IBRAHIM v. STATE (2022)

IBRAHIM v. STATE

(2022)LCN/16356(CA)

In The Supreme Court

On Friday, May 06, 2022

SC.192/2015

Before Our Lordships:

Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Abdu Aboki Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Ibrahim Mohammed Musa Saulawa Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Tijjani Abubakar Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

ABUBAKAR IBRAHIM APPELANT(S)

And

THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

PRINCIPLE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

MEANING OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

In AFOLALU V. THE STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1220) 5841 it was again held that;
“proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof to moral certainty, such proof as satisfies the judgment and conscience of a Judge as a reasonable man, and applying his reasons to the evidence before him that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant and so satisfies him as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible.
See also DAIRO V. STATE (2017) 9-12 SC 119. IKPO V. STATE (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1521 501 and BAKARE V. STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 52) 579. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY

The essential ingredients of the offence of armed robbery, which must be beyond reasonable doubt are;
1. that there was a robbery or series of robberies
2. that each robbery was an armed robbery
3. that the accused was one of those who participated in the robbery or series of robberies.
See BOZIN V. STATE (1985) (pt.8) 465 and ALABI V. STATE (1993) 7 N WLR (pt. 37) 511. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

MEANING OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE

Identification evidence is that which tends to show that the person charged is the same person seen at the locus criminis. See NWATURUOCHA V. STATE (SUPRA). TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

MEANING OF A CONFESSION

WHETHER AN ACCUSED PERSON CAN BE CONVICTED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

It is settled law that an accused person may be convicted solely on the basis of his confessional statement if it is positive, direct, unequivocal and voluntarily made. See YESUFU V. STATE (1976) 6 SC 167 at 173, NWACHUKWU V. STATE (2003) NWLR (pt. 123) 312 and KAMILA V. STATE (2018) 8 N WLR (pt. 1621) 252. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW ON AN ACCUSED PERSON CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Notwithstanding the positive, direct and unequivocal confession, it is the usual practice of the Courts to consider facts outside the statement, no matter how minimal, that suggest that the confession is likely to be true. The questions the Court would ask itself are as follows;
I. is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true
II. is it corroborated?
III. are the relevant statements made in it true as far as they can be tasted?
IV. Was the accused person one who had the opportunity of committing the crime?
V. Is the confession possible
Vi. Is it consistent with other facts, which have been ascertained and proved?
See R V. SYKES (1913) 18 CR APP. REP 2331, EGBOGHONOME V. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.306) 383 OJEGELE V. STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 414 and SIMEON V. STATE (2018) 13 NWLR (pt. 1635) 128. TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

POSITION OF LAW ON THE ISSUE OF CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE OF WITNESSES

The settled position of the law on the issue of contradictions in the evidence of witnesses that testify in Court is well-settled, on a chain of endless authorities, it is not every minor contradiction in evidence that matters or has the effect of rendering the evidence unbelievable. For a trial Court to disbelieve a witness for the said reason, the contradiction in his evidence must be on a material point. The contradiction must be substantial as to render the evidence doubtful – See KALU V THE STATE (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 90) 503 SC. and OCHEMAJE V. STATE (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1109) 57, where this Court per Tobi, JSC, (of blessed memory) eloquently elucidated as follows-
“Although witnesses see and watch the same event, they may narrate it from different angles, in their individual peculiar focus, perspective or slant. This does not mean that the event that they are narrating did not take place. It only means most of the time that the event took place, but what led to the even was given different interpretations, arising from the senses of sight and mind dictated by their impressions and idiosyncrasies. That is why the law says that contradictions which are not material or substantial will go to no issue. The main interest of the Court is that the witnesses are in union or unison as to the happening of the event but gave different versions in respect of the peripheral surrounding the event” TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

WHETHER PROSECUTION IS REQUIRED TO CALL A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF WITNESSES

It is also well settled that in proving its case, the prosecution is not required to call a particular number of witnesses or a host of witnesses. All it needs do is to call enough material witnesses to satisfy the burden of proof. Where the prosecution fails to call a particular witness and the defence deems his evidence is crucial to the case, he is at liberty to call that witness himself. See AFOLALU V. STATE (supra). TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.

ELEMENT OF PROVING THE OFFENCE OF ARMED ROBBERY

It is indeed past par-adventure that where an accused person is charged with the offence of armed robbery, the prosecution is duty bound to establish by evidence the following elements beyond reasonable doubt to wit:
1. Theft by the accused person,
2 The causing of hurt or wrongful restraint on the victim by the accused person,
3. That the acts complained of were done in the process of committing the theft or in order to commit the theft and/or carry away the property obtained by the theft.
4 That the accused person did the acts complained of by voluntarily and
5 That the accused person was armed with a dangerous weapon while committing the offence in question.
I place reliance on the case of Abdullahi v State (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt 1115) 203 at 205. MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C

ELEMENT OF PROVING THE GUILT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON

TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the Court of Appeal Sokoto Division, delivered on the 4th day of March, 2016, affirming the conviction and sentence of three years imprisonment without option of fine passed on the Appellant by the High Court of Sokoto State delivered on the 1st day of February, 2008 for conspiracy and armed robbery punishable under Sections 97 and 298C of the Penal Code.

The Appellant and one Atto Maba were charged jointly. They were alleged to have conspired to rob and did actually rob one Fatima Darai, while armed with a knife on or about the 16th day of June, 2006 in Takau village of Tangaza Local Government Area, Sokoto. They were alleged to have forcefully collected the sum of N5,000 from her.

Both accused persons pleaded not guilty to the two count charge. At the trial Court, the Appellant herein was the 1st accused. The prosecution called four witnesses and tendered exhibits, including the English and Hausa versions of statements made to the police by the Appellant, admitted and marked as exhibits C and C1 respectively.

The facts are fairly straightforward; According to the complainant Fatima Darai the victim (PW 3) on 16th day of June, 2007 at about 3 pm, she travelled to Takau village for a business transaction with her customer, one Baidu. While Baidu was counting the money paid to her for goods purchased from her by him, she noticed the Appellant and the co-accused gambling and smoking cannabis nearby, apparently hovering over their activities and mounting surveillance. On her way back to her village in the company of a neighbour, she was attacked by the same two men. It was her testimony that the Appellant held her by the neck and pulled her to the ground while the 2nd accused brought out a knife threatening to slit her throat unless she handed over the money she just collected. She disclosed to them that the money was in her shirt pocket. She was stripped of her shirt and the Appellant and his co-accused took the sum of N5,020.00 they found in her pocket. Her neighbour fled the scene. She stated that after the incident, she made a report to the police and that she told them she knew the accused persons although she did not know their names.

PW1, Sgt Ahmed Bala was the exhibit keeper, he tendered in evidence a knife, which was admitted as exhibit 1 and the sum of N980.00 in various denominations, which were marked exhibit 1A. PW21 Sgt Chindo Manu, attached to the State C.I.D Sokoto, was the investigating Police Officer (I.P.O) in the case, he recorded the Appellant’s statements and testified, stating the procedure adopted in obtaining the statements. The witness said since the Appellant offered confessional statement he took him before a superior officer before whom he confirmed that the statements were voluntarily made in line with the established procedure where an accused offers confessional statement.

The Appellant as an accused person testified in his own defence, he denied any involvement in the crime and stated that he was tortured and forced to make exhibits C and C1. He also denied knowing his co-accused and stated that he was at home in Takau Village on the day of the incident. At the conclusion of trial, the Court found the Appellant and his co-accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to 3 years imprisonment without option of fine on each count, sentence to run concurrently.

The Appellant became dissatisfied with the judgment, and appealed to the Court below. In a considered judgment delivered on the 4th day of March, 2006, the Appellant’s appeal was dismissed. The Appellant further appealed to this Court.

Learned Counsel L. Olaseinde Karim Esq filed the Appellant’s brief of argument on the 24th August, 2015, while Sulaiman Usman, the Honourable Attorney General of Sokoto State on behalf of the Respondent, filed the Respondent’s brief of argument on the 11th day of January, 2016, the brief was deemed as properly filed and served on the 14th day of November, 2019.

Learned counsel for the Appellant nominated sole issue for determination, the issue reads as follows:
“Whether having regard to the evidence in this case, the lower Court was right in affirming the decision that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.”

On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent, the Honourable Attorney General Sokoto State nominated a corresponding sole issue for determination, the issue is also reproduced as follows:
“Whether in the circumstances of this case the lower Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s appeal and affirming the decision of the trial Court regards being had to the evidence.”

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT
Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that this Court in ABDULLAHI V. STATE (2008) 17 NWLR (pt. 1115) pg. 203 at 205 held that where an accused person is charged with the offence of Armed Robbery, it is the duty of the prosecution to establish by evidence the following ingredients beyond reasonable doubt;
a) Theft by the accused person
b) The causing of hurt or wrongful restraint on the victim by the accused person
c) That the acts complained of were done in the process of committing the theft or in order to commit the theft and/or carry away the property obtained by the theft.
d) That the accused person did the acts complained of voluntarily and
e) That the accused person was armed with a dangerous weapon while committing the offence in question.

Learned counsel submitted that a cursory look at the facts and the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial, the facts clearly reveal that the prosecution has not in any way proved the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law, learned Counsel said where the prosecution fails to prove the guilt of the accused person, there is no duty on the accused person to prove his innocence relying on the case of IGABELE V. STATE (2006) 6 NWLR Pt. 975 Pg. 100 at 108.

Learned counsel contended that it is settled principle of law that in criminal trial, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt, and therefore it is never the duty of the accused to prove his innocence. Learned Counsel contended the prosecution did not adduce cogent evidence to prove the ingredients of the offence of Armed Robbery as provided by law against the Appellant.

Learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge at page 76 lines 17 to 20 of the records of appeal correctly stated the settled position of the law that before a conviction can be properly founded on the retracted confessional statement of the accused person, it is desirable to have some evidence outside the confession which will make it probable that it is true. Counsel cited the cases of F.R.N V. DAIRO (2015) 6 NWLR (pt. 1454) pg. 141 at 147, ONOCHIE V. REPUBLIC (1966) 1 SCNLR 204, KOPA V. STATE (1971) 1 ALL NLR 150, EJINIMA V. STATE (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) AT 617 in support of this submission.

Learned Counsel contended that, the learned trial Judge premised his findings and judgment on the extra-judicial statement of the accused person and concluded that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel said both exhibits C & C1 are not consistent with the facts of this case and that does not mean that the Appellant has accepted and admitted the contents of the said exhibits C & C1.

Learned Counsel further submitted that the fact that the document has been admitted in evidence, with or without objection does not necessarily mean that the document has established or made out the evidence contained therein and must be accepted by the learned trial Judge. Counsel relied on the decision in ABUBAKAR V. CHUKS (2008) 20 W.R.N 27 at 44. Learned counsel submitted that it is clear from the records of appeal that prosecution failed to prove the veracity of the purported confessional statement credited to the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required by law.

Learned counsel submitted that it is settled law that where the evidence of a witness is materially contradictory to his earlier statement to the police, the witness should be regarded as unreliable and his evidence ignored. Counsel relied on the case of NWANKWOALA V. STATE (2006) 14 NWLR (pt. 1000) pg. 663 at 666.

Learned counsel further submitted that it is the duty of the prosecution to explain the contradiction in the evidence of its witness either under re-examination of the witness or in the evidence to the Court after the defence had closed its case.

Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution at page 57 of the records of appeal clearly stated during the final address that the offence committed by the Appellant was extortion and not armed robbery, counsel further contended that the contradiction is material and it casts serious doubt as to whether the Appellant was one of the robbers and whether the purported offence was an armed robbery or extortion.

Counsel finally Urged the Court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower Court.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT
Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that in our system of administration of criminal justice system, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel relied on Section 137 of the Evidence Act and ALONGE V. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE (1959) 4 FSC, 203 (1959) S. S.C.N.R. 516.

Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant contended that the prosecution has not in any way proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as required by law and that the identity of the Appellant was not established so as to link him with the crime. Counsel submitted that to prove the offence of Robbery under Section 289 of the Penal Code, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt the following ingredients of the offence;
1. That the accused committed theft.
2. That he caused or attempted to cause to some person
a. Death, hurt, wrongful restraint or
b. Fear of instant death or instant hurt or instant restraint.
3. That he did as above;
a. In committing theft or
b. In order to commit theft or
c. in carrying away or attempting to carry away the property obtained by that theft.

Learned counsel submitted that all the above ingredients were duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the Respondent before the trial Court and the lower Court was right in affirming the decision of the trial Court.

Learned counsel submitted that PW3, who is the eye witness and victim of the crime stated that she travelled to Takau Village to transact business with her customer named Baidu and after selling her commodities, her customer gave her the sum of N5,020 in the presence of the Appellant and his co-accused. On her way back, the Appellant held her neck while the other accused held her thighs and the Appellant pushed her down. The co- accused brought out knife and directed her to give him the money or he would kill her. The Appellant and his co-accused later collected the money from her and ran away.

Learned counsel submitted that aside the Pw3, there was also confessional statement made by the Appellant which was tendered through PW 2 the investigating police officer which was admitted in evidence after initial objection was withdrawn by the counsel representing the accused. Learned counsel argued in respect of the 2nd count of the charge of conspiracy that it was established through the evidence of PW2 and PW3 and exhibit 1 which is the knife used by the Appellant and his co-accused to rob the victim.

Learned counsel submitted that from the testimonies of the witnesses at the trial, it is patently clear that the offence for which the Appellant was convicted had been established beyond reasonable doubts.

Counsel cited the case of EKE V. STATE (2011) 6 NCC page 1 at 7 to support his argument. Learned counsel submitted that PW3 who is the eye witness and victim of the crime in the case corroborated the confessional statement of the accused person.

Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant’s contention that the confessional statement was not voluntarily made- cannot hold water. Counsel further submitted that in the records of appeal at pages 9 to 18, when the issue of admissibility of the confessional statement arose, the trial Court ordered for trial within trial, the counsel for the accused eventually withdrew his objection. Learned counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss this appeal and affirm the judgment of the lower Court.

RESOLUTION

I have examined the lone issues formulated each by the contending parties in this appeal. The issues are substantially the same, resolution of any of the issues will have the effect of determining the issues in controversy in this appeal effectively and effectually. I will therefore adopt the issue as formulated by the Appellant as the issue to resolve in the determination of this appeal.

The burden placed on the prosecution in a criminal trial is a heavy one, it must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. See. Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and the decision in NWATURUOCHA V. THE STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (pt. 1242) 170 at 193 where it was held that:
“proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt or all shadow of doubt. It simply means establishing the guilt of the accused person with compelling and conclusive evidence, a degree of compulsion which is consistent with a high degree of probability.
@ 186 E-G (supra)
it is not proof beyond all iota of doubt. One thing that is certain is that where all the essential ingredients of the offence charged have been proved or established by the prosecution …the charge is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt should not be stretched beyond limit”
In AFOLALU V. THE STATE (2010) 16 NWLR (pt.1220) 5841 it was again held that;
“proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof to moral certainty, such proof as satisfies the judgment and conscience of a Judge as a reasonable man, and applying his reasons to the evidence before him that the crime charged has been committed by the defendant and so satisfies him as to leave no other reasonable conclusion possible.
See also DAIRO V. STATE (2017) 9-12 SC 119. IKPO V. STATE (2016) 10 NWLR (PT. 1521 501 and BAKARE V. STATE (1987) 1 NWLR (pt. 52) 579.

In the instant appeal, the first and second ingredients of the offence are not in serious contention. The main plank upon which this appeal has been fought is that the prosecution failed to prove that the Appellant was the person who attacked the victim (PW3), the identification of the accused as a participant in the commission of a crime is a crucial factor in the successful prosecution of a case of armed robbery. Identification evidence is that which tends to show that the person charged is the same person seen at the locus criminis. See NWATURUOCHA V. STATE (SUPRA).

Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that PW3 did not give the description or names of her attackers to the police prior to their arrest, especially as she stated that they covered their faces with caps. Under cross-examination, she stated that in her statement to the police, she told them that she knew the accused persons, although she did not know their names. Her statement to the police was not tendered with a view to challenging her on that aspect of her evidence. it follows therefore that her evidence remained unshaken, even under cross-examination.

She stated that she saw the Appellant and his co-accused sitting close to the shop of one Baidu, with whom she was conducting her business, and that they were gambling and smoking Indian hemp and that they saw when the said Baidu counted money and handed over to her for the goods she had sold to him. She was clear and unequivocal in her testimony. The learned trial Judge, who had the opportunity of listening to her testimony and observing her demeanour in the witness box, believed her. The lower Court agreed with her.

Even though PW3 said the robbers covered their faces with caps at the time they attacked her, she had testified not only that she knew them, even though she did not know their names, she also stated that she had seen them shortly before she was attacked observing her transaction with Baidu.

In addition, the Appellant made a confessional statement wherein he stated inter alia, as follows
“I could remember on 16/6/06 about 1500 hours myself and Atto Maba of the same Village. We conspired and went to the bush between Takkau village to Gaddau Village with knife and attacked one Fatima Darai F of Sabro Village. Atto Mabo was armed with knife and also used a cap and covered his face. He also told me to jack the Fatima Darai neck whenever we meet with her in the bush so he will then removed knife and told her to bring money. When we were in the bush Fatima then came we rushed to her and I jacked her neck while Atto Maba removed knife and said to her to bring money or he will kill her. She bring out the money and Atto Maba collected the money and we went away and leave her in the bush. We counted the money the sum of N5,000.00 which we shared equal each take N2,500 I spent my share as follows 1- I bought one packet of standard cigarette at N75.00k while I continued spending it with remaining balance of N980.00K of which is the part of the money (l was) I recovered from me N980.00K The money are in the following denomination four pieces of N200…”

Section 28 of the Evidence Act 2011, provides as follows as I quote;
“A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime”
It is settled law that an accused person may be convicted solely on the basis of his confessional statement if it is positive, direct, unequivocal and voluntarily made. See YESUFU V. STATE (1976) 6 SC 167 @ 173, NWACHUKWU V. STATE (2003) NWLR (pt. 123) 312 and KAMILA V. STATE (2018) 8 N WLR (pt. 1621) 252.
There can be no better proof of the commission of a crime than the words of the accused himself, voluntarily stating how the offence was committed and the role he played.

In the instant case, not only did the Appellant give a graphic account of all that transpired, he also gave details of how the money taken from the victim was shared between him and his co-accused and how he spent his own share. Notwithstanding the positive, direct and unequivocal confession, it is the usual practice of the Courts to consider facts outside the statement, no matter how minimal, that suggest that the confession is likely to be true. The questions the Court would ask itself are as follows;
I. is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true
II. is it corroborated?
III. are the relevant statements made in it true as far as they can be tasted?
IV. Was the accused person one who had the opportunity of committing the crime?
V. Is the confession possible
Vi. Is it consistent with other facts, which have been ascertained and proved?
See R V. SYKES (1913) 18 CR APP. REP 2331, EGBOGHONOME V. STATE (1993) 7 NWLR (pt.306) 383 OJEGELE V. STATE (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 414 and SIMEON V. STATE (2018) 13 NWLR (pt. 1635) 128.

As observed earlier, the two lower Courts found the evidence of PW3 to be cogent convincing and credible. Her evidence corroborates the facts contained in exhibits C and C1. The contention of learned counsel for the Appellant that PW3’s testimony was procured to tally with exhibits C and C1 is speculative and totally without basis.

It is evident from the testimony of PW3 that she knew the Appellant and his co-accused prior to the incident, even though she did not know their names. The Court was entitled to treat the Appellant’s confessional statement as having been voluntarily made, as the objection to its voluntariness was withdrawn after the commencement of the trial within trial. Where an accused person unequivocally admits that he committed the crime for which he is charged, an identification parade is no longer necessary.

Learned counsel for the Appellant has been unable to satisfy this Court that there were any material contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to warrant interference by this Court, the Appellant himself having confessed to committing the crime.

The fact that the police initially investigated a case of extortion is also of no moment. The charges before the Court were conspiracy and armed robbery and that is the case on which evidence was led and which was proved by the prosecution.

Furthermore, having confessed that he committed the offence in the company of and with the cooperation of his co-accused as stated by PW3, the charge for conspiracy was fully established. Having acted in concert with another to do an illegal act, it makes no difference who did what in the prosecution of the crime.

On the whole therefore, I am satisfied that the Appellant was properly connected to the crime with which he was charged. Appellant has not made a case for interference by this Court, l am not convinced that there is any reason for us to tinker with the concurrent findings of the trial and the lower Court. The sole issue for determination in this appeal is therefore resolved against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent. Appellant’s appeal therefore lacks merit, it is hereby dismissed.

The judgment of the lower Court delivered on the 4th day of March, 2016, in appeal number CA/S/36C/2010 is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Tijjani Abubakar JSC and to register the support I have in the reasonings from which the decision came about, I shall make some remarks.

This is an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal, Sokoto Division or Court below or lower Court delivered on the 7th day of December, 2012, Coram: Tijjani Abdullahi, Philomena Mbua Ekpe, Moore AA Adumein JJCA wherein their Lordships dismissed the appeal of the Appellant and affirmed the conviction and sentence per Malami Umar Dogon Daji J.

BACKGROUND FACTS
The Appellant was charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery and robbery while armed with a knife on or about the 16th day of June 2006, at about 1500 hrs in Takkau village of Tansaza Local Government within the Sokoto Judicial Division and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 97 of the Penal Code.

The Appellant herein pleaded not guilty to the charges. The prosecution called a total of 4 witnesses while the Appellant called two witnesses.

The prosecution witnesses’ evidence before the trial Court is to the effect that on the 16th day of June, 2006 the Appellant attacked and robbed one Fatima Darai while armed with knife and carted away the sum of N5,020. The prosecution relied heavily on the supposed Confessional Statement of the Appellant.

The Appellant put up his defence and stated before the trial Court that he knew nothing about the crime and that his purported extra judicial statement was not voluntarily made.

THE CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
The case of the prosecution can be gleaned from the testimonies of PW1-PW4 being the witnesses called by the prosecution to prove its case before the trial Court.

The 1st Prosecution witness is one Sergeant Ahmed Bala Bala — PW1 — He testified that he is an Exhibit Keeper attached to D Department C.I.D. Sokoto.

He testified that on 21st June, 2006 while on duly one Sergeant Chindo Manu an IPO attached to his department brought to him a knife and sum of N980.00 in company of the accused. He testified that he was not there when the alleged armed robbery was committed and that he did not investigate the case.

The 2nd Prosecution witness was one Sergeant Chindo Manu. He testified that he knew the accused persons. He testified that on 20th June, 2006 about 1430hrs, the accused and exhibits recovered from them were handed over to him. The exhibits according to him included the sum of N980 and a butcher knife.

The defence counsel objected to the admissibility of the statements of the accused persons on the ground that they were induced to give the statement involuntarily.

A trial within trial was thereafter conducted wherein he testified that he did not obtain the accused person’s statement by force, threat, duress, promise or intimidation from himself or any member of the department and that the statement was obtained voluntarily.
Under cross-examination, he testified that the statement of the accused was made voluntarily.

The PW3 was one Fatima Darai a trader. She said that on her way home from Takkau Village where she had gone to transact a business on 16th June, 2006, she was attacked by the Accused and his friend. According to her, the accused attacked her with a knife and collected the sum of N5,020 with a threat to kill her should she fail to deliver possession of the above stated objects. Under re-examination- she testified that it was the 1st accused person that held her neck but that she could not exactly say who put the knife on her.

The 4th prosecuting witness was one Yahaya Lawal. He testified that he is a Police Constable attached to Gidan Madi Police Division as an IPO. That he knew the accused person. He narrated how he investigated the case. That on the 18th June, 2006, a search was conducted in the house and premises of the 1st accused and nothing was found therein.

Under cross-examination, he testified that he was surprised to hear that the sum of N5,020 was collected from the Complainant i.e. PW3 and that it was the accused persons that put a knife on her throat.

THE DEFENCE’S CASE
The DWI testified in defence of his case, that he did not know anything about the crime. He remembered having been tied and beaten up till he lost consciousness. He testified not knowing how he signed the papers brought to him by the Police but remembered that the Police told him that upon carrying out proper investigation, it was discovered that he was not guilty. He also testified not to know/understand what was written on the said papers.

Under cross-examination, he testified that he is not a farmer but only sells food items. He confirmed that upon his arrest on the 19th of June 2006, he was transferred to the CID Office in Sokoto where one Sergeant Chindo Manu tortured him. He also reaffirmed the fact that he was unconscious when the said statement was signed.

On the 24th February, 2022 date of hearing, learned counsel for the Appellant, P.O Ojiehanor Esq adopted the brief of argument settled by L. Olasejnde Karim Esq and filed on 24/8/2015 and raised a single question for determination, viz:
Whether hearing regard to the evidence in this case, the lower Court was right in affirming the decision that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, (Distilled from grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Grounds of Appeal).

Learned Senior Advocate, Suleiman Usman, the Attorney General of Sokoto State for the Respondent adopted the brief of argument filed on 11/1/2016 and deemed filed on 14/11/2019. He differently crafted a sole issue for determination as follows:
Whether in the circumstances of this case, the lower Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial Court regards being had to the evidence adduced.
For ease of reference I shall make use of the issue drafted by the Appellant.

SOLE ISSUE
Whether having regard to the evidence in this case, the lower Court was right in affirming the decision that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the prosecution did not adduce cogent evidence to prove the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery as required by law. He cited Yongo v COP (1992) 8 NWLR pt. 257; Onafowokan v State (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 61) 538 at 540; Alabi v State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt 307) 511 515 etc.

That the learned trial Judge based his decision on the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant which was not voluntarily made. He cited Abubakar v Chuks (2008) 20 WRN 27 at 44; FRN v Borisade (2015) 5 NWLR (pt 1451) 155 at 159 etc.

For the Appellant, it was contended that material contradictions existed in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which cast doubt that cannot be ignored. He referred to Nwankwoala v State (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 1000) 663 at 666; Dagayya v State (2006) 7 NWLR (pt 980) 637 at 647 etc.

That the lower Court failed to embark on a fresh appraisal which is perverse and has occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the Appellant hence the need for the interference of the Apex Court. He cited C.S.S Bookshops Ltd v R.T.M.C.R.S (2006) 11 NWLR (pt 992) 530 at 544.

Learned Attorney General for the Respondent submitted that all the ingredients of the offences charged were duly established beyond reasonable doubt. He relied on Fatai Olayinka v State (2007) 9 NWLR (pt 1040) 561 etc.

That apart from the eye witness account of PW3, there was the confessional statement made by the Appellant admitted without objection. He cited Eke v State (2011) 2 SCNJ 57 in support.

For the Respondent, it was further contended that the contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which the Appellant pointed to were not material enough to vitiate the convictions.

RESOLUTION
It is indeed past par-adventure that where an accused person is charged with the offence of armed robbery, the prosecution is duty bound to establish by evidence the following elements beyond reasonable doubt to wit:
1. Theft by the accused person,
2 The causing of hurt or wrongful restraint on the victim by the accused person,
3. That the acts complained of were done in the process of committing the theft or in order to commit the theft and/or carry away the property obtained by the theft.
4 That the accused person did the acts complained of by voluntarily and
5 That the accused person was armed with a dangerous weapon while committing the offence in question.
I place reliance on the case of Abdullahi v State (2008) 17 NWLR (Pt 1115) 203 at 205.

The stance of the Appellant is that the prosecution has not discharged this bounden duty of proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt as required in the administration of criminal justice in our land. Generally, there is no duty on the accused/Appellant to prove his innocence since under Nigeria system of criminal justice, there is no question of accused proving his innocence before the law Court hence during a trial, an accused may not utter a word as he is not bound to say anything. The duty is on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt whether or not the accused says anything. See Igabele v State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt 975) 100 at 108, Williams v State (1992) 8 NWLR (pt 261) 515 at 516-517; Section 137 Evidence Act, Alonge v Inspector General of Police (1959) NSCC 169; (1959) 4 FSC 203.
The above principle is further enhanced in the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which Section 36(5) of the 1999 provides thus:
“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty provided that noting in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon any such person the burden of proving particular facts”.

The Appellant has argued that the identity of the Appellant was not established so as to link him with the crime and that the learned trial Judge wrongly relied on the extra-judicial statement of the Appellant to reach the conclusion that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

In the charge preferred against the Appellant, he was alleged to have conspired with Atto maba and attacked and robbed one Fatima Darai of Sabro Village in a bush between Tukkar and Guddau Villages of Tangaza Local Government of Sokoto State and forcefully collect the sum of N5,000 from her.

The Respondent submits that to prove the charge of robbery under Section 289 of the Penal Code the prosecution is required to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the ingredients of the offence, earlier enumerated.

See S.S. Richardson’s Annotated Notes on the Penal Code, Fourth Edition, pages 231-233.

I agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent that all the ingredients of the offences were duly established beyond reasonable doubt before the trial Court and the lower Court was correct in affirming the decision of the trial Court.

The whole ingredients of the offence of robbery under the Penal Code were established through the evidence of PW3 who was the victim of the robbery and the only eye witness, who saw and suffered from the acts of the Appellant and whose evidence needs no corroboration to secure a conviction as well as through exhibits tendered in the case; exhibits 1 and 1A. See to the decision of NIKI TOBI JSC in the case of FATAI OLAYINKA V STATE (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt 1040) 561.

Indeed, in Adeniyi Adekoya v. The State (2012) 9 NWLR (pt 1306) 539 at 566 — 567, The Supreme Court Per Adekeye, JSC held thus;
“The guilt of an accused person can be proved by:
a. Confessional Statement
b. Evidence of eyewitness of a crime
c. Circumstantial evidence” With regard to the offence of armed robbery, PW3, Fatima Darai who is the eyewitness and the victim of the crime stated that she travelled to Takkau village to transact business with her customer named Baidu and after selling her commodities, her customer counted the sum of N5,020 (Five Thousand and Twenty naira) and gave her in the presence of the Appellant and his co-accused who accosted her on her way to her village. The Appellant herein held her neck while the other co-accused held her thighs and the Appellant pushed her down. After she had fallen down, the co-accused brought out a knife and said she should give them the money or else they will kill her. She pleaded with them not to kill her and after slapping her, the co-accused collected the money from her and ran away. While the Appellant held her down. PW3 later returned home and went to police station to report the matter. She stated under cross-examination that “the accused were covering their heads with cap” and confirmed that they collected the sum of 5,020 from her.

It is evident that apart from the eyewitness account of PW3, there was also a confessional statement made by the Appellant which was tendered through PW2, the Investigating Police Officer (IPO) which was admitted in evidence after the initial objection was withdrawn by the accused counsel and marked Exhibit B while its English translation was marked exhibit B1.

In respect of the 2nd count of the charge of conspiracy, it was established through the evidence of PW2 and PW3 and exhibit 1 which is the knife used by the Appellant and exhibit 1A which is the money, stolen and recovered from the Appellant. PW 2 testified that he knew the Appellant when the Appellant was brought to him to the C.I.D Office in connection to the case of conspiracy and robbery. While PW 3 who is the victim in the case testified that the Appellant was the one who fell her down and held her neck while he brought out a knife and said she should give them money or else they would kill her. See EKE V STATE (2011) 2 SCNJ 57.

I hereby refer to the case of DIBIE v. STATE (2007) 3 SEC, (pt. 1) 176 at 193 where the Supreme Court had this to say;
“Before I reach my conclusion on the eye witness account of the PW1 and 4, (sic) I would pause here to comment on Exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’, the confessional statements made by the 2nd and 3rd accused persons respectively, It is trite law that a Court can convict on the confessional statement of an accused person, It so also prudent for a Court, before doing so, to test the confessional statement against other facts outside the confession itself ‘G’ is the confessional statement of the 2nd accused, while Exhibit ‘K’ is that of the 3rd accused. The 2nd accursed person, in these statements said it was the 3rd accused who was armed with the gun and that he was the one who pointed at the P.W and demanded for money. The evidence of the P.W corroborate this. They also stated that the sum of N4,000 was handed over to the 3rd accused. The evidence of the PW1 corroborates these statements. They stated that the 1st accused was at the corridor or outside acting as the lookout the evidence of the PW1 corroborates these statements. These are the material facts in an offence of armed robbery, and the Court is of the view that the evidence of the PW1 corroborates Exhibit ‘G’ and ‘K’ in all material particulars. The Court is satisfied therefore, that Exhibits ‘G’ and ‘K’ are free and voluntary statements made by the 2nd and 3rd accused persons respectively, and that the Court can convict them on these statements, even standing alone.” A voluntary confession by itself without any other evidence is sufficient to support a conviction. The learned trial Judge however, found corroboration, I resolve this issue also against the appellants.”

The Appellant argued that there was contradiction in the testimonies of PW3 and PW4, that PW3 testified that the persons who robbed her had their faces covered with caps, robbed her N5,020 and PW4 mentioned that PW3 informed him that N5,000 was stolen from her. PW3 mentioned seeing the accused persons gambling, and smoking Indian hemp near the shop of one Baidu and the accused persons were near the shop when the said Baidu gave her the sum of N5,020 (Five thousand and Twenty naira). On the contrary, there are no material contradictions in the testimonies of PW3 and PW4 to vitiate the decision of the Court below. See Eke v state (2011) 6 NCC Page 5.

It is correct as the Respondent submits that from the evidence of the witnesses above namely PW 1, PW2, PW3 and PW4, the Respondent has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant. In the case of EKE V STATE (2011) 6 NCC page 1 at 7, the Court held that “It is quite clear that the prosecution had proved its case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. With the evidence of the robbery even without confessional statement of the appellant, the prosecution was still on strong ground in discharging its burden of proof.”

In the case at hand, the evidence of PW3 who is the only eye witness and victim in the case corroborated the confessional statement of the accused/appellant. Indeed the Respondent has discharged its burden effectively and by the evidence adduced at trial, proved beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of the appellant, and that the lower Court properly evaluated the evidence before it and thereafter convicted and sentenced the Appellant.

A curious turn in this proceeding is the Appellant raising the issue of admissibility of his confessional statement. I say so because of what transpired at the trial Court, wherein Appellant initially raised the matter of the admissibility of the confessional statement and the trial Court ordering a trial-within trial. After the commencement of the trial within trial, the Appellant withdrew his objection and the trial-within-trial was dispensed with and the lower Court rightly admitted the statements in evidence. He could not therefore raise this issue in this appeal as he had already waived his right to object to the admissibility of the said confessional statement, which in effect means he had conceded to the fact that it was voluntarily made and which also means that the trial Court had no business in testing the voluntariness of the confessional statement. I refer to the case of YAHAYA V STATE (2005) 1 NCC page 1220 at 122.

Furthermore, PW2 in his evidence-in-chief stated that he is a sergeant attached to ‘D’ Department C.I.D Office Sokoto as an IPO, he also testified that as an IPO his duties are investigation of cases. He said that he knew the accused person. He was on duty at C.I.D Office when a case of conspiracy and armed robbery was transferred from Divisional Police Headquarters Gidan Madi Tangaza L.G.A. where the two accused persons were the suspect, “which I and team were detailed for investigation. The accused and the exhibits that were brought from the divisional police headquarters were handed over to me. I took the two accused persons to the detective room where we do investigate cases. I recorded the statement of the accused person in Hausa Language. I read and explained the words of caution to the 1st accused person Abubakar Ibrahim and he said he understood and he signed by using his thumbprint I then counter-signed as a recorder, the accused voluntarily gave me his statement. I read ‘the statement to his hearing and he said it is correct and I counter-signed as a recorder. I did not cause the accused person to give his statement”.

It is necessary at this point to have recourse to the guiding principles earlier enunciated by this Court upon the retraction of an extra-judicial statement of an accused person.
In the case of DIBIE V STATE (2007) 2 NCC page 475 at 482, ratio 16. It was held:
“That the retraction of a confessional statement by an accused person in his evidence on oath during trial does not adversely affect the situation once the Court is satisfied as to its truth and can rely solely on the confessional statement to ground a conviction, ” Per Ogbuagu, JSC.
Also in the case of OLABODE V STATE (2007) 2 NCC page 711 at 714 it was held that “The fact that an accused person as in this case subsequently retracts or resiles from his confession (as exhibits D and D1) does not mean that the Court cannot act on it and convict him accordingly as the circumstances of the case justify it. It is however, desirable particularly if the confession is subsequently retracted that there should be corroboration, no matter how slight, but a conviction will not be questioned merely because it is based entirely upon the evidence by a confession by the accused. In the present case, the confessional statement of the Appellant was corroborated by the evidence of PW3 who is the only eye witness and victim in this case. See also the case of GBOKO V STATE (2011) 6 NCC Page 312 at 317.

It follows that the retraction of the Appellant’s statement to the police at this stage is of no moment to the proof of the charge against him and his conviction by the lower Court.

I see no fault in the concurrent findings of facts of the two lower Courts and their eventual decisions. Clearly, there is no merit in this appeal which I too dismiss.

I abide by the consequential orders made.
Appeal dismissed.

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Tijjani Abubakar, JSC just delivered. The reasoning and conclusion therein reflect my views in this appeal.

In support and for emphasis, I shall make a few remarks. The Appellant and his co-accused, one Atto Maba were alleged to have conspired to rob and to have robbed one Fatima Darai While armed with a knife on or about the 16th day of June, 2006 in Takau Village of Tangaza Local Government Area of Sokoto State and in the process were forcefully collected the sum of N5,000 from her. They pleaded not guilty to the two-count charge.

PW3, the victim of the offence testified inter alia that the Appellant and his co-accused were gambling and smoking cannabis outside a shop close to where she was transacting business with her customer, one Baidu, who was paying her for goods supplied to him. On her way back to her village, she alleged that the Appellant and his co-accused waylaid her. The Appellant held her by the neck and pulled her to the ground while his co-accused produced a knife and threatened to slit her throat unless she handed over the money she had just collected. They stripped her of her shirt and in the process, the sum of N5,000 was taken from her. She reported the matter to the Police and at the earliest opportunity informed them that she knew the accused persons even though she did not know their names.

Among the exhibits tendered in the case were a knife (Exhibit 1); the sum of N980 (Exhibit 1A); the statement of the Appellant (Exhibits C and C1 – Hausa and English versions). The Appellant and his co-accused testified on their own behalf and did not call any other witnesses.

When the prosecution sought to tender Exhibits C and C1, which are confessional in nature, an objection was raised to their admissibility on grounds of involuntariness. A trial within trial (TWT) was conducted. After the prosecution closed its case in the TWT, the Appellant withdrew his objection and the statements were admitted in evidence. It is pertinent to state here, that having withdrawn his objection, the issue of its admissibility no longer arises. The contention of learned counsel for the Appellant in paragraphs 4.22 and 4.23 of the record that Exhibit C and C1 were not made voluntarily is misconceived.

One of the methods by which the prosecution can discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, is through his own confession as to the role he played in the commission of the crime. A confession by the perpetrator of a crime has been held to be the best evidence that could be relied upon as to his guilt so long as it is positive, unequivocal, shown to be voluntary and satisfactorily proved. See: Mohammed Vs The State (2020) LPELR-52451 (SC) at 10 A-E; Fabiyi vs The State (2015) LPELR-24834 (SC) at 24 B-C; Timothy vs FRN (2012) 6 SC (Pt. 111) 159. Other methods the prosecution may rely on are the evidence of eyewitnesses and/or circumstantial evidence.

In the instant case, apart from the Appellant’s confessional statement, the prosecution relied on the evidence of PW3, the victim of the offence, which both the trial Court and the Court below found to be credible and unimpeached.

Although a confessional statement is sufficient to ground a conviction, it is now the practice of the Court to examine the surrounding evidence thoroughly to ascertain whether there are other facts outside the statement, no matter how slight, that show that the confession is likely to be true. The questions the Court is advised to ask itself are:
(i) Is there anything outside the confession to show that it is true?
(ii) Is it corroborated?
(iii) Are the relevant statements made in it true as far as they can be tested?
(iv) Was the accused person one who had the opportunity of committing the crime?
(v) Is the confession possible?
(vi) Is it consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved?
See: R vs Sykes (1913) 18 cr, App. Rep. 233; Egboghonome Vs The State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 306) 583; Simeon vs The State (2018) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1635) 128.

In convicting the Appellant and his co-accused, the learned trial Judge considered the evidence of PW3, which was extrinsic to Exhibits C and C1. Having found her to be a witness of truth, the Court had no difficulty in finding that her evidence corroborated the contents of Exhibit C and C1 wherein the Appellant not only stated in graphic detail how he and his co-accused waylaid PW3 in the bush, attacked her with a knife and stole the sum of N5,000 from her, he went further by stating that his share of the loot was N2,500 and gave a detailed account of how he spent it.

Where an accused retracts his confessional statement at the trial, it does not affect its admissibility. The duty of the Court is to consider it along with other evidence before it and determine the weight to attach to it.

In the instant case, the Appellant and his co-accused were positively identified by their victim, PW3. Her testimony as to how she was attacked confirms the Appellant’s narration in Exhibits C and C1. He was thus fixed at the scene by PW3 and on his own showing. The Court below, rightly in my view, affirmed the findings of the learned trial Judge on the culpability of the Appellant in the commission of the crime. The Court was also right when it held that the recognition of the Appellant by PW3, as one of the robbers was even more reliable than if an identification parade were to have been conducted.

The appeal of the Appellant’s co-accused to this Court was dismissed on 10/1/2020 in SC. 778/2016: Atto Maba Vs The State. I maintain the position taken by this Court in that appeal.

The Appellant has failed to persuade me that the findings of fact made by the two lower Courts were perverse to warrant interference by this Court.
The appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed,
Appeal dismissed.

ABDU ABOKI, J.S.C.: I had the privilege of reading before now, a draft of the lead judgment written by my learned brother, TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JSC. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion, arrived thereat, and wish to add a few words in support.

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, holden at Sokoto, delivered on the 7th December, 2012, wherein that Court, affirmed the trial Court’s conviction and sentence of the Appellant for the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery, contrary to Sections 97 and 298C of the Penal Code,

The story of the Prosecution was that the Appellant and one Atto Maba, while armed with a knife on or about the 16th of June 2006, in TakKau Village of Tansawa Local Government, attacked and robbed one Fatima Darai, of the sum of N5,000 (Five Thousand Naira). The Appellant and the other defendant pleaded not guilty and the trial commenced. Prosecution in proof of its case called four witnesses the Appellant gave evidence in his own defence and denied committing the offences charged. Appellant also called another witness. In a considered judgment the trial Judge convicted the Appellant in respect of the offences of conspiracy and armed robbery and he was sentenced to three (3) years without option of fine, for each of the offences, and the sentence was to run concurrently.

The Appellant was aggrieved by this decision, and appealed to the Court below, which dismissed the appeal, and affirmed the judgment of the trial Court.

The Appellant is still aggrieved, hence his appeal to this Court, wherein he raised a singular issue for determination, namely:
“Whether having regard to the evidence in this case, the lower Court was right in affirming the decision that the Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt?”

The Respondent also distilled a sole issue for determination, to wit:
“Whether in the circumstance of this case, the lower Court was right in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and affirming the decision of the trial Court, regards being had to the evidence adduced?”

My Learned Brother TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JSC, has adroitly summarized the arguments of Counsel on both sides of the divide, in respect of their sole issue, which is the same in purport, though couched differently. I also adopt arguments as summarized by my Learned Brother, and advance a few words in support.

It is not in doubt, that the ingredients of the offence of armed robbery under Section 298C of the Penal Code is that:
1. That the accused committed theft;
2. That he caused or attempted to cause to some person:
i. Death, hurt or wrongful restraint, or
ii. Fear of instant death or instant hurt or instant restraint.
3. That he did as above:
i. In committing theft, or
ii. In order to commit theft, or
iii. In carrying away or attempting to carry away the property obtained by that theft.

The 2nd and 3rd ingredients as listed above are not in serious contention. What is the pith of the instant appeal is whether or not the identity of the Appellant as the person who committed the offence, has been established.

It is the law that one of the ways by which the Prosecution can discharge the burden of establishing the guilt of an accused person, is through his own confession, as to the role he played in the commission of the crime.
By Section 28 of the Evidence Act, 2011, as amended, a confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime.
In Adebayo v. State (2014) LPELR-22988(SC) this Court held that:
“A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime, stating or suggesting the inference that he committed the crime and this includes both extra-judicial and judicial confessions. It also includes an incriminating admission made that is not direct and positive and short of a full confession.”
See also:
Akpan v. State (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 745,
Jimoh v. The State (2014) LPELR – 22464 (SC):.

The evidence adduced by the Prosecution in the instant appeal, clearly consisted of the confessional statement and evidence of an eye witness. These admittedly constitute two of the three ways or methods of proving the guilt of an accused person, the third method being circumstantial evidence.

Exhibits C and C1 are the Hausa and English versions of the Appellant’s extra-judicial statements respectively. When these statements were sought to be tendered, an objection was raised as to their voluntariness, which prompted the trial Court to conduct a trial within trial. After the Prosecution closed its case on the TWT, the Appellant withdrew his objection, and the statements, which were confessional in nature, were admitted in evidence. It. follows therefore that the Appellant’s contention that Exhibits C and C1 were not voluntarily made, is without basis.

What did the Appellant say in Exhibit C1?
“l could remember on 16/6/2006, about 1500hours, myself and Atto Maba of the sane village, conspired and went to the bush between Takkau village to Giddau village with knife and attacked one Fatima Darai, ‘F’ of Sabro villager Atto Maba was armed with knife, and also a cap which covered his face. He also told me to jack Fatima Darai neck whenever we meet her in the bush, so he will then remove knife and told(sic) her to bring money. When we were in the bush, Fatima, then came, we rushed to her and I jacked her neck while Atto Maba removed knife and said to her to bring money or he will kill her. She bring out the money and Atto Maba collected the money and we went away and leave her in the bush. We counted the money the sum of N5,000.00 which we shared equal each take N2,500…”

PW3, Fatima Darai (the victim of the attack) was consistent in her testimony that though she knew the attacked, she however did not know their names. She stated that she saw the Appellant and the other convict, sitting close to the shop of one Baidu, with whom she was conducting her business, and that they were gambling and smoking Indian hemp. According to her, they saw when the said Baidu counted out some money and gave to her for the goods she sold to him. Under cross-examination, she maintained that though they covered their faces with caps, she still recognized them, because she had seen them shortly before the attack and they were observing her transaction with Baidu.

The learned trial Judge, who had the opportunity of listening to her testimony and observing her demeanour, found her testimony to be credible and unimpeached. The Court below agreed with the trial Court.

Looking at the evidence on record, particularly the only eye witness to the commission of the crime, one will be right to say that all the above listed ingredients of the offence of Armed Robbery under Section 298C of the Penal Code have been established. The Appellant, narrated with exactitude, how he and Atto Maba attacked and robbed Fatima Darai. This was by the evidence of the victim, PW3. There is an unmistakable and straight fact that the conjunctive ingredients of armed robbery, punishable under Section 298C of the Penal Code, have been established against the Respondent.

In fact, it is trite that even the confessional statement of the Respondent suffices to convict him for the offence charged. It is settled law that an accused person can be convicted solely on his confessional statement. if a Court of law comes to the conclusion that a statement made by an accused person satisfies all the legal requirements of a confessional statement, then the charge against the accused must of necessity have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The reason is simply that the Court can and does convict an accused person solely on his confessional statement.
See generally:

State v. Ahmed (2020) LPELR 49497 SC
Tope v. State (2019) LPELR- 47837(SC)
Fatai v. State (2013) LPELR-20182(SC)

As indicated earlier, the evidence of PW3 corroborated the contents of Exhibits C and C1, which invariably fixed the Appellant at the scene of the crime. The two Courts below found as a fact, that the Appellant was one of the perpetrators of the crime.

The above concurrent findings of facts by the learned trial Judge and the Court of Appeal are factually and legally sound and does not merit any interference by this Court. Without any clear evidence of errors in law or fact leading to or occasioning miscarriage of justice, this Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings.
It is settled law that there must be clear proof of error either of law or of fact on the record which has occasioned miscarriage of justice before this Court can upset or reverse concurrent findings of fact. See:
Ogundiyan v. The State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 181) 519,
Ogoala v. The State (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 175) 509.

The Appellant has not, in my opinion, adduced any evidence to convince me to set aside the concurrent decisions of the two Courts below.

Based on the above and the fuller reasons enunciated in the lead judgment of my Learned Brother TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, JSC, I agree that there is no merit in this appeal. It is hereby dismissed by me.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal which affirmed the conviction and sentence of the Appellant of three years imprisonment without option of fine, by the High Court of Sokoto State, is further affirmed by me.
Appeal dismissed

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.: My Learned brother, the Hon. Justice Tijjani Abubakar, JSC has accorded me the opportunity of reading in draft, the judgment just delivered. I entirely concur with the reasoning expressed therein, to the conclusive effect that the present appeal is grossly unmeritorious.

Hence, having adopted the said reasoning and conclusion as mine, I too hereby dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal Sokoto Judicial Division, delivered on March 4th, 2016.
Appeal dismissed.

Appearances:

P. O. Ojiehanor Esq For Appellant(s)

Sulaiman Usman SAN, Adah Usman Esq with him Anayo Illo Esq For Respondent(s)