For HON. MINISTER.”
It is my view that contrary to the 1st Respondent’s contention, the Appellant did not raise issue of the admissibility of exhibit P2 rather, they contended that exhibit P2 qualifies as a state Grant and it is void for want of registration within six months of the grant. Therefore, the case of MOHAMMED VS. MUSTAPHA (SUPRA) cited and relied

upon by the 1st Respondent is not applicable to this case.
A community reading of Sections 2 & 14 (1) of the Land Registration Act (Supra) shows that Exhibit P2 is a state Grant that requires registration, and having not registered within six months from the 3rd July, 2001, it is void.
The 1st Respondent who desires to rely on a registrable instrument to buttress title in land must show clearly, the particulars of registration of such title, this is because Section 15 of the Land Registration Act provides that if a registrable instrument is not duly registered, it shall not be pleaded or given in evidence. In this case the 1st respondent failed to do so. Therefore, the trial Court was wrong to have granted a declaration of title, injunction and damages for trespass in favour of the 1st Respondent by relying on the said Exhibit P2.

This issue is resolve in favour of the Appellant,

ISSUE TWO
Whether the writ of summons and a statement of claim are the only documents that a Court must look at in determining locus standi in the course of a litigation fought on pleadings and evidence led thereon? (Distilled from Ground 5 of the Notice

of Appeal).

Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the trial Court was in error to have reached the finding at page 258 of the record of appeal, that that the evidence of PW2 that the Plaintiff sold her plot to PW1 for N2,000,000.00 was not pleaded by the Plaintiff or even the 1st Defendant who relies on it, therefore goes to no issue, He referred the Court to paragraph 16 of the 1st Defendant statement of defence at page 92 of the record of appeal.

He added that the evidence in support of that pleading that the 1st Respondent lacked locus standi on the ground that she has divested herself on her interest in the land by sale was abundant on the printed record at appeal. He referred the Court to PW2 witness statement on oath paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 & PW2 evidence under cross examination on pages 73 and 218 of the record of appeal respectively.

He contended that the trial Court was wrong to have found that it is the statement of claim only that the Courts looks at in determining locus standi. He referred the Court to the cases of; ADETONO VS. ZENITH INT’L BANK PLC (2011) 18 NWLR PT. 1279 PG 413.
RUTHLINZ INT’L

INVEST. LTD VS. MRS. STELLA IHBUZOR (2016) 11 NWLR PT. 1524 PG 429.
E.T.E.C NIG. LTD VS. NEVICO INT’L LTD (2004) 3 NWLR PT. 860 AT 342.

With respect to the matters for declaration of title, learned counsel submitted that where it is shown that a Plaintiff has sold his land to another as in the Instant case, he will no longer be clothed with the requisite locus stanch to maintain the action. He referred the Court to the case FARAJOYE VS. HASSAN (2006) 16 NWLR PT. 1006 AT 499.

He added that where a Plaintiff lacks locus standi to institute an action, the Court is also robbed of the jurisdiction to entertain the matter. He referred the Court to the case of CBN VS. MR. JAMES EJEMBI OKEFE (2016) 4 NWLR PT. 1502 PG 345.

He urged the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellant.

Learned counsel for the 1st Respondent on their part contended that the totality of the averments in the Plaintiff’s statement of claim disclosed sufficient interest in the matter and dearly established the 1st Respondent’s locus standi to sue.

He argued that exhibit P1 (the power of attorney) was pleaded to show that the Plaintiff appointed one

Arthur Okafor as her attorney to manage and superintend the management of the laid including to warn of trespassers, proceed against them and maintained legal action thereof. Thus, exhibit P1 can only be used for that purpose by the Court. He referred the Court to the case of NGWU VS. NNAJI (1991) 5 NWLR PT. 189 AT 23.

He maintained that exhibit P1 was not tendered as an instrument of sale, neither was any other document. It was tendered to show the relationship between the Plaintiff and the PW1. Therefore, the Appellants contention that the 1st Respondent by selling the property cannot maintain this action is not true.

He further argued that assuming without conceding that the PW2 gave evidence of payment of N2milllon for the land, prepared the power of attorney which was signed by the Plaintiff and given to Arthur Okafor together with the original documents, exhibit P1 in law is not an instrument of transfer of title. He referred the Court to the case of EZEIGWE VS. AWUDU (2008) 11 NWLR PT. 1097 AT 176.

He contended that proof of sale/assignment of interest in land under the Land Use Act is not on oral evidence of witness, but by a document

evidencing sale. He referred the Court to Section 132 (1) of the Evidence Act and the case of OLALOYE VS. BALOGUN (1990) 7 SC AT 152.

He insisted that the only document that will prove the divesting of the Plaintiff’s interest can be by deed of assignment which was not tendered by the Appellant who asserted it.

In his reply brief on issue two, the Appellants counsel insisted that the law is now settled that locus standi can also be determined at the close of the case of the parties especially where the Defendant raises it as a point in defense of the claim.

He contended that the Appellant pleaded and proved by the evidence of the 1st Respondent that the land was sold and deed of assignment duly executed.

He urged the Court to dismiss the 1st Respondent’s claims on grounds of want of locus standi.

The phrase ‘locus standi’ in general parlance means a recognized position or standing. In law, it means a place of standing in Court or right to appear in Court. Locus standi or standing to sue is defined as the legal right of a party to an action to be heard in litigation before a Court of law or Tribunal. The term entails

the legal capacity of instituting, initiating or commencing an action in a competent Court of law or tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever. In other words, locus standi is the right of appearance in a Court of justice or before a legislative body on a given question. See the cases of;
DADA VS. OGUNSANYA (1992) 3 NWLR (PT 232) 754,
UNITED BANK OF AFRICA PLC VS. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2004) 18 NWLR (PT 904) 180,
ADETONO VS. ZENITH INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC (2011) 18 NWLR (PT 1279) 627,
CHARLES VS. GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE (2013) 2 NWLR (PT 1338) 294.
The doctrine of locus standi was developed to protect the Court from being used as a playground by professional litigants and busybodies who have no real stake or interest in the subject matter of the litigation they wish to pursue. See the cases of;
AMAH VS. NWANKWO (2007) 12 NWLR (PT 1049) 552,
TAIWO VS. ADEGBORO (2011) 11 NWLR (PT 1259) 562.
The Courts have stated that a party seeking to establish locus standi must show (a) a legal or justifiable right; (b) sufficient or special interest adversely affected; and (c) a

justifiable cause of action. See the cases of;
ATTORNEY GENERAL KADUNA STATE VS. HASSAN (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 8) 483,
ADEKUNLE VS. ADELUGBA (2011) 16 NWLR (PT 1272) 154,
CHARLES VS. GOVERNOR OF ONDO STATE (2013) 2 NWLR (PT 1338) 294.
In other words, for a person to have locus standi, he must show that his civil rights and obligations have been or are In danger of being infringed and that he has sufficient legal interest in seeking redress in a Court of Law. In other words, there must be a nexus between the party and the disclosed cause of action concerning his rights or obligations, See the cases of;
SENATOR ABRAHAM ADESANYA VS. THE PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1981) 2 NCLR 358,
IMADE VS. MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EDO STATE (2001) 6 NWLR (PT 709) 478.
And a person is said to have interest in a thing when he has rights, advantages, duties, liabilities, losses or the like, connected with the thing, whether present or future, ascertained or potential provided that the connection, and in the case of potential rights and duties, the possibility, is not too remote. IMADE VS MILITARY ADMINISTRATOR, EDO STATE (SUPRA).<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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In the instant case, the Appellant raised the contention that the Plaintiff lacked locus standi in paragraph 16 of the 1st Defendant amended statement of defence. See pages 88-93 of the record of appeal.

The trial Court In Its Judgment at page 258 of the record of appeal, found thus;
“In the present case, the evidence of PW2 that the Plaintiff sold her plot to PW1 for N2,000,000.00 was not pleaded by the Plaintiff or even by the 1st Defendant who relies on it. It is therefore goes to no issue.” (Underline mine for emphasis).

It has been settled by a long line of cases that in determining the locus standi of a party, a trial Court must have regard to, and only to, the originating processes by which the action was commenced or the claim was made by that party, that is the writ of summons and the statement of claim or counterclaim, in an action commenced by a writ of summons, or originating summons or originating motion and the affidavit in support. See the cases of;
GLOBAL TRANS OCEANICO SA VS. FREE ENTERPRISES NIGERIA LTD (2001) 5 NWLR (PT 706) 426,
JFS INVESTMENT LTD VS. BRAWAL LINE LTD (2010) 18 NWLR (PT 1225) 495,<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”>

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WILSON VS. OKEKE (2011) 3 NWLR (PT 1235) 456.
Where documents are pleaded in the statement of claim and are frontloaded as documents to be relied upon at trial or attached to an affidavit in support as exhibits, as part of the originating processes, then such documents might also be looked at, as suggested by the Supreme Court in JFS INVESTMENT LTD VS. BRAWAL LINE LTD SUPRA. A trial Court cannot go outside the originating processes in determining the issue of locus standi of a claimant. In the instant case, I have carefully perused the entire Plaintiffs (now 1st Respondent) originating processes filed before the trial Court, there is nowhere the 1st Respondent pleaded that she sold her plot to PW1 for N2,000,000.00 or asserted that she had the necessary standing. It was the 1st Defendant/Appellant that averred in his amended statement of defense that the Plaintiff sold the plot of land In dispute and divested herself of all interests and rights over the subject matter of the action and so cannot maintain the present action as constituted. See the 1st Defendant amended statement of defense at paragraph 16 on page 92 of the record of appeal.

Now can

it be sad that the 1st Defendant amended statement of defense is the originating processes by which this action was commenced or the claim was made by the Plaintiff’ I do not think so. Therefore, the cases of RUTHLINZ INT’L INVEST LTD VS. MRS STELLA IHEBUZOR SUPRA & E.T.E.C NIG. LTD VS. NEVICO INT’L LTD SUPRA cited by the Appellant are not on all fours with the instant case.

It is important to point out that in determining locus standi, the chances that the action may not succeed are completely irrelevant. See the cases of;
WILLIAMS VS. DAWODU (1988) 4 NWLR (PT 87) 189,
EJIWUNMI VS. COSTAIN (WA) PLC (1998) 12 NWLR (PT 576) 149.

In view of all the above, this Issue is resolve against the Appellant.

On the whole not withstanding I resolved issue two in favour of the 1st Respondent, having resolved issue one in this appeal in favour of the Appellant. This appeal is adjudged by me to meritorious and it is hereby allowed. The judgment of the trial Court delivered in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1682/2013 is hereby set aside.

There shall be no order as to costs.

MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, J.C.A.: I have had the benefit of reading in

draft the lead judgment of my learned brother, Abdu Aboki, JCA, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything useful to add. I abide by all the orders made therein.

EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the judgment delivered by my Learned brother Lord Justice Abdu Aboki, JCA, I agree with the decision on issue No. 2. With the greatest respect to his Lordship, I view the matter differently on issue No. 1.

The central questions in this case are the exact legal status of exhibit P2 and whether the trial Court was right to have made a declaration of title to the suit land in favour of the plaintiff and ordered injunction and damages for trespass on the basis of exhibit P2.
I have considered all the arguments in the respective briefs on issue No. 1 in the appellant’s brief which the above two questions:
The exact text of exhibit P2 reads thusly-
MINISTRY OF FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
P.M.B 25, ABUJA, NIGERIA
Land Planning & Survey Department
3rd July, 2001
MFCT/LA/98/KD.2874/35
W/Cpl. Jamila Chawai,
C/o FCT Hon. Minister’s Residence,

Abuja
RE: APPLICATION FOR STATUTORY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY WITHIN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY, ABUJA
Please refer to the above subject matter and the approval of the Hon. Minister of the Federal Capital Territory to allocate to you Plot No. 449 within Sabon Lugbe SW Ext. for which approval was conveyed to you by Right of Occupancy No. MFCT/LA/KD.2874 which was involved in a case of double allocation.”
The facts that such letters of allocation of plots of land in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja by the Minister of Federal Capital Territory do not usually state the duration and terms of the allocation, that such letters are usually written conveying the Minister’s approval of the allocation and followed subsequently with the Minister’s issuance of the statutory right of occupancy of the allocated plot containing the duration of the right of occupancy of the plot and the terms and conditions of the right of occupancy, that such letters of allocation are usually not registered, not being the final document of the title to the statutory right of occupancy of the plot, that it is the certificate of the statutory right of occupancy, the

final document of title that is usually registered, are common knowledge in this country and are not reasonably open to question and therefore do not require any proof by virtue of Section 124(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 which provides that-
“124(1) Proof shall not be required of a fact the knowledge of which is not reasonably open to question and which is-
(a) Common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held, or generally; or
(b) Capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned.”
The implication of the proposition of Learned Counsel for the appellant that because the letter of allocation is not registered and does not contain the terms and duration of the allocation, it is void and worthless, is that every letter of allocation of land in Federal Capital Territory by the Minister of Federal Capital Territory as part of the process for his issuance of the Certificate of the Statutory right of occupancy to a particular plot is void arid of no effect. This would inflict untold hardship and injustice on innocent applicants for allocation of plots of land in the

Federal Capital Territory who obviously have no control over the practices or policies of the management and allocation of such plots by the Federal Capital Territory Minister in the exercise of his powers in Sections 5 and 9 of the Land Use Act.
The argument of Learned Counsel for the appellant that exhibit P2 is not capable of vesting a statutory right of occupancy and that therefore the trial Court was wrong to have relied on it to declare title of the disputed plot to the 1st respondent disregards the exact legal nature or status of exhibit P2, a letter from the Minister of Federal Capital Territory approving the allocation of the plot of land therein to the 1st respondent. Such a letter commences the process of issuing a Certificate of the right of occupancy of the plot allocated therein to the allocatee and vests in the allocatee the legal right to be issued a certificate of his statutory right of occupancy to the plot allocated to him by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. Until the certificate of occupancy of the allocated plot is issued by the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, the letter of the Federal Capital Territory

Minister’s allocation of the plot vests an equitable right or title to the statutory right of occupancy that entitles the 1st respondent to the right of immediate possession and development of the plot and the legal right to be issued with the certificate of occupancy to the allocated plot by the Federal Capital Territory Minister. It is inequitable, unconscionable, and unjust to treat such a letter of allocation as vesting no rights on the allocatee of the land therein, after he has furnished the demanded consideration (price) for the land and paid all the prescribed fees demanded by the Federal Capital Territory Minister and on the basis of which the Minister issued the letter allocating him the plot of land.
It is glaring from the heading of exhibit P2 that what the 1st respondent applied for is the statutory right of occupancy for a plot. Exhibit P2 conveyed the grant of the application by the approval of the Minister to allocate to him Plot 449.
Another legal effect of the Minister’s allocation of the said plot to the 1st respondent as conveyed to him by exhibit P2 is that the same plot 449 cannot be validly allocated to any other

person. The allocation even before the certificate of occupancy is issued divests the Minister the power or right to subsequently allocate the same plot to another person, while the existing &location remains extant.
In view of the legal effect of the said allocation by the Minister, it would be wrong to treat the allocation as ineffectual until the certificate of the statutory right of occupancy of the allocated plot is issued.
It is noteworthy that the certificate of occupancy is merely evidence of the grant of the statutory right of occupancy, which grant or allocation took place immediately the Federal Capital Territory Minister approved the grant by exhibit P2 on 3-7-2001. Practically, the allocation or grant by the Minister pursuant to Section 5(1)(a) of the Land Use Act has to be made as a condition for the issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy as evidence of the grant and entitles the grantee to the right of occupancy of the allocated or granted land. Sections 5(1)(a), 9(1) of the Land Use Actstates thusly-
(1) It shall be lawful for the Governor in respect of land, whether or not In an urban area-
(a) To grant statutory rights

of occupancy to any person for all purposes
9(1) it shall be lawful for the Governor-
a. When granting a statutory right of occupancy to any person; or
b. When any person is in occupation of land under a Customary right of occupancy and applies in the prescribed manner or
c. When any person is entitled to a statutory right of occupancy, to Issue a certificate under his hand In evidence of such right of occupancy.”
There is no doubt that the letter of allocation or grant of the plot by the Minister in exhibit P2 is a state grant by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Land Registration Act. But the state grant required to be registered is defined in Section 2 of the Land Registration Act as follows:
“Include a Certificate of Occupancy under the Land Use Act, and a mining less, mining right, water right or exclusive prospecting licence granted under the Forestry Act, and every other grant, conveyance, lease or mortgage by or on behalf of the Government.” (Underline mine for emphasis)
This definition clearly excludes the letter of allocation or grant of plot of land by the Federal Capital Territory Minister. It is not a registrable state grant.

The title declared by the trial Court in favour of the 1st respondent, the allocatee of the plot in exhibit P2 is the equitable title or right to the statutory right of occupancy of the plot already granted or allocated him by the Minister by exhibit P2. The trial Court rightly granted the 1st respondent the declaration of title to the disputed plot, injunction and damages for trespass.

In the light of the foregoing, I resolve issue No. 1 in favour of the 1st respondent.
I agree with the decisions in the lead judgment on issue No. 2.
On the whole this appeal fails as it lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed.
The appellant shall pay costs of N400,000.00 to the 1st respondent.

Appearances:

F.R. Onoja, with him, A.O Otori, T.E lyoha- Osagie and T.A Akpor For Appellant(s)

Obi C. Nwakor – for the 1st Respondent

2nd & 3rd Respondents absent and unrepresented For Respondent(s)