JAFAR SANI BELLO v. ABBA K. YUSUF & ORS
(2019) LCN/4860(SC)
In The Supreme Court of Nigeria
On Friday, the 24th day of May, 2019
SC.363/2019
RATIO
DEFINITION OF THE PHRASE “CAUSE OF ACTION”
The phrase “cause of action” has been defined by this Court, see FRED EGBE V. HON. JUSTICE J. A. ADEFARASIN (1987) LPELR 1032 (SC), as the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action. It is the factual situation that gives an aggrieved person the right to judicial relief. Cause of action is constituted by the entire set of circumstances which give rise to an enforceable claim. See ALHAJI WADA KUSADA V. SOKOTO NATIVE AUTHORITY (1968) LPELR 25424. (SC) and CHIDI B. NWORIKA V. MRS ANN ONONEZE-MADU & ORS (2019) LPELR 46521 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
WHAT DETERMINES THE PLAINTIFF’S CAUSE OF ACTION
It is settled law that the totality of the plaintiff’s claim determines his cause of action. In the case at hand where appellant’s action is pursuant to an originating summons, his reliefs and the averments in his supporting affidavit delineates his cause of action. See AG FEDERATION V. AG ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR 24862 (SC) andOWURU & ANOR V. ADIGWU & ANOR (2017) LPELR 42763 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
WHEN DOES A CAUSE OF ACTION ARISE OR ENURE TO A PLAINTIFF
it is trite that a cause of action arises on the date or from the time the breach of duty occurs which warrants the person adversely affected by the breach or the injury therefrom to sue in a law Court to assert or protect his legal right that has been violated. Thus, a cause of action enures to the plaintiff the very moment a wrong is done to him by another which fatual situation entitles the former to seek relief in the law Court by way of enforcement. See AG ADAMAWA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2014) LPELR 23221 (SC) and ALHAJI HANAFI ZUBAIR V. ALHAJI ABDULLAHI ATANDA KOLAWOLE (2019) LPELR 46928 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
WHEN DOES TIME BEGINS TO RUN AGAINST A PLAINTIFF, FOR THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATION
This Court has also held in decisions too numerous to call that time begins to run against a plaintiff, for the purpose of limitation, from the date the cause of action accrues which, generally, is the date on which the incident or event giving rise to the cause of action occurs. See JOHN EBOIGBE V. NNPC (1994) LPELR 992 (SC) and ACTION CONGRESS OF NIGERIA & ANOR V. INEC (2013) LPELR 20300 (SC). PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 285 (9) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION AS TO WHETHER CAUSE OF ACTION BEGINS TO RUN AGAINST A PLAINTIFF FROM THE TIME HE BECOMES AWARE OF AN OPPOSITION’S NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A POLITICAL PARTY’S CONSTITUTION AND ELECTORAL GUIDELINES
I am unable to agree with learned counsel that appellant’s cause of action begins to run, by virtue of the limitation prescribed under Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered, from the time he becomes aware of 1st respondent’s non-compliance which, on the latter’s participation in the primary election, creates appellant’s right to sue. The clear and unambiguous section neither makes knowledge on the part of the appellant a pre-Condition to the filing of his action nor excludes the date his cause of action accrues in the determination of when time begins to run against him. By the section, appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance with 2nd respondent’s Constitution and Electoral Guidelines is immaterial. To hold that time begins to run against the appellant only on his becoming aware of 1st respondent’s non-compliance and further exclude the date appellant’s cause of action accrues, in determining when limitation begins to run against him, is to read into the section what it does not contain. No Court has the jurisdiction of doing so. See DANGANA & ANOR V. USMAN & ORS (2012) LPELR 25012 (SC) and GANA V. SDP & ORS (2019) LPELR 47153 (SC). By the section, the limitation period is 14 days and since neither knowledge nor the date of the accrual of the cause of action is made a precondition for the determination of the period, the lower Court in excluding appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance and taking into congnisance the date his cause of action arises in its computation of the limitation period is beyond reproach. In AJIBONA V. KOLAWOLE (1996) 10 NWLR (PT 476) 22 at 36 this Court per Ogwuegbu JSC held: “The Limitation Law and all laws of this description ought to receive beneficial construction. They should be construed liberally but not in such a way as to read into them words not intended by the law makers as the majority decision of the Court below portrayed. All limitation laws have for their object the prevention of the rearing up of claims that are stale. To contend that the defendant must prove plaintiff’s knowledge of such adverse possession for time to start to run, or the defendant’s presence on the land is to import a strange condition into the Limitation Law. See Sosan & Ors v. Ademuyiwa & Ors. (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 241 at 256.” Kutigi JSC (as he then was and now of blessed memory) in his contribution opined at page 37 of the report thus:- “I also agree that the defendant having lived in his house on the land in dispute for over twelve years before the suit was filed, the limitation period under the Limitation Law would in addition run in his favour whether or not the plaintiff was aware of such adverse possession by the defendant.” See alsoALHAJI A. W. ODEKILEKUN V. MRS. COMFORT O. HASSAN & ANOR (1997) 12 NWLR (PT 531) 56. PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C.
JUSTICES
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
EJEMBI EKO Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
JAFAR SANI BELLO Appellant(s)
AND
- ABBA K. YUSUF
2. PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY [PDP]
3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION [INEC] Respondent(s)
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Kaduna Division, hereinafter referred to as the lower Court, delivered on the 15th day of March 2019, affirming the judgment of the Kano State High Court, hereinafter referred to as the trial Court, dated on the 14th January 2019, adjudging suit No: K/458/2018 commenced by the appellant statute barred. The brief facts of the case that brought about the appeal are stated below.
On the 16th day of October 2018, the appellant as plaintiff filed an originating summons contesting the participation of the 1st respondent in the 2nd respondent’s 2018 Gubernatorial primary election in Kano State witnessed by the 3rd respondent. It is appellant’s case that the 1st respondent who did not comply with Section 8(8) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party and paragraph 23(a) and (b) of the Party’s Electoral Guidelines for primary elections in his bid to rejoin the party could not have lawfully participated in the party’s Kano State Gubernatorial primary election. The appellant inter-alia sought the trial
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Court’s declaration that, having come second in the primary election, he be declared the party’s duly elected candidate at the primary election, recognized and substituted as such by the 3rd respondent as 2nd respondent’s candidate in the forthcoming Governorship Election in Kano State.
Appellant’s originating summons is supported by an affidavit and a written address.
The 1st and 2nd respondents, in addition to their counter-affidavit filed in opposing the originating summons, raised a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial Court on the ground that the action is statute barred. The trial Court upheld the 1st and 2nd respondents’ preliminary objection and struck out appellant’s suit.
Dissatisfied, the appellant appealed to the lower Court which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial Court’s decision.
It is against the concurrent decisions of the two lower Courts that the appellant filed the instant appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal, counsel to the parties on identifying their respective briefs adopted and relied on same as their arguments for and against the appeal. In the appellant’s brief settled by Dr.
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Nasiru A. Aliyu, the following two issues have been formulated as arising for the determination of the appeal:-
“(1) Whether the learned justices of the lower Court were right in holding that 4th October 2018 was the day when the cause of action of the Appellant arose despite his clear depositions in paragraph 15, 15 (a), 15(c) and 15(d) of the 2nd affidavit in support of the originating summons in his judgment.
(2) Whether the learned trial justices of the lower Court were right in disregarding the Supreme (sic) cases on computation of time in pre-election matter, which held time runs from the day of the act which day is not excluded.”
At page 5 of the 1st and 2nd respondents’ brief, the two issues distilled as arising for the determination of the appeal read thus:-
(1) Whether the learned justices of the lower Court were right when the lower Court held that the suit was statute barred having been filed in excess of the 14 days provided by Section 285 (a) of the 4th alteration to the 1999 Constitution as amended (Grounds 1,2 & 5 of the Notice of Appeal).
(2) Whether the lower Court was right in holding that in the computation of
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time in election matters, time begins to run from the date of the occurrence of the event. (Grounds 3 and 4 of the Notice of Appeal).”
The 3rd respondent did not file any brief of argument in the appeal. It urged nothing on the Court.
Arguments in respect of the two issues distilled by the appellant are proffered jointly in his brief. Paragraph 15 of the affidavit in support of the appellant’s originating summons at pages 26 27 of the record of appeal, it is submitted, shows that the appellant only became aware of 1st respondent’s non-compliance with the provisions of Section 8 (8) and Section 23 (a) and (b) of their party’s Constitution and Electoral Guidelines respectively on the 4th October 2018 when he was informed by the Peoples Democratic Party’s Secretary of Diso ward, the 1st respondent’s ward, in Kano State. The appellant, it is argued, could only sue on becoming aware of this non-compliance by the 1st respondent. By the facts the appellant relies on as averred in paragraph 15 of the supporting affidavit to his originating summons, it is contended, the logical and rational conclusion pertaining the date appellant’s cause of action
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accrued is the 4th October 2018 which the lower Court in its judgment at pages 547 and 576 ignored. Not surprisingly, it is submitted, the Court, arising from this wrongful evaluation of the facts on record, ended up affirming the perverse decision of the trial Court on the point. It is this grave erroneous finding by the lower Court, as well, that the appellant’s cause of action accrued on the date the 1st respondent was returned nominated, it is further submitted, that the appellant seeks this Court to remedy. The facts which combination gave rise to the action, learned counsel emphasizes, became evident unmistakably on the 4th of October 2018 which remains the only date the facts became actionable. Learned counsel relies on RANSOME KUTI V. AG OF THE FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT 6) 211, HASSAN V. ALIYU & ORS (2010) LPELR 1357 (SC) and AJIBONA V. KOLAWOLE AND ANOR (1996) LPELR 299 (SC).
Further arguing the appeal, learned counsel contends that in reckoning when a cause of action arose, the day of the happening of the event that gave rise to the cause of action is excluded. The computation, learned counsel
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asserts, is therefore commenced with the next date after the event. In interpreting the provision of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution as altered, therefore, it is contended, the lower Court wrongly included the date on which the primary election took place. The Court, it is further contended, wrongly relies on the decisions in TUKUR IBRAHIM V. ISHAG UMAR & ORS (2013) LPELR 22805 (CA) and ADEOGUN V. FASHOGBON (2008) 17 NWLR (PT 1115) 149 at 181 which are not decisions on computation of time for the purpose of determining whether or not the cause of action in a pre election matter is statute barred. In the circumstance, learned appellant’s counsel concludes, the lower Court’s judgment that fails to ascribe to the clear and unambiguous words that make up Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution their literal meaning must accordingly be adjudged perverse and interfered with. Learned counsel relies on OBUSEZ & ANOR V. OBUSEZ & ANOR (2007) LPELR 2197 (SC) and urges the resolution of the two issues in appellant’s favour as well as allowing the appeal.
Responding, learned counsel contends that the 1st and 2nd reliefs
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sought by the appellant constitute his principal claim which challenges 1st respondent’s participation in the primaries of the 2nd respondent. Appellant’s case, it is submitted, is that since the 1st respondent is not a bonafide member of the P.D.P, the 2nd respondent, he is neither qualified to participate in the primary election nor is the 2nd respondent competent to return him as the winner of the said primary election. The crucial issue to determine, it is further submitted, is as to when the primary election took place. The appellant himself, it is argued, averred in paragraph 12 of the 2nd affidavit in support of his originating summons at page 26 of the record that the primary election the 1st respondent and the appellant participated in took place on the 2nd of October 2018. Since the appellant is complaining about 1st respondent’s improper participation in the party’s primary election, having not properly rejoined the party, a computation of time from the date of their participation in the primary election and the date he filed his action to seek redress as envisaged by Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution will reveal the status of appellant’s
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action. The trial Court and the lower Court at pages 463 and 568 respectively, learned respondents’ counsel submits, arrived at the unassailable conclusion that appellant’s action is statute-barred. By Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution, appellant’s suit, it is submitted, has become unenforceable. Appellant’s insistence that the 4th October 2018 he avers in paragraph 15 of his supporting affidavit be the date to reckon in computing whether his action is rendered unenforceable by the operation of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution as altered, it is contended, is not only indolent but renders the law uncertain. The lower Court’s finding at page 569 of the record that 4th October 2018 the date the appellant alleges he became aware that 1st respondent had not rejoined the 2nd respondent is incapable of constituting appellant’s right of action, it is submitted, sets the law straight. In any event, it is further argued, Ahmed Dalhat Sani the Peoples Democratic Party Secretary, the appellant contends informed him 1st respondent’s non-compliance with the statutory requirements in respect of persons rejoining the party, has in paragraph 10 of the further
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counter-affidavit he filed in opposition to appellant’s originating summons, disowned the disclosure ascribed to him.
Concluding, learned counsel submits that all the cases relied upon by the learned appellant’s counsel do not avail him since they are not on the Court’s interpretation of Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered or similar legislation.
Instead, the decision in GARBA V. ADUA (2011) 12 NWLR (PART 1263) 1 at 17 18 is the most apposite. There in, learned counsel submits, it is held that the very date on which the event that gives a claimant his right to sue occurred is included in the computation as to whether or not the action is statute barred. On the whole learned counsel urges that the issues be resolved against the appellant and the appeal dismissed.
My lords, it appears pertinent to ponder at this stage what questions the appeal raises. These include , inter-alia, what a cause of action is, how it is determined, when it arises and when does time begin to run against a plaintiff for the purpose of limitation
The phrase “cause of action” has been defined by this Court, see FRED EGBE V. HON. JUSTICE J. A. ADEFARASIN
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(1987) LPELR 1032 (SC), as the fact or facts which establish or give rise to a right of action. It is the factual situation that gives an aggrieved person the right to judicial relief. Cause of action is constituted by the entire set of circumstances which give rise to an enforceable claim. See ALHAJI WADA KUSADA V. SOKOTO NATIVE AUTHORITY (1968) LPELR 25424. (SC) and CHIDI B. NWORIKA V. MRS ANN ONONEZE-MADU & ORS (2019) LPELR 46521 (SC).
It is settled law that the totality of the plaintiff’s claim determines his cause of action. In the case at hand where appellant’s action is pursuant to an originating summons, his reliefs and the averments in his supporting affidavit delineates his cause of action. See AG FEDERATION V. AG ABIA STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR 24862 (SC) andOWURU & ANOR V. ADIGWU & ANOR (2017) LPELR 42763 (SC).
Again, it is trite that a cause of action arises on the date or from the time the breach of duty occurs which warrants the person adversely affected by the breach or the injury therefrom to sue in a law Court to assert or protect his legal right that has
10
been violated. Thus, a cause of action enures to the plaintiff the very moment a wrong is done to him by another which fatual situation entitles the former to seek relief in the law Court by way of enforcement. See AG ADAMAWA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2014) LPELR 23221 (SC) and ALHAJI HANAFI ZUBAIR V. ALHAJI ABDULLAHI ATANDA KOLAWOLE (2019) LPELR 46928 (SC).
This Court has also held in decisions too numerous to call that time begins to run against a plaintiff, for the purpose of limitation, from the date the cause of action accrues which, generally, is the date on which the incident or event giving rise to the cause of action occurs. See JOHN EBOIGBE V. NNPC (1994) LPELR 992 (SC) and ACTION CONGRESS OF NIGERIA & ANOR V. INEC (2013) LPELR 20300 (SC).
The issue distilled by an appellant supposedly circumscribes his complaint(s) by virtue of which his appeal succeeds or fails. Like pleadings, he should ordinarily be bound by these issues. Appellant’s two issues in this appeal question the lower Court’s decision as to when time began to run against him given the limitation prescribed under Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered.
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The justice of the instant matter dictates that appellant’s submissions which are manifestly outside the precinct of and contrary to his two issues be accommodated in our resolution of his two issues. Appellants inability to appreciate the relationship between his “cause of action” and his “right to sue” creates particular difficulty. At paragraph 2.8 of the appellant brief learned counsel surmises in part thus:-
“We therefore, submit that the factual situation that gave rise to this suit accrued and became actionable with an accrued cause with the reception of the information of the failure of the 1st Respondent to reapply to the 2nd Respondent in accordance with the Section 8(8) of the PDP Constitution. We submit that the right to sue is entirely different from a cause of action, therefore at the time of the nomination of the 1st respondent on the 2nd October 2018 the Appellant had acquired right to sue, but not cause of action as he had no issue with the conduct of the primary election. We submit that there is clear distinction between a cause of action and a right of action to enforce the cause of action
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or the right of judicial relief in the plaintiff. HASSAN V. ALIYU & ORS (2010) LPELR 1357 (SC). Therefore, with the coming into light, the concealment of the facts combination of fact which gave rise to this action then, the Appellant’s cause of action accrued on the 4th October 2018 not the 2nd October 2018 as held by both the trial and the lower Court.” (Underlining mine for emphasis).
Appellant’s position in the foregoing is preposterous It explains his failure to appreciate the futility inherent in the appeal! It must be stressed that it is his “cause of action” that creates his “right to sue” and that the two phrases are interchangeable. For the purpose of the limitation put in place by Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered, therefore, it is permissible to talk in terms of when time begins to run against appellant’s “cause of action” or his “right to sue”. If caught up by the prescribed limitation his “cause of action” completely dissipates in the same way his right to sue becomes unenforceable.
Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution (as amended) which provides for the limitation
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to appellant’s cause of action reads:-
“(9) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.”
In upholding the preliminary objection, the trial Court at pages 463 464 the record of appeal held thus:-
“It is apparent from reliefs 1 and 2 of the applicants originating summons that his main complaint is the participation of the 1st Defendant/Respondent in the conduct of the primary election of the 2nd Respondent which was held on the 1st and 2nd of October, 18 that is in issue in this suit.
The 2nd day of October, 2018 was the day the event was concluded and results announced. The results of the Primary Election having being (sic)
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announced on the 2nd day of October, 18 time begins to run for that day and the said 2nd of October, 18 shall not be excluded.
From the 2nd of October, 18 to the 16th day of October, 18 is 15 days…
The originating summons in this suit having being (sic) filed 15 days after the conclusion of the Gubernatorial Primaries of the 2nd Respondent is caught up by the provision of Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) hence is statute barred.”
In affirming the foregoing, the lower Court at pages 568 – 569 of the record enthused as follows:-
“The date of the occurrence of the event is none other than the date the cause of action arose in this case on appeal… the Court below in its judgment rightly in my view held or found that the decision taken on the 2/10/18 to nominate, select or elect the 1st respondent as the candidate of the PDP for Gubernatorial elections in Kano State on the 2nd October, 2018 gave rise to the cause of action and time begins to run from that date in the computation of the 14 days period allowed under Section 285 (9) of the Constitution as altered.
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I am in complete agreement with this finding of the trial Court… Certainly, the 4th of October, 2018, the date the appellant “became aware” that the first respondent had not “rejoined” the party cannot in law constitute a cause of action or give the appellant the right to initiate action for judicial relief.”
The Court at page 570 of the record concluded thus:-
“Therefore, by the arithmetical calculation of a period of 14 days from the 2nd October 2018 the 14 days lapsed on the 15th days that is to say, one day outside the 14 days limited by the Constitution hence the suit commenced at the trial Court was caught by that statute of limitation. It is statute barred. The trial Court indeed came to the right conclusion when it struck out the suit.”
Learned appellant’s counsel ascribes perversity to the lower Court’s foregoing findings on two grounds.
Firstly, he contends that because the appellant was not aware of 1st respondent’s non compliance with 2nd respondent’s Constitution and Electoral Guidelines in rejoining the party, the two lower Courts are wrong in their concurrent findings that time begins to run
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against the appellant, for the purpose of the limitation envisaged by Section 285 (9) of 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution as amended, from the 2nd October 2018 when 2nd respondent’s primary election took place.
Secondly, the findings are also wrong because they stand in conflict with the binding decisions of the Supreme Court on the point all of which exclude the date the plaintiff’s cause of action arises in their determination of when time begins to run against him for limitation purposes.
I entirely agree with learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents that the lower Court’s findings learned appellant’s counsel contends are perverse remain unassailable. Again, having evolved in complete obedience to earlier decisions of the apex Court, learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd respondents is correct to insist that the findings cannot be interfered with.
Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered which application to appellant’s suit by the two lower Courts renders the cause of action therein unenforceable is clear and unambiguous. In ascribing to the words which make up the section their literal meaning, the two Courts remain
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within the bounds set by this Court in that regard. See RABIU V. STATE (1980) 8 11 SC 130 and AG FEDERATION V. AG LAGOS STATE (2013) LPELR 20974 (SC). The words “event, decision or action”, the two Courts are right, refer to a plaintiff’s cause of action on the basis of which his right to sue enures. Appellant’s cause of action is the alleged participation of the 1st respondent, while in breach of Section 8 (8) of 2nd respondent’s Constitution and paragraph 23 (a) and (b) of its Electoral Guidelines for primary elections, in the party’s Kano State Gubernatorial primary election that held on 2nd October 2018.
Learned appellant’s counsel insists that the lower Court is wrong to have found appellant’s action statute barred by reference to 2nd October 2018 instead of the 4th of October 2018 that the appellant became aware of the 1st respondent’s non-compliance with the party’s Constitution and Electoral Guidelines.
I am unable to agree with learned counsel that appellant’s cause of action begins to run, by virtue of the limitation prescribed under Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution as altered, from the time he becomes aware
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of 1st respondent’s non-compliance which, on the latter’s participation in the primary election, creates appellant’s right to sue. The clear and unambiguous section neither makes knowledge on the part of the appellant a pre-Condition to the filing of his action nor excludes the date his cause of action accrues in the determination of when time begins to run against him. By the section, appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance with 2nd respondent’s Constitution and Electoral Guidelines is immaterial. To hold that time begins to run against the appellant only on his becoming aware of 1st respondent’s non-compliance and further exclude the date appellant’s cause of action accrues, in determining when limitation begins to run against him, is to read into the section what it does not contain. No Court has the jurisdiction of doing so. See DANGANA & ANOR V. USMAN & ORS (2012) LPELR 25012 (SC) and GANA V. SDP & ORS (2019) LPELR 47153 (SC). By the section, the limitation period is 14 days and since neither knowledge nor the date of the accrual of the cause of action is made a precondition for the determination of the period, the
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lower Court in excluding appellant’s knowledge of 1st respondent’s non-compliance and taking into congnisance the date his cause of action arises in its computation of the limitation period is beyond reproach.
In AJIBONA V. KOLAWOLE (1996) 10 NWLR (PT 476) 22 at 36 this Court per Ogwuegbu JSC held:
“The Limitation Law and all laws of this description ought to receive beneficial construction. They should be construed liberally but not in such a way as to read into them words not intended by the law makers as the majority decision of the Court below portrayed. All limitation laws have for their object the prevention of the rearing up of claims that are stale. To contend that the defendant must prove plaintiff’s knowledge of such adverse possession for time to start to run, or the defendant’s presence on the land is to import a strange condition into the Limitation Law. See Sosan & Ors v. Ademuyiwa & Ors. (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 27) 241 at 256.”
Kutigi JSC (as he then was and now of blessed memory) in his contribution opined at page 37 of the report thus:-
“I also agree that the defendant having lived in
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his house on the land in dispute for over twelve years before the suit was filed, the limitation period under the Limitation Law would in addition run in his favour whether or not the plaintiff was aware of such adverse possession by the defendant.”
See alsoALHAJI A. W. ODEKILEKUN V. MRS. COMFORT O. HASSAN & ANOR (1997) 12 NWLR (PT 531) 56.
The lower Court in affirming the trial Court’s decision has kept faith with the binding decisions of this Court. Appellant’s two issues, it follows, fail and are resolved against him. His unmeritorious appeal is dismissed at a cost of N500,000.00k in favour of the 1st & 2nd respondents and the concurrent decisions of the lower Courts are hereby further affirmed.
MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad JSC and to register the support I have in the reasonings from which the decision emanated, I shall make some remarks.
This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal or Lower Court or Court below, Kaduna Division, Coram: Hussein Mukhtar, Saidu Tanko Hussaini
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and Oludotun A. Adefope-Okojie JJCA, delivered on the 15th day of March, 2019 which dismissed the appeal over the decision of the trial Court, Kano State which had struck out the suit of the appellant.
The background facts are well set out in the leading judgment and no useful purpose will be derived in repeating them unless when the occasion warrants a reference to any part thereof.
On the 14th day of May, 2019 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant, Dr. N. A. Aliyu adopted the brief of argument filed on 17/4/19 and a reply brief filed on 9/5/19. The appellant formulated two issues for determination which are as follows:-
1. Whether the learned justices of the lower Court were right in holding that 4th October 2018 was the day when the cause of action of the appellant arose despite his clear depositions in Paragraph 15, (a), 15 (b), 15 (c) and 15 (d) of the 2nd affidavit in support of the originating summons in his judgment. (Distilled from Grounds 1, 2 and 5).
2. Whether the learned justices of the lower Court were right in disregarding the Supreme Court cases on computation of time in pre-election matter, which
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held time runs from the day of the act, which day is not excluded. (Distilled from Grounds 3 and 4).
Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents adopted their brief filed on 24/4/19 and in it distilled two issues for determination which are thus:-
ISSUE 1:
Whether the learned Justices of the Lower Court were right when the lower Court held that the suit was statute barred having been filed in excess of the 14 days provided by Section 285 (i) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution as amended (Grounds 1, 2 and 5 of the Notice of Appeal).
ISSUE 2:
Whether the Lower Court was right in holding that in the computation of time in election related matters, time begins to run from the date of the occurrence of the event. (Grounds 3 and 4 of the Notice of Appeal).
The issues as crafted by either side are really the same and would be convenient to use.
ISSUES 1 AND 2:
The questions raised are whether the learned Justices of the Court below were right to hold that the suit was statute barred being instituted outside the 14 days prescribed. Also whether the Court below was right that the computation of time was
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from the occurrence of the event.
Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant became aware of the cause of action which is the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 8 (8) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party and Section 23 (a) and (b) of the PDP Electoral Guidelines for Primary Elections 2018 by the 1st respondent on the 4th October 2018 when he was informed by the PDP Ward Secretary of Diso, Kano State and so the accrual date of the cause of action would be the 4th October 2018 and not 2nd October 2018 when the PDP Kano Gubernatorial Primary Election was conducted as erroneously held by the Court of Appeal. He cited Ajibona v Kolawole & Anor. (1996) LPELR – 299; Etsako West LGC v Christopher (2014) 14 NWLR (Pt.1426) 90-91; Tukur Ibrahim v Ishaq Umar & Ors. (2013) LPELR – 22805 (CA); Adeogun v Fashogbon (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt.1115) 149 at 181.
That the constitution is silent on whether the date of the occurrence of the event is included in the computation of the 14 days prescribed in Section 285 (9) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 4th Alteration. Therefore that
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considering the silence in the provision and when the appellant became aware of the occurrence of the event, he was within the 14 days stipulated. He referred to Obusez & Anor. v. Obusez & Anor. (2007) LPELR – 2197; Okechukwu v INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt.1436) 284; Ikpeazu v Ogah (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt.1562) 494-495.
For the 1st and 2nd respondents, it was submitted that the event which was the participation of the 1st respondent in the primaries occurred 15 days before the filing of the suit and so robbed the trial Court of the jurisdiction to adjudicate. That equity does not aid the indolent. He cited Okorocha v PDP (2015) 1 EJSC 1 at 45; FCDA v Sule (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.332) 25; FMH v C.S.A, ANYADUBA v N.R.T.C Ltd (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.243) 535 at 561.
Learned counsel for the 3rd respondent, S. M. Dambaba Esq. filed no brief of argument.
The contending positions of the parties as put forward on either side have been summarily placed on display, I shall refer to the considered decision of the trial Court on the 14th January 2019 in striking out the suit as follows:-
“The originating summons in this suit having being filed 15 days after the conclusion of
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the Gubernatorial primaries of the 2nd respondent is caught up by the provision of Section 285 (9) of the alteration of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) hence is statute barred.
Having resolved the 1st issue against the applicant, consideration of the 2nd issue for determination becomes super flows”. I refer to pages 463-464 of the record of appeal
That decision was sequel to the reliefs sought in the trial Court which are as follows:-
I. A declaration that by virtue of the provisions of Section 8 (8) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party and Section 23 (a) and (b) of the PDP Electoral Guidelines for primary elections 2018, a person who desires to re-join the party after leaving shall apply in writing to his ward secretary for re-admission.
II. A declaration that the 1st respondent did not satisfy the condition stipulated by Section 8 (8) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party and Section 23 (a) (b) of the PDP Electoral Guidelines for primary elections 2018 in re-joining the party, thus ought not to participate in the just concluded PDP 2018 State Gubernatorial Primary
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Election, Kano State Chapter conducted by the 3rd respondent”.
The Lower Court held at page 568 of the record of appeal thus:-
“The appellant on the one part and the 1st and 2nd respondents on the other part take their own separate positions as to when indeed the cause of action arose in this case on appeal but the Court below in its judgment rightly in my view held or found that the decision taken on the 2/10/18 to nominate, select or elect the 1st respondent as the candidate of the PDP for Gubernatorial elections in Kano State on the 2nd October, 2018 gave rise to the cause of action…”
A further reference to the excerpts of the trial court’s decision as shown at page 463 of the Record is thus:-
“It is apparent from reliefs 1 and 2 of the applicant’s originating summons that his main complaint is the participation of the 1st defendant/respondent in the conduct of the primary election of the 2nd respondent which was held on the 1st and 2nd of October, 18 that is in issue in this suit.
The 2nd day of October, 18, was the day the event was concluded and results announced. The results of the primary elections having being announced on the
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2nd day of October, 18 time begins to run from that day and the said 2nd of October 18 is 15 days.
This therefore follows that this suit was not filed within the period allowed under Section 285 (9) of the alteration of the constitution”.
The Court of Appeal on its own part at judgment stage shown at page 568 of the Record of Appeal held as follows:-
“The date of the occurrence of the event is none other than the date the cause of action arose in this case on appeal. The appellant on the one part and the 1st and 2nd respondents on the other part take their separate positions as to when indeed the cause of action arose in this case on appeal but the Court below in its judgment rightly in my view held or found that the decision taken on the 2/10/18 to nominate, select or elect the 1st respondent as the candidate of the PDP for Gubernatorial elections in Kano State on the 2nd October, 2018 gave rise to the cause of action…”
Having set out the decisions of the two Courts below albeit excerpts thereof which anyway showcase the raison d etre of the judgments or decisions or conclusions, it has to be said that
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it is difficult to push forward the position as espoused by the appellant that the cause of action arose when the appellant realised or got the knowledge of the event or issue. The reason is simple and logical as it is to render uncertain and tied to people’s convenience whenever a party decides to activate a Court process depending on his subjective whim.
The implication being that the statute of limitation would start to run at the point when the plaintiff/appellant in this instance puts across as time of becoming aware of the happening of the event that he is aggrieved over. That position of uncertainty will aid indolence and give a one sided subjective advantage to a party to the detriment of the other side.
It is now trite and even an over flogged cliche that equity does not aid the indolent. That is to say that if such a subjective stance is allowed to stand, it would encourage and breed uncertainty in the polity and create the ludicrous situation where a person can wake up a year or more after an election and swearing into an elective position to have a challenge to his nomination by way of substitution for election that brought the person
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to power. The possible angles abound in this uncertainty and easily lead to a chaotic scenario where the populace is not sure if a said elected person can remain there on seat within a given period or even after he had had his tenure expended to have the intimacy of the occupation of the position challenged at any time. The law cannot recognise or endorse such a speculative situation and so everyone or I daresay, every stake holder must be watchful or vigilant of his legal rights. See Okorocha v PDP (2015) 1 EJSC 1 at 45; Hassan v Aliyu & Ors. (2010) LPELR – 1357.
What I am trying to say is that the stance of the appellant that the 4th October, 2018 when the appellant claimed to become aware that the 1st respondent had not rejoined the party cannot be the date of the cause of action’s accrual giving rise to his right to initiate the action for judicial relief. The correct situation in my view borne out of the record and sustained by the relevant legislations is that the cause of action arose if there was one at the date of the primary election and the result declared or announced which is the 2nd October 2018 and taking that date as pointer. It needs
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be reiterated that by the time the appellant as plaintiff commenced his action by originating summons on the 16th October 2018, he was way out of the 14 days prescribed under Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
It is to be noted that in the computation of time in an electoral action including the pre-election one such as the present in the light of the constitutional alteration referred to as 4th Alteration the computation includes the very date on which the results were declared. This is further highlighted under Section 141 of the Electoral Act 2006. I place reliance on Garba v Adua (2011) 13 NWLR (Pt.1263) page 1 at 17-18;Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) which provides thus:-
“285 (9) – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit”.
The provision of Section 285 (9) are simply in plain language self explanatory and needs
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no outlandish interpretation on it. Indeed the situation is cut and dried as the suit at the trial Court was statute barred and the jurisdiction of the Court well ousted thereby. The follow up being that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction and the Court below was right in affirming same.
From the foregoing and well articulated lead judgment, this appeal lacks merit and is dismissed by me.
I abide by the consequential orders made.
Appeal Dismissed.
KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, JSC just delivered.
The reasoning and conclusion reached therein reflect my views in this appeal.
In my considered view, the simple issue in this appeal is when the cause of action accrued and whether the appellant’s suit at the trial Court was time barred having regard to the provisions of Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution, as amended.
The appellant and the 1st respondent both participated in the primary election conducted by the 2nd respondent, People Democratic Party (PDP)
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from 1st to 2nd October, 2018 to select its candidate for the Kano State Gubernatorial Election schedule to hold in February 2019. The 1st respondent was declared the winner of the primary, having scored a total of 2,421 votes, while the appellant scored 1,258 votes. It was the appellant’s contention at the trial Court that the 1st respondent had previously defected from the P.D.P to join the All Progressives Congress (APC) and that it came to his knowledge on 4th October, 2018, that the 1st respondent was not qualified to contest the election having failed to comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 8 (8) of the P.D.P’s Constitution and Section 23 (a) and (b) of the P.D.P Elections Guidelines for Primary Elections 2018 for rejoining the party.
The 1st and 2nd respondents raised a preliminary objection to the suit on the ground that it was statute barred, having been filed 15 days after the conclusion of the Gubernatorial Primaries and therefore caught by Section 285(9) of the 4th Alteration.
Both the trial Court and the Court below held that the cause of action accrued on 2nd October 2018 when the primary was conducted and
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lapsed on the 15th October 2018 and therefore the suit filed on 16th October 2018 was statute barred. Both Courts included the date of the primary in the calculation. It was and is the appellant’s contention that the cause of action accrued from the date he became aware that the 1st respondent had not fulfilled the condition for rejoining the party and not the date the primary was conducted. He is also of the view that the date the primary was conducted ought not to have been included in the computation.
Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution provides:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or act complained of.”
Relying on Obusez & Anor. Vs Obusez & Anor. (2007) LPELR -2197 (SC) and Ikpeazu Vs Ogah (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1562) 494, learned counsel for the appellant contended that since Section 285 (9) does not specifically exclude the day of the occurrence of the act complained of, the date of the occurrence of the event must be excluded in
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computing the 14 days. The 1st and 2nd respondents on the other hand, contend that the cause of action accrued on 1st and 2nd October, 2018, when the appellant and the 1st respondent participated in the primary, the result of which were announced on October 2018.
It has been held severally by this Court that a cause of action arises on a date or from the time when the breach of any duty or act occurs, which warrants the person who is adversely affected by such breach, to institute an action to protect his legal right which has been breached or violated. A cause of action arises as soon as the combination of facts giving the right to complain accrued or happened. See: A.G. Adamawas State Vs A.G. Federation (2014) LPELR 2322 (SC) @ 52 A-C; Woherem JP Vs Emereuwa & Ors. (2004) 8 SCM 45, UBN Plc Vs Umeoduagu (2004) 13 NWLR Pt. 890) 352.
On when time begins to run for the purpose of a limitation law, this Court in:Fadare and Ors. Vs A.G. Oyo State (1982) NSCC 52 @ 60, referred to the case of Board of Trade Vs Cayzer, Irvine Land Co. Ltd. (1927) A.C. 610, where it was held:
“Time therefore begins to run when there is in existence, a
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person who can sue and another who can be sued, and all facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.”
Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the appellant’s complaint is related to the 1st respondent’s participation in the primaries that took place on 1st and 2nd October, 2018. The event/cause of action that gives the appellant the right to complain is the actual participation of the 1st respondent in the primaries conducted on 1st and 2nd October 2018. Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration provides that a pre-election matter must be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of tree event, decision or action complained of. The act complained of is the failure of 1st respondent to comply with the provisions of Section 8 (8) of the P.D.P’s Constitution and Section 23 (a) and (b) of its 2018 Primary Election Guidelines, which are conditions precedent to his eligibility to participate in the primaries.
Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration is quite clear and must be given its plan and ordinary meaning. It is evident from the wording of the provision that the date of the
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occurrence of the event complained of is inclusive in the calculation of when the cause of action arose.
Election and election related matters are sui generis. Because of their special nature, where time is of the essence, the rules applicable to ordinary civil suits do not apply.
His Lordship, Ariwoola, JSC had this to say on the issue in: Okechukwu Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt.1436) 255 @ 284 G-H:
“…Being aware of the sui generic nature of election and election related matters in which time is of the essence, and the stand of this Court on the Interpretation Act, I hold no hesitation in concluding that the provisions of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by the Practice Directions. Time shall run, in the peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.”
The appellant’s cause of action arose on 2nd October 2018. His Originating Summons was filed on 16 October 2018, more than 14 days from the date of the primaries. The two lower Courts were therefore right in holding
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that the suit was statute barred and striking it out.
There is no justifiable reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts. I agree with my learned brother, MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, JSC that this appeal is devoid of merit. It is hereby dismissed.
I abide by the order on costs.
EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: The phraseology of Section 285 (9) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended by the Fourth Alteration, leaves no doubt that the framers of the Constitution intend that
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.
Section 285 (9) of the Constitution, as amended; contrary to the construction subversive of the clear provisions that the Appellant wants this Court to adopt, expressly states that “the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of” is inclusive.
In OBUSEZ & ANOR. v. OBUSEZ & ANOR. (2007) LPELR 2197 (SC) this Court, at page 20 thereof, the point very clearly –
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The function of a Court of law is to interpret the provisions of the Constitution in the clear tenor of the words contained in it. Court of law has no jurisdiction to import into the Constitution or impute into the Constitution words, which are not used therein. That will not bring out the intention of the makers of the Constitution and it is the duty of the Court to interpret the Constitution in line with the words used and the intention of the Constitution.
The Court, in its interpretative jurisdiction, is enjoined, when the provisions of the Constitution or Statute are clear and unambiguous, to give the provisions the meaning that accords with the natural ordinary grammatical meaning of the provisions. In other words, the Court must not construe the provisions to mean what the provisions do not actually mean. Nor must the provisions be construed not to mean what they actually mean. This interpretational restraint on the Court is an outflow from the basic function of the Court which is only to declare what the law is, and not to make laws. Legislation or law making constitutionally belongs to another branch of government, but not to the
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judicature.
The Appellant and the 1st Respondent participated in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) primary election for the nomination of the PDP’s governorship election. The event took place and was concluded on 2nd October, 2018. The 1st Respondent, emerging with the majority of lawful votes from the primary election, was returned and declared the PDP candidate at the general election to elect the governor of Kano State. The Appellant was the aspirant with the next majority of lawful votes. He was the runner-up. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant approached the Kano State High Court, upon an Originating Summons, seeking to nullify the return of the 1st Respondent as winner of the PDP 2018 Gubernatorial primary Election, Kano State Chapter that was conducted on October, 2018. The ground for this relief is that the 1st Respondent, allegedly, did not qualify, and ought not, to have participated in the said primary election of 2nd October, 2018. On this basis, therefore, the Appellant sought an order that he be recognized as the PDP candidate in the event of the disqualification of the 1st Respondent.
Indubitably, the event that the suit of the
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Appellant was directed took place and was concluded on 2nd October, 2018.
The Appellant took out the suit on 16th October, 2018 on the 15th day from the said 2nd October, 2018.
The Appellant confronted with the objection to his suit, on the ground that it was statute barred by dint of Section 285 (9) of the Constitution, as amended, contends that since, as averred in the supporting affidavit, he only got to know on 4th October, 2018 that the 1st Respondent did not, by virtue of Section 8 (8) of the PDP Constitution, and the Guidelines for the primary election, qualify to participate in the primary election, the cause of action for his action should be construed to have arisen from 4th October, 2018 when he was informed of the disqualification fact. He seems, through his counsel, to argue that his ignorance of the law of his party (PDP) that allegedly disqualified the 1st Respondent was an excuse. The argument is most puerile and disingenuous. Ignorance of the law is, of course, no excuse. I should think that the Appellant, like every member of his party, particularly the aspirants seeking nomination like himself and the 1st Respondent,
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should know aforehand the laws, particularly the party Constitution and Guidelines, as they affect their rights and obligations as members of the party.
Implicit in the puerile argument of the Appellant is the outrageous suggestion that the National Constitution applies subject to the knowledge of the Appellant of the fact upon which the provisions of the said constitution are invoked. It is on this fallacy that the Appellant argues that his right to litigate on his cause of action arises from the date he gets to know that he can enforce his cause of action. He argues naively, if I may say, that the occurrence of the event that constitutes the cause of action is one thing, and that his knowledge of the fact that he can enforce his right to the cause of action is another. Unfortunately, the Constitution, in Section 285(9) thereof, provides emphatically that the suit in “every pre-election matter shall be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the OCCURRENCE OF THE EVENT, decision or ACTION”. It is as plain and unambigous as that.
The Appellant at page 10, paragraph 2.8 of the Appellant’s Brief had argued that at –
the time of the nomination of
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the 1st Respondent on the 2nd October, 2018 the Appellant had acquired the right to sue, but not the cause of action as he had no issue with the conduct of the primary election.
This is argument on which he premised his contention that “there is clear distinction between a cause of action and a right to enforce the cause or the right of (sic: to) judicial relief in the plaintiff” A right of action is not independent of the cause of action. This Court inADIGUN v. AG. OYO STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 53) 678 has held that a right of action consists in the fact which enables a person to bring a complaint before the Court. The cause of action is a factual situation, the existence of which, entitles the Plaintiff to bring his complaint to the Court to seek reliefs: THOMAS v. OLUFOSOYE (1986) 17 NSCC (pt. 1) 323 at 331: (1986) 1 NWLR 669 at 682. It is the cause of action that gives the Plaintiff the right of action or the right to sue:SAVAGE v. UWECHIA (1972) 3 SC 214 at 221.
I have, from the foregoing, sufficiently demonstrated how unavailing the Appellant’s puerile distinction between the cause of action and the right of action is. And on the
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facts, I agree with the lower Court that the Appellant’s cause of action arose and accrued to him on 2nd October, 2018.
That is from the primary election; the event the Appellant complained of in his suit. This apart; the admission of the Appellant that he “had no issue with the conduct of the primary election” rendered his suit, and of course this appeal, completely vexatious and abuse of Court process.
The fuller details in the lead judgment of my learned brother, MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, JSC, which I endorse, have sufficiently demonstrated why the appeal should be, and is hereby, dismissed. The appeal is frivolous and vexatious. I abide by all the consequential orders made in the lead judgment.
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC. The reasoning and conclusion reached therein reflect my views in the appeal.
The Appellant on 16/10/2018 filed an originating summons challenging the participation of the 1st Respondent in the 2nd Respondent’s gubernatorial primary election of 2018 in Kano State
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witnessed by the 3rd Respondent and that the Appellant could not have participated in the party’s primary election. That having come second, he should be declared the party’s duly elected candidate. This was however opposed by the 1st and 2nd Respondents who vide preliminary objection challenged the jurisdiction of the trial Court on the ground that the action was statute barred. The bone of contention therefore is between the time the action and event took place i.e. when the primary election took place and was concluded on 2/10/2018 or on 4/10/2018 when the Appellant became aware that the 1st Respondent did not rejoin the party
The whole connotation of “Limitation” of action in respect of a given subject-matter postulates a statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in Court. It usually comes about by legislation [Statutes] and it can even be made by a written agreement between contracting parties. Thus, a statute of limitation is a law which bars claims after a specified period has elapsed. It establishes a time limit for suing in a civil case based on the date when the claim accrued. The purpose of such a statute of
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course, is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved in good time while evidence is reasonably available and fresh. See Per MUHAMMAD, J.S.C in AG ADAMAWA STATE & ORS V. AG FEDERATION (2014) LPELR- 23221(SC).
By Section 285(9) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), only 14 days is given for filing every pre-election matter from the date of occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of. The event herein was the primary election which took place on the 1st and 2nd October, 2018 and the result announced on 2/10/2018. Thus, it means that by the statute of limitation, herein Section 285(9) of the 4th Alteration to the 1999 Constitution (as amended), any matter filed outside the circumference of 14 days from the date of the event or primary election has effluxed and lapsed. The statute of limitation is also a hook on the neck to all prosecutory layabouts and idlers who will want to resurrect an already dead case. The time herein started counting since on 2/10/2018 when the result was announced and expired on
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16/10/2018. Thus, by instituting the action after 15 days from when the cause of action or the event occurred, the Appellant was caught up by Section 285 (9) of the 4th Alteration Act.
An action instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period is said to be statute-barred. The essence is that a legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right, but a right generally limited by statute.
Therefore a cause of action is statute barred if legal proceedings cannot be commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the Limitation Law had elapsed. The conspicuous effect of a Limitation Law is that legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Secondly, the Court is divested of its jurisdiction in the matter as it is no longer a live issue, it is dead in substance and in form. See Per ADEKEYE, J.S.C in AMADI & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2012) LPELR-7831(SC).
The Appellant has labored all through to be flogging a dead horse expecting may be a miracle, which has unfortunately not happened. I fully endorse the order made and the costs for the precious time of this
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Court wasted.
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Appearances:
N. A. ALIYU with him Victor IzibiliFor Appellant(s)
EYITAYO FATOGUN with him Kelvin Ugiabe and Paschal Obuchi, for 1st 2nd Respondents.
S.M. DANBABA, for 3rd Respondent.For Respondent(s)
Appearances
N. A. ALIYU with him Victor IzibiliFor Appellant
AND
EYITAYO FATOGUN with him Kelvin Ugiabe and Paschal Obuchi, for 1st 2nd Respondents.
S.M. DANBABA, for 3rd Respondent.For Respondent
