EBINIKE & ORS v. OKOYE & ORS (2022)

EBINIKE & ORS v. OKOYE & ORS

(2022)LCN/16388(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Thursday, June 02, 2022

CA/AW/558/2014

Before Our Lordships:

Chioma Egondu Nwosu-Iheme Justice of the Court of Appeal

Frederick Oziakpono Oho Justice of the Court of Appeal

Patricia Ajuma Mahmoud Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

1. NWANKWO EBINIKE 2. EDMUND NWANGBAKOR 3. TIMOTHY NWEKE 4. NWANYA ARIZE 5. NWEKE ARIZE 6. ANTHONY ONWUASOANYA (For Themselves And On Behalf Of The Umuokili Family Lfite Village,Nibo) APPELANT(S)

And

1. PATRICK OKOYE 2. DANIEL EMESIANI 3. REUBEN OYENTA 4. EUGENE OKAFOR S. EUGENE OKOYE 6. NWONICHA CHIOEBE 7. BENJAMIN OKAFOR 8. JONATHAN OYENTA 9. IFEANYI NWEKE 10. ANAYO OGBUEFI 11. VICTOR OKEKE (For Themselves And On Behalf Of Other Members Of Obunasato Group Of Families Urnuonurn. Nibo) RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO:

THE POSITION OF LAW ON VOLUNTARY OATH-TAKING BY PARTIES TO RESOLVE A DISPUTE

……the case of OKEREKE & ANOR vs. NWANKWO & ANOR (2003) LPELR- 2445 SC, where the Apex Court per EDOZIE, JSC had this to say on the subject:
“From the principles enunciated in these decisions, the ingredients or preconditions for a valid customary arbitration may be stated to be as follows: 1. that there has been a voluntary submission of the matter in dispute to an arbitration of one or more persons; 2. that it was agreed by the parties either expressly or by implication that the decision of the arbitrators will be accepted as final and binding; 3. that the arbitration was in accordance with the custom of the parties or of their trade or business; 4. that the arbitrators reached a decision and published their award and; 5. that the decision or award was accepted at the time it was made. See Ohiaeri vs. Akabeze (supra).” FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.

POSITION OF LAW ON TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH TITLE TO LAND

The settled position of the law is that one of the five ways to establish title to land in Nigeria is by traditional evidence. See the case of IDUNDUN vs. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9-10 Sc. 227 and a host of other decisions on the subject. It is also settled that once the traditional evidence is found to be conclusive and cogent, as in the instant case, there would be no need whatsoever to require further proof. See the cases of AKUNYILI vs. EJIDIKE (1996) 5 NWLR (PT. 449) 381 at 417; BALOGUN vs. AKANJI (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 70) 301 etc. But the traditional evidence must be such that it is consistent and properly links the Plaintiff with the traditional history relied upon. For this, see the case of OWOADE vs. OMITOLA (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 77) 413. The Plaintiff must prove his title to the land and this he has to do by tracing title to his ancestors both orally in Court. See also the case of EGWA vs. EGWA (2007) 1 NWLR [PT. 1014] 71, 87 – 88, R. 2, cited by learned Respondent’s Counsel and in a case wherein the Court held that a Plaintiff who traced his root of title, has established his title through traditional evidence. FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A.

FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court of Anambra State sitting at the Idemili Judicial Division (hereinafter referred to as: “the Court below”) and delivered the 26th day of June, 2014 Coram: IJEM ONWUAMAEGBU, J wherein the Learned Trial Judge entered judgment for the Respondents and granted both declarative and injunctive reliefs, as well as monetary damages against Appellants. It is this decision that the Appellants now appeal against.

The brief fact of the case is that the Respondents, as Plaintiffs in the trial Court, brought this action against the Appellants seeking declaration of title to land known as “Ana Edeagu” and situate in Ifite Village Nibo, Anambra State. The Plaintiffs’ case was that the parcel of land in dispute belonged to them because there had been a customary arbitration of the dispute in 1992 by Ozo-Nibo Society, which was favourable to Plaintiffs. See pages 5-8 of the records. Defendant’s denied that any such arbitration took place as they refused to submit to Arbitration by Ozo-Nibo. See pages 95, 240-241 and 386 of the Records.

As the hearing progressed, it became clear to both parties and the trial Court that the matter is simply a case of boundary dispute at an area in Nibo, which each party calls ‘Edeagu’ land. This made the parties’ survey plans (Exhibits ‘A’, ‘H’, ‘J’ and ‘W’) critical and extremely crucial for the just determination of the case.

The Learned Trial Judge made a visit to the Locus in Quo and made material factual findings, which were relied upon to render judgment. Evidence was also adduced that PW3, an illiterate person deposed to his affidavit in the chambers of Plaintiff’s Counsel who was not authorized by law to administer oaths and the deposition was not accompanied by a jurat. See pages 1-317 of the Records.

In proof of their claim of declaration of title to the disputed land, the Respondents relied on traditional history and testified that their ancestors exercised acts of ownership and possession and enjoyed: “Ana Edeagu” without disturbance from anybody until 1992 when Defendants/Appellants trespassed into it. See page 385 of the Records. However, there was evidence that Defendants share boundary with Plaintiffs and have been disputing various portions of “Edeagu” land since 1915.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
1. Whether having regards to the nature of the evidence, the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law and thereby occasion a miscarriage of justice when he found that there was a valid customary arbitration in 1992 between the parties? (Grounds 1 and 2).
2. Whether the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law and occasion a miscarriage of justice when during the visit to the locus in quo, the learned trial Judge treated his perception at the scene as a finding of fact without evidence of such perception being given by a witness? (Ground 3).
3. Whether the Learned Trial Judge did not err in law and occasion a miscarriage of justice when he held that the failure by an illiterate person to swear to the witness deposition before a person authorized to administer oaths as required by law does not render the said deposition invalid? (Ground 4).
4. Whether the Learned Trial Judge was correct in finding that Respondents have established their title to the land in dispute through traditional evidence (Ground 5, 6).

On the part of the Respondent, four (4) issues were nominated for the determination of this appeal, thus:
1. Whether the trial Court was right in finding that there was a valid customary arbitration in 1992 between the parties?
2. Whether the trial Court treated its perception at the locus in quo as a finding of fact to the prejudice of the Appellants?
3. Whether there was an illiterate who swore his deposition before a person who was not a Commissioner of Oath in this case; if so, whether that very fact by itself invalidated his testimony in Court?
4. Whether the trial Court was right in finding that the Respondents established their title to the land in dispute by traditional evidence?

A careful perusal of the issues nominated by the parties shows clear signs of similarities except for minor issues of semantics. This appeal shall therefore be determined based on the issues nominated by the Appellants. Learned Counsel addressed this Court extensively, citing a plethora of decided cases in support of their views. The Appellants’ Brief of argument dated 14-5-2014, settled by DR. CHIKE AMOBI, was filed on 18-5-2015, while the Brief of Argument of the Respondents dated 23-10-2015, settled by DR. E. S. OBIORAH, was filed on 27-10-2015. On 3-2-2022 at the hearing of this appeal, learned Counsel for the parties adopted their respective Briefs of Arguments and urged the Court to decide in favour of their sides.

SUBMISSIONS OF COUNSEL:
APPELLANTS:
ISSUE ONE:
Whether having regards to the nature of the evidence, the learned trial Judge did not err in law and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice when he found that there was a valid customary arbitration in 1992 between the parties?
In arguing this issue, Counsel started by submitting that the learned trial Judge erred in law and thereby occasioned a miscarriage of justice when he found that there was a valid customary arbitration in 1992 between the parties. Counsel further stated that the law is clear on the elements required to establish a valid customary arbitration. Counsel cited the case of OKOYE vs. OBIASO (2010) 8 NWLR (PT. 1195) 145 A. C. Counsel further submitted that it is also not in dispute that Oath taking is a valid process under customary arbitration to establish the truth of a matter. See the case of JOHN ONYENGE & ORS vs. CHIEF LOVEDAY EBERE & ORS, (2004) 12 NWLR (PT. 889) 20 AT 40.

Counsel contended that an examination of the timeline of events in this matter clearly shows that no valid customary arbitration ever took place between the parties. According to Respondents, a valid oath taking ceremony took place in or around 1992, upon which they base their contention that the arbitration took place. However, in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Amended Statement of Claim Respondents also copiously recounted another Oath taking ceremony, which took place in 1993 in respect of the same parcel of land, which they claim was in compliance with Ozo-Nibo Society’s decision in 1992. See pages 7-9 of the Records. Learned Counsel therefore asked why was it necessary to conduct another oath taking ceremony in 1993 where the Respondents claim that the 1992 Oath taking ceremony resolved all the issues. According to Counsel, it is clear from the record that when invited by the Ozo-Nibo Society to submit the matter to arbitration, the Appellants consistently refused that invitation. In separate and distinct correspondences to Ozo-Nibo dating back to 1992, receipt of which was duly acknowledged by them, Appellants have consistently declined the invitation to submit to the matter to Ozo-Nibo arbitration. In addition, Counsel further stated that whenever there was any insinuation by Ozo-Nibo that the matter had been adjudicated or resolved by them, Appellants vehemently and promptly refuted these falsehoods. See pages 239-242 of the Records.

Counsel drew attention to the glaring and credible evidence before the trial Court that the decision of the Ozo-Nibo Society, which purports to be the decision reached after the arbitration, was not accepted by the Appellants, thus failing prong (e) of the test enumerated in OKOYE vs. OBIASO (Supra). See the cases of EHOCHE vs. IJEGWA (2003) 7 NWLR (PT. 818) 139; EKE vs. OKWARANYIA (2001) 12 NWLR (PT. 726) 181. Counsel argued that there is no evidence that the purported decision by Ozo-Nibo was ever accepted. On the contrary, there are several documented evidence, which was tendered before the trial Court, showing that Appellants neither submitted to the arbitration, nor accepted the “purported decision”. See pages 239-243 of the Records. Based on the listed authorities as cited above, Appellants respectfully urged this Court to respond to this issue in the affirmative and find that there was no valid customary arbitration between the parties.

Again, Counsel submitted that at trial, Plaintiffs relied on the oral testimony of PW3 to prove that customary arbitration took place between the parties. Counsel disclosed that PW3 is an illiterate witness whose statement on oath was taken by his lawyer, a person not authorized to administer oaths. Counsel further disclosed that PW3’s statement on oath was also not accompanied by a jurat. He argued that the Defendants and Appellants’ herein on the other hand, tendered documentary evidence which indicate otherwise. See pages 388-389 of the Records.

It is the further submission of Counsel that the trial Judge committed an error of law when he found that only those members of the Appellants’ family named by Respondents as being present at the customary arbitration can controvert the eyewitness accounts of the Respondents’ witnesses; in essence, this means that the Court chose to accept uncorroborated oral evidence over credible documentary evidence. Counsel cited the case of FBN PLC vs. IMASUEN & SONS (NIG) LTD (2013) LPELR-20875(CA) wherein the Court held that the position of the law is that oral evidence will not be allowed to vary the content of a document”. See also the cases of AGBAKOBA vs. INEC (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 489; EGHAREVBA vs. OSAGIE (2009) 18 NWLR (PT. 1173) 299. Counsel contended that it is the position of the law that documentary evidence being permanent in form is more reliable than oral evidence. See the cases of FASHANU vs. ADEKOYA (1976) 6 SC 83; EZEMBA vs. IBENEME(2004) 14 NWLR (PT. 894) 617.

Counsel further contended that, on the authority of the above-cited cases, it is now clear that the trial Court misdirected itself when it relied on the oral testimony of PW3 to find that there was a valid arbitration when Appellants put forth credible documentary evidence, which indicated otherwise. Learned Counsel stated that in the light of the overwhelming documentary evidence to the contrary, this is an incorrect statement of the law. Counsel urged this Court to so hold.

ISSUE TWO:
Whether the learned trial Judge did not err in law and thereby occasion a miscarriage of justice when during the visit to the locus in quo, the learned trial Judge treated his perception at the scene as a finding of fact without evidence of such perception being given by a witness?
It is the submission of Counsel that the learned trial Judge erred in law and occasioned a miscarriage of justice when during the visit to the locus in quo, learned trial Judge treated his perception at the scene as a finding of fact without evidence of such perception being given by a witness. According to Counsel, after the close of evidence, the learned trial Judge visited the locus in quo. During the visit, the Learned Trial Judge made factual findings upon which he relied on to reach his decision. See pages 405-407 of the Records. Counsel argued that in violation of the law, these factual findings were not testified to nor tendered as evidence by any witness.

Learned Counsel submitted that it is undisputed that visits to locus in quo are allowed under Nigerian law. However, clear statutory guidelines which govern the procedure for such visits were not adhered to. See Section 127(2) of Evidence Act, 2011.

Counsel argued that, where a trial Judge makes a visit to locus in quo, it is not proper for him to treat his perception at the scene as a finding of fact without evidence of such perception being given by a witness either at the locus or later in Court after the inspection. Counsel cited the cases of SEISMOGRAPH SERVICES LTD vs. ONOKPASA (1974) 6 SC 119; SHEKSE vs. PLANKSHAK (2008) VOL. 44 WRN 34 AT 47 – 48.

Again, Counsel contended that the material factual findings on the boundaries and features of the disputed land upon which the Court relied for the judgment unfortunately; were neither received in evidence nor testified to by a sworn witness. Counsel further argued that the learned trial Court in this instance, substituted his own observation for the sworn testimony of a witness. Finally, according to Counsel on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in the seminal case of OBI vs. MBIONWU (Supra), this conduct by the learned trial Judge runs afoul of the law and warrants a reversal of the judgment. Counsel urged this Court to so hold.

ISSUE THREE:
Whether the learned trial Judge did not err in law and thereby occasion a miscarriage of justice when he held that the failure of an illiterate person to swear to the witness deposition before a person authorized to administer oaths as required by law did not render the said deposition invalid?
Counsel contended that the learned trial Judge erred in law and occasioned a miscarriage of justice when he held that failure of an illiterate person to swear to the witness deposition before a person authorized to administer oaths as required by law did not render the said deposition invalid. Counsel drew attention to the facts in this case which indicate that PW3, an illiterate person swore to his deposition in the office of his lawyer, a person who is not authorized by law to administer oaths and the deposition was not accompanied by a jurat. Counsel argued that these deficiencies render the said deposition fatally defective and liable to being struck out. Again, Counsel argued that, the trial Court ought not to have relied upon the deposition of PW3 for the judgment. See pages 391-393 of the Records.

Counsel further argued that in interpreting the statutory provisions of Section 119 of Evidence Act (2011) the Courts states as follows:
“The law is that the deposition on oath must be signed in the presence of the person authorized to administer Oaths…Thus where there is evidence that the depositions were not sworn before a person duly authorized to administer Oaths, such deposition would be defective”.

See the decision of this Court in the case of MADUAKOLAM SAMUEL CHIDUBEM vs. OBIOMA EKENNA & 12 ORS (2010) LPELR-3913. On the authority of the above cited Court of Appeal decision, Appellants respectfully urged this Court to find that PW3’s deposition was defective and the trial Court’s reliance thereon for its judgment offends the law.

Also, Counsel contended that it is fundamental that a document prepared for an illiterate must carry a jurat; that prior to its being so signed, it was read over and explained to the illiterate person that he fully understood the contents. See the case of AMIZU vs. NZERIBE, (1989) 4 NWLR (PT. 118) 755 AT 768. In the instant case, the deposition of PW3, an illiterate was neither accompanied by a jurat nor was there any evidence that it was read over and explained to him so that he fully understood the contents. Learned Counsel further argued that these defects are fatal to the admissibility of the deposition and as a result, the Court’s reliance on the said deposition was an error of law, warranting an upturning of the said judgment. According to Counsel, where an illiterate deposition is not accompanied by a jurat, it makes the statement unacceptable and worthless. See the case of BALONWU vs. EMORDI & ORS (2009) LPELR-3848 (CA). Counsel urged this Court to so hold.

ISSUE FOUR:
Whether the learned trial Judge was correct in finding that respondents have established their title to the land in dispute through traditional evidence?
In arguing this issue, Counsel submitted that the learned trial Court erred in law and misdirected itself when he found that the Respondents established their title to the land in dispute through traditional evidence. According to Counsel, it has long been established by the Supreme Court on the celebrated case of D. O. IDUNDUN & ORS vs. DANIEL OKUMAGBA & ORS (1976) 9-10 SC 227 AT PP. 246-250 that there are five ways of proving title to land. Counsel submitted that the plaintiffs relied on traditional evidence and acts of long possession in proof of their case. See pages 402-403 of the Records. It is the further submission of Counsel that the burden of proving title to land has always been placed upon the Plaintiff. See the case of NRUAMAH & ORS vs. EBUZOEME & ORS., (2013) LPELR-19771 (SC). Consequently, Counsel stated that the Courts have enumerated very specific facts which must be established by a person who is trying to prove title through traditional evidence. Viz:
i. Who founded the land?
ii. In what manner was the land founded?
iii. The names and particulars of successive owners through whom he claims”. Counsel cited the case of OLUJINLE vs. ADEAGBO (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 75) 238.

Also, Counsel drew attention to the fact that, the testimony of plaintiffs’ witness PW2, one particular link in the chain of successive ancestral owners of the land, one Ezeanowa is, upon whose standing Plaintiffs claim their traditional title to the land, was disinherited for his incestuous conduct. See page 404 of the Records.

Finally, Counsel argued that this particular fact breaks the successive ancestral ownership of the disputed land, which Plaintiffs must prove in order to establish traditional title to the land in dispute. Failure to do so is sufficient ground to set aside the judgment of the trial Court. See the case of MADUAKOLAM SAMUEL CHIDUBEM vs. OBIOMA EKENNA & 12 ORS (2008) LPELR-3913 (CA) PER SAULAWA, JCA (as he then was). Counsel urged upon this Court to so hold.

RESPONDENTS:
ISSUE ONE:
Whether the trial Court was right in finding that there was a valid customary arbitration in 1992 between the parties?
In arguing this issue, Counsel submitted that, the learned trial Judge after a painstaking evaluation of evidence found that there was a valid customary arbitration between the parties in 1992. See page 399 of Records. This finding of the trial Court is unassailable on the available evidence on record and has not been effectively challenged by the Appellants. Counsel further submitted that there is no dispute that customary arbitration is an accepted means of settling land disputes in Igbo land. See the cases of AGU vs. IKEWIBE (1991) 3 NWLR [PT. 180] 385, 407, R. 11; OKEREKE vs. NWANKWO (2003) 9 NWLR [PT. 826] 592, 613, 621-622. Counsel drew attention to the fact that, the Appellants also admitted at page four (4) of their Appellants’ Brief that oath taking is a valid process under customary law arbitration and it is one of the methods known to customary law for establishing the truth of a matter. Counsel cited the case of ONYENGE vs. EBERE (2004) 13 NWLR [PT. 889] 20, 40, R. 2 wherein the Supreme Court held that where two parties voluntarily agree to the resolution of their dispute by oath-taking in accordance with customary law, neither of them can thereafter resile from the exercise of oath taking.

It is the submission of Counsel that, the Appellants’ main grouse is that there is no evidence that the purported decision by Ozo-Nibo was not accepted as shown in page 5 of the Appellants’ Brief. Counsel, however, drew attention to the fact that in their pleading and Final Address at the Court below the Appellants submitted that the Defendants denied that there was ever such arbitration for the simple reason that they did not submit to any arbitration by Ozo-Nibo Society. See page 150 of the Records. Learned Counsel further disclosed that in pages 4.5 and 4.6 at page 5 of the Appellants’ Brief before this Court these same Appellants somersaulted and now argue that the decision of the Ozo-Nibo society, which purports to be the decision reached after the arbitration was not accepted by the Appellants. Counsel argued that by this latest submission, the Appellants have impliedly admitted that there was arbitration by Ozo-Nibo but that there is no evidence that the arbitral decision was accepted by them.

Again, Counsel argued that on the contrary the unchallenged evidence on record clearly established not only that such arbitration took place between the parties but also that the Appellants accepted the decision reached at the arbitration and even complied with it. For instance, PW1, an eyewitness to the said arbitration in his evidence as shown in pages 10-15 of his Statement on Oath which he adopted during trial gave graphic details of the arbitration proceeding, how the Appellants submitted to the said arbitration, accepted the arbitral decision and even complied with it. See pages 20-24 of the Record. PW2, another eyewitness to the arbitration by Ozo-Nibo Society, corroborated PW1’s testimony with an amazing consistency. See pages 33-36 of the Records. Both PW1 and PW2 even named the 1st Appellant and Mr. Samuel Okeke as the Appellants’ key representatives during the arbitration in 1992 and the eventual taking of ‘juju’ oath, which was provided by the Appellants and was taken by Respondents on the 18th day of May, 1993. See pages 21-22, 34-35 of the Records. According to Counsel, it is noteworthy that the Appellants refused to call their said representatives (the 1st Appellant and Mr. Samuel Okeke) to testify, knowing very well that if they had testified they would have corroborated the Respondents’ evidence that there was arbitration between the parties herein over the disputed land and that the Appellants accepted the arbitral decision and complied with it. Counsel further disclosed that the Appellants failed to cross-examine PW1 and PW2 on their evidence on the arbitration, thereby admitting their testimonies in toto as true and undisputed.

Again, Counsel submitted that to finally nail this issue of arbitration and the Appellants’ acceptance thereof to the level of unassailability, he disclosed that the Respondents subpoenaed the Ozo-Nibo Society, the arbitration body to testify on the said arbitration and in the process produced PW3 who represented them and testified on their behalf about the said arbitration; that PW3 gave details of the arbitration proceedings in 1992 and the eventual oath-taking in 1993, as shown at pages 44-48 of the Records. Learned Counsel stated that PW3 testified that the Appellants and Respondents participated in the arbitration, which Ozo-Nibo conducted and that the said Ozo-Nibo arrived at a decision, which was accepted and complied with by both parties. See page 46 of the Records. Counsel drew attention to the fact that this clear testimony of PW3 was neither challenged nor even contradicted.

In fact, he said that the Appellants produced Exhibits ‘M’ and ‘N’, which completely contradicted their case and supported the Respondents’ case on the arbitration. Exhibit ‘M’ is titled: “Re: 1992 Verdict by Ozo-Nibo Land Dispute Between Umuezudu Family and Umuokeli Family”; it was written by Ozo-Nibo to the Appellants. On the part of Exhibit N, titled: “Re: Land Dispute: Obunasato Umuokili”, again addressed to the Appellants by the OzoNibo society.

According to Counsel, faced with the powerful and unchallenged testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the Appellants’ own admissions by their Exhibits ‘M’ and ‘N’ and the fact that the Appellants failed to cross-examine the Respondents’ eyewitnesses to the arbitration proceeding, the trial Court had no choice but to find and rightly found that effectively the eyewitness accounts of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses remain unchallenged. See page 399 of the Records. Counsel argued that the Appellants are therefore deadly wrong when they claimed that there is no evidence that the decision by Ozo-Nibo was ever accepted by them.

Counsel further argued that the Appellants failed to call the 1st Appellant and Mr. Samuel Okeke of the Appellants’ family who played major roles during the said arbitration as stated by PW1, PW2 and PW3. Counsel stated that a simple common sense demands that it is those members of Appellants’ family whom the Respondents said were present during the arbitration and represented the Appellants therein that the Appellants should have called to deny the existence of the said arbitration and dispute the Respondents’ witnesses’ testimonies on the issue. Again, Counsel contended that the Appellants shielded them and refused to call them even though they were coming to Court and were present during trial. According to Counsel, this compelled the trial Court to invoke the presumption of existence of the facts under Section 167(D) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel further contended that rather than calling those two vital witnesses, the Appellants were contented with producing documentary hearsays to attempt to contradict the clear unchallenged evidence of eyewitnesses. They were mistaken in law and the trial Court rightly held so. Counsel urged upon this Court to affirm.

ISSUE TWO:
Whether the trial Court treated its perception at the locus in quo as a finding of fact to the prejudice of the appellants?
In arguing this issue, Counsel submitted that the Appellants claim at pages 7 and 8 of the Appellants’ Brief that during the visit to locus in quo, the learned Trial Judge made factual findings upon which he relied on to reach his decision; and that these factual findings were not testified to by a sworn witness nor tendered or received as evidence by any witness, Counsel contended that, these claims and conclusions by the Appellants in their briefs are not only terribly false and constitute very unfair aspersions on the learned trial Judge, but also disclosed that firstly the Appellants failed to include in the Record of this Appeal the Court proceedings which took place at the locus in quo and was fully recorded thereat in the presence of witnesses. See pages 381 and 405 of the Records.

Secondly, the Appellants failed to point out one single factual finding by the learned trial Judge at the locus in quo, which was already testified to by witnesses prior to the said visit. To Counsel, the purpose of an appeal is not to cast unfair aspersions on the trial Court by raising unfounded issues and making empty conclusions that are totally devoid of facts and evidence.

Counsel further contended that one cardinal purpose for making a visit to locus in quo in law is for the trial Court to use its visual senses in aid of its sense of hearing to inspect the property in dispute in order to resolve conflicts in evidence for proper determination of the issue in dispute. Counsel cited the cases of BRIGGS vs. BRIGGS (1992) 3 NWLR [PT. 228] 128, 148, R. 1; OKUNRINMETA vs. AGITAN (2002) 2 NWLR [PT. 752] 565, 581, R. 5; and Section 127 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel stated that, in the instant case, the trial Court adjourned the proceedings to the locus in quo in the company of the parties in compliance with Section 127 (2)(a) of the Evidence Act, 2011. See page 381 of the Records. Again Counsel submitted that in its judgment at page 405 of the Records the trial Court stated that the reasons for the necessity to visit the locus in quo, was for a better appreciation of the features of the land. Counsel drew attention to the fact that during trial, each party gave conflicting evidence of the features of the land. See pages 22, 30, 87 and 93 of the Records.

Learned Counsel submitted that it was the Respondents’ case that beacons, which were coordinates of Beacon No: ANA 10754, which both parties showed in their respective survey plans, were the real boundary line between the parties but that the Appellants removed those coordinate beacons in order to encroach and claim parts of the Respondents’ land. Again, Counsel stated that because of this conflict and confusion, the learned trial Judge needed to visit the locus in quo to appreciate the features of the land.

It is the submission of Counsel that throughout the judgment, the learned trial Judge was simply analyzing and evaluating the features of the land in dispute which the witnesses of both parties had already testified to and produced exhibits in support thereof. Thus, the visit to locus in quo assisted the trial Court in resolving the conflicts in the evidence of the parties on the boundary marks and features on the land and in determining which of the parties testimonies and evidence were more credible and probable than the other. Counsel argued that this is exactly what visit to locus in quo is meant to do. See the case of BRIGGS vs. BRIGGS (supra).

Counsel submitted that, it is therefore wrong and unconscionable for the Appellants to falsely claim that the factual findings made by the trial Court after the visit to locus in quo was not testified to nor supported by evidence by any witness. According to Counsel, the Appellants failed to appreciate the fact that because evidence and testimonies had already been concluded prior to the visit to locus in quo, there was no need for further evidence afterwards; all the learned trial Judge went to the locus to do was to clear a doubt as to the accuracy of the pieces of evidence on the location of the features of the land and the boundary lines between the parties. Counsel argued that there was therefore neither need for oath taking nor cross-examination as regards proceedings at the locus in quo. Again, Counsel stated that the visit was only for an inspection in accordance with Section 127(2)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011, which states in material particulars that the Court shall attend and make an inspection of the subject matter only. See the case of OKUNRINMETA vs. AGITAN (Supra).

Also, according to learned Counsel in his judgment, the learned trial Judge said: “Following the said visit I confirmed that the case between the parties was a boundary dispute.” See page 405 of the Records. Counsel argued that, the Appellants’ complaint on the learned trial Judge’s treatment of her perception at locus in quo is totally misconceived. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this second issue against the Appellants.

ISSUE THREE:
Whether there was an illiterate who swore his deposition before a person who was not a Commissioner of Oath in this case; if so, whether that very fact by itself invalided his testimony in Court?
It is the contention of Counsel that in response to the complaint of the Appellant that PW3’s deposition failed to contain a jurat, the first question is: whether PW3 is an illiterate whose deposition should contain a jurat and was not sworn before a person authorized to take the oath? Counsel answered this question in the negative. According to Counsel, this Statement on Oath shows clearly at page 50 of the Records that it was signed (not thump-printed) and sworn to on 15th day of August, 2007 before the Commissioner of Oaths who signed the same and stamped it with the High Court stamp. Counsel argued that there is nothing in PW3’s Statement on Oath that shows that he is an illiterate. In this circumstance, PW3’s Statement on Oath is presumed by law to be regular under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel further argued that the Appellants did nothing to rebut this presumption; they did not even show that the said statement of PW3 was sworn before any other person than the Commissioner of Oath who signed it at the High Court of Anambra State, Awka Division. Counsel submitted that the Appellants’ claim is vacuous and should be discountenanced.

Again, Counsel submitted that the Appellants’ claim that PW3’s Statement on Oath does not contain a jurat constitutes crass ignorance of the meaning of a jurat. Counsel stated that a ‘jurat’ is a certification by the commissioner of oath or notary public that a particular statement has been sworn to before him/her. According to Counsel, a certification added to an affidavit or deposition stating when and before what authority the affidavit or deposition was made shows that it contains a jurat like in the instant case, contrary to the Appellants’ claim. See page 50 of the Records.

Counsel further contended that if the Appellants’ grouse is that the Statement on Oath should contain not the ordinary jurat but an illiterate jurat, then the Appellant must first prove that PW3 is an illiterate. Counsel cited the case of DUGERI vs. VEE-NETORKS LTD (2015) 2 NWLR [PT. 1442] 30, 49, R. 3, wherein this Court held that the party who asserts that a person is an illiterate has the onus of proving the assertion. In any event, the question is: Who is an illiterate? According to learned Counsel, a person is not an illiterate simply because he cannot read and write in English language but can read and write in Igbo, French or any other language. See the decision of this Court case of OMOZEGHIAN vs. ADJARHO (2006) 4 NWLR [PT. 969] 33, 56, R. 1.

Learned Counsel further argued that in this case, it is clear that the Appellants failed to establish that PW3 is an illiterate. PW3 signed his Statement on Oath by appending his normal signature and he swore to it before a Court official – the Commissioner of Oath; he did not even thump-print the said statement. Counsel stated that PW3 is therefore not an illiterate. However, even if he is an illiterate, Section 5 of Illiterate’s Protection Law of Anambra State, CAP 68 exempts his written statement on oath from the requirement of an illiterate jurat since it was clearly written by a lawyer. Counsel contended that the Illiterate’s Protection Act exists for the protection and benefit of the illiterate not for his damnification. Counsel cited the case of EZEIGWE vs. AWUDU (2008) 11 NWLR [PT. 1097] 158, 174-175, R. 2. In this case, it is not PW3 who is complaining; it is the Appellants who have no locus to make the said complaint.

It is the submission of Counsel that, the Second Question is: assuming but not conceding that PW3 is an illiterate, is his Statement on Oath invalid because it did not contain an ‘illiterate’ jurat and was not signed before a commissioner for oath? Learned Counsel stated that this question can only be answered in the negative. Counsel argued that the law is that a potential witness’ statement on oath is not an affidavit as it is in the nature of pleadings only and pleadings are not evidence. See the case of IDRIS vs. A.N.P.P. (2008) 8 NWLR [PT. 1088] 1, 153, R. 35. It is only when the witness’s statement on oath is adopted under oath during trial that it becomes evidence in the Court. Also, Counsel further argued that even if the said statement was totally unsworn, the swearing of the witness and his adoption of the said statement a ex facie curie cures that defect. See the cases of UDEAGHA vs. OMEGARA (2010) 11 NWLR [PT. 1204] 168, 195, R; AJAYI vs. ALALADE (2015) 5 NWLR [PT. 1452] 380, 399. Finally, Counsel submitted that, based on the above, it is clear that the Appellants’ claim that PW3’s statement on oath was defective and invalid because it did not contain a jurat and was not sworn to is totally misconceived. Counsel urged this Court to resolve this third issue against the Appellants.

ISSUE FOUR:
Whether the trial Court was right in finding that the respondents established their title to the land in dispute by traditional evidence?
In arguing this issue, Counsel started by reproducing the findings of the Court below. Counsel stated that after analyzing and evaluating the complex evidence tendered in this case, the trial Court held thus:
“I am satisfied from the evidence before me that Plaintiffs have shown the successive persons through whom their ‘Edeagu’ land devolved through an unbroken chain to them. This evidence is unchallenged and I am bound to accept it.”

It is the submission of Counsel that the Appellants are not denying the fact that they did not challenge the Respondents’ unbroken chain of title nor their traditional evidence. The Appellant also did not even challenge the Respondents’ centuries-old several and successive acts of ownership and possession of the ‘Edeagu” land. Counsel submitted that, the Appellants’ only complaint is that one ‘Ezeanowai’ upon whose standing Respondents claim their traditional title to the land was disinherited for his incestuous conduct. According to the Appellants, this particular fact breaks the successive ancestral ownership of the disputed land. Learned Respondent Counsel disclosed that, this same Appellants’ argument was also their contention at the Court below but that was fully answered by the learned trial Judge in her judgment. Counsel drew attention to the fact that this eminent finding and well reasoned conclusion of the trial Court has not been challenged in any shape or form in this Appeal. See page 404 of the Records.

Also, Counsel submitted that according to the Respondents’ witnesses, it was Ezike of Nibo who originally discovered the “Edeagu” land and appropriated it to himself as its original founder/deforester without any let or hindrance from any person. From Ezike, the land was transmitted by inheritance to Okpaechekwubelu (the Respondents’ ancestor) then to the Respondents by inheritance. Counsel cited the case of EGWA vs. EGWA (2007) 1 NWLR [PT. 1014] 71, 87 – 88, R. 2, wherein the Court held that a plaintiff who traced his root of title, has established his title through traditional evidence.

Learned Counsel drew attention to the fact that this Respondents’ traditional evidence was never challenged by the Appellants and their witnesses. Counsel contended that it has been held in a plethora of cases that the trial Court has little or no choice but to accept the unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence placed before it by the plaintiff since it was not been discredited by the defendant during cross-examination. Counsel cited the cases of MONKOM vs. ODILI (2010) 2 NWLR [PT. 1179] 419, 442, PARAS D-E; KOTUN vs. OLASEWERE (2010) 1 NWLR [PT. 1175] 411, 430, R. 2; MANSON vs. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES LTD. (2007) 2 NWLR [PT. 1018] 211, 234.

Counsel further submitted that the Appellants’ DW2 expressly admitted that the Respondents own “Edeagu” land. See page 350 of the Records. Counsel argued that by this admission, the Appellants have now the heavy burden of proving that the Respondents’ “Edeagu” land is different from the “Edeagu” land now in dispute. See Sections 123 & 143 of the Evidence Act, 2011. On the whole, Counsel submitted that it is therefore clear that the Respondents established their traditional title to the land in dispute by traditional evidence through unbroken chain of succession to the title of the land in dispute. Finally, Learned Counsel stated that issue number four (4) in this appeal should be resolved against the Appellants in favour of the Respondents.

RESOLUTION OF APPEAL
The Respondents, as Plaintiffs at the Court below brought this action against the Appellants as Defendants seeking declaration of title to land known as “Ana Edeagu” and situate in Ifite Village Nibo, Anambra State. The Plaintiffs’ case was that the parcel of land in dispute belonged to them because there had been a customary arbitration of the dispute in 1992 by Ozo-Nibo Society, which was favourable to the Plaintiffs. See pages 5-8 of the records. Defendant’s denied that any such arbitration ever took place as they refused to submit to Arbitration by Ozo-Nibo at the time.

In the course of hearing, it soon got to be known that the kernel of the dispute was actually a simple case of boundary dispute at an area in Nibo, which each party calls: ‘Edeagu’ land. This made the parties’ survey plans extremely crucial for the just determination of the case. The Learned Trial Judge, to make doubly sure of the matter he was facing, made a visit to the locus in quo and made material factual findings, which were relied upon to render judgment. Perhaps, the question that should be addressed at this stage is whether there was actually a valid customary arbitration between the parties in 1992 as alleged by the Respondents?

It would be recalled that at page 399 of the printed records, the Court below made a finding on the available evidence on record, that there was a valid customary arbitration between the parties. It is nevertheless, clear that the Appellants’ main reason for disagreeing that there was a valid customary Arbitration between the parties, is that there is no evidence that the decision by Ozo-Nibo, who acted as Customary Arbitrators was ever accepted as shown in page 5 of the Appellants’ Brief. However, it is clear from the pleading and Final Address of the Appellants at the Court below that they (Appellants) submitted that the Defendants denied that there was ever such arbitration for the simple reason that they did not submit to any arbitration by Ozo-Nibo Society. See page 150 of the Records. But in paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 at page 5 of the Appellants’ Brief before this Court these same Appellants a volte face, somersaulting as it were and now argue that the decision of the Ozo-Nibo society, which purports to be the decision reached after the arbitration was not accepted by the Appellants. There is therefore, no doubt about the fact that the latest submission of the Appellant shows that there is a tacit admittance on the part of the Appellants that there was indeed Arbitration by the Ozo-Nibo except that there is no evidence that the arbitral decision was accepted by them.

The pertinent question to be therefore addressed at this stage is whether there was indeed no evidence of the customary Arbitration given at the Court below? Learned Respondents’ Counsel drew the attention of this Court to the fact that there was sufficient unchallenged evidence on record, which clearly established not only that such arbitration took place between the parties but also that the Appellants accepted the decision reached at the arbitration and even complied with it. The evidence of PW1, for instance, was said to be an eyewitness to the said arbitration in his evidence as shown in pages 10-15 of his Statement on Oath, which he adopted during trial and gave graphic details of the arbitration proceeding, how the Appellants submitted to the said arbitration, accepted the arbitral decision and even complied with it. See pages 20-24 of the Record.

There was also the evidence of PW2, another eyewitness to the arbitration by Ozo-Nibo Society. He corroborated PW1’s testimony with an amazing consistency. See pages 33-36 of the Records. Both PW1 and PW2 even named the 1st Appellant and Mr. Samuel Okeke as the Appellants’ key representatives during the arbitration in 1992 and the eventual taking of ‘juju’ oath, which was provided by the Appellants and was taken by Respondents on the 18th day of May, 1993. See pages 21-22, 34-35 of the Records. It is remarkable that Respondents’ Counsel made an issue out of the fact that the Appellants in the course of trial refused to call their said representatives (the 1st Appellant and Mr. Samuel Okeke) to testify, in rebutting the evidence of the fact that the Appellants took part in the customary Arbitration between the parties herein over the disputed land and that the Appellants accepted the arbitral decision and even complied with it. What is even more, the Court’s attention was also drawn to the fact that the Appellants failed to cross-examine PW1 and PW2 on their evidence on the arbitration, thereby admitting their testimonies wholeheartedly as the truth and undisputed.

Still on the question of evidence or the lack of it thereof, this Court was also made to understand that the Ozo-Nibo Society, the body which acted as Arbitrators was subpoenaed to testify on the said arbitration and in the process produced PW3 who represented them and testified on their behalf about the said arbitration. The PW3, based on the records, gave details of the arbitration proceedings in 1992 and the eventual oath-taking in 1993, as shown at pages 44-48 of the Records. It is on record, that the PW3 testified that the Appellants and Respondents participated in the arbitration, which Ozo-Nibo conducted and that the said Ozo-Nibo arrived at a decision, which was accepted and complied with by both parties. See page 46 of the Records. It is obvious from the records that the evidence of PW3 was hardly contradicted. In short, it was neither challenged nor even controverted.

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds it difficult to disagree with the learned Respondents’ Counsel submission that the Appellants’ Exhibits ‘M’ and ‘N’, completely contradicted their case and supported the Respondents’ case on the arbitration. Exhibit ‘M’ titled: “Re: 1992 Verdict by Ozo-Nibo Land Dispute between Umuezudu Family and Umuokeli Family”; was written by Ozo-Nibo to the Appellants and it reads thus:
“We have received a report from Umuezudu Family [the Respondents] that you [the Appellants] have revoked our decision of 1992 on the above disputed land.
Kindly make chance to come to our meeting on Sunday Nkwo which falls on the 30th day of June 2002 to adduce reason why you have entered into the land again in spite of the fact that we have settled the boundary.”

On the part of Exhibit N, titled: “Re: Land Dispute: Obunasato Umuokili”, again addressed to the Appellants by the Ozo-Nibo Society, reads:
“We have received reports from Obunasato people [Respondents] that you [Appellants] have encroached into the portion of the disputed land owned by Obunasato people which we the Ozo-Nibo have settled between you and Obunasato people in 1992 …”

The records also show that the testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3, the Appellants’ own admissions by their Exhibits ‘M’ and ‘N’ and the fact that the Appellants failed to cross-examine the Respondents’ eyewitnesses to the arbitration proceeding, left the Court below with no choice but to find and rightly found that effectively the eyewitness accounts of the Plaintiffs’ witnesses remain unchallenged. See page 399 of the Records. Against the backdrop of the foregoing, this Court is unable to agree with the Appellants when they claimed that there is no evidence that the decision by Ozo-Nibo Arbitration over the disputed parcel of land was ever accepted by them.

The settled position of the law is that where two parties voluntarily agree to the resolution of their dispute by oath-taking in accordance with customary law, neither of them can thereafter resile nor renege from the exercise of oath taking. See the case of ONYENGE vs. EBERE (2004) 13 NWLR [PT. 889] 20, 40, R. 2. Where the Apex Court per TOBI, JSC had this to say on the subject:
“This Court recognizes oath-taking as a valid process under customary law arbitration. In Ume v. Okoronkwo (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt.477) 133, (1996) 12 SCNJ 404, Ogwuegbu, J.S.C. held that oath-taking was one of the methods of establishing the truth of a matter and was known to customary law and accepted by both parties. I am bound by that decision.”
See also the case of OKEREKE & ANOR vs. NWANKWO & ANOR (2003) LPELR- 2445 SC, where the Apex Court per EDOZIE, JSC had this to say on the subject:
“From the principles enunciated in these decisions, the ingredients or preconditions for a valid customary arbitration may be stated to be as follows: 1. that there has been a voluntary submission of the matter in dispute to an arbitration of one or more persons; 2. that it was agreed by the parties either expressly or by implication that the decision of the arbitrators will be accepted as final and binding; 3. that the arbitration was in accordance with the custom of the parties or of their trade or business; 4. that the arbitrators reached a decision and published their award and; 5. that the decision or award was accepted at the time it was made. See Ohiaeri vs. Akabeze (supra).”

On the question of whether the Court below treated its perception at the locus in quo as a finding of fact to the prejudice of the Appellants, it is important to note that the Appellants by that allegation seemed to have cast an unfair aspersion on the person of the learned trial Judge more so when they failed woefully in pinpointing one single factual finding by the learned trial Judge at the locus in quo, which was testified to by witnesses prior to the said visit and which had worked prejudicially against their interests. In agreement with learned Respondents’ Counsel, one of the cardinal purposes for making a visit to locus in quo in law is for the trial Court to use its visual senses in aid of its sense of hearing to inspect the property in dispute in order to resolve conflicts in evidence for proper determination of the issue in dispute.

It will be recalled that in its judgment at page 405 of the Records the trial Court stated that the reasons for the necessity to visit the locus in quo, was for a better appreciation of the features of the land. A situation where each party had given conflicting evidence of the features of the parcel of land in dispute, there was nothing wrong in the Court making an on-the-spot visit to the locus to clear whatever confusions that have been created. It was for instance, the Respondents’ case that beacons, which were coordinates of Beacon No: ANA 10754, which both parties showed in their respective survey plans, were the real boundary line between the parties, but the Appellants were said to have removed those coordinate beacons in order to encroach and claim parts of the Respondents’ land. Whether this was true or not necessarily required that the trial Court ought to visit the locus in quo to appreciate the features of land and ascertain the correctness of the allegations made thereto.

On the issue of whether the trial Court was right in finding that the Respondents established their title to the land in dispute by traditional evidence, it is instructive to note that page 404 of the record, the Court below made a finding to that effect after analyzing and evaluating the complex evidence tendered in this case, when the Court held thus:
“I am satisfied from the evidence before me that Plaintiffs have shown the successive persons through whom their ‘Edeagu’ land devolved through an unbroken chain to them. This evidence is unchallenged and I am bound to accept it.”

It is rather clear from the records that Appellants neither challenged the Respondents’ unbroken chain of title nor their traditional evidence. It is also clear and in agreement with the observation of the Court below, that the Appellant did not also challenge the Respondents’ centuries-old several and successive acts of ownership and possession of the ‘Edeagu” land. In what appears to be the only grouse of the Appellants is that one ‘Ezeanowai’ upon whose standing Respondents claim their traditional title to the land was disinherited for his incestuous conduct. It is instructive to note the eminent findings and well reasoned conclusions of the trial Court has not been challenged in any shape or form in this appeal.

In taking a careful but calm view of the evidence on record, it is clear that the Respondents’ case is anchored on the fact that it was “Ezike” of Nibo who originally discovered the “Edeagu” land and appropriated it to himself as its original founder/deforester without any let or hindrance from any person. Then, from Ezike, the land was transmitted by inheritance to Okpaechekwubelu (who is the Respondents’ ancestor), and then to the Respondents by inheritance. The settled position of the law is that one of the five ways to establish title to land in Nigeria is by traditional evidence. See the case of IDUNDUN vs. OKUMAGBA (1976) 9-10 Sc. 227 and a host of other decisions on the subject. It is also settled that once the traditional evidence is found to be conclusive and cogent, as in the instant case, there would be no need whatsoever to require further proof. See the cases of AKUNYILI vs. EJIDIKE (1996) 5 NWLR (PT. 449) 381 at 417; BALOGUN vs. AKANJI (1988) 1 NWLR (PT. 70) 301 etc. But the traditional evidence must be such that it is consistent and properly links the Plaintiff with the traditional history relied upon. For this, see the case of OWOADE vs. OMITOLA (1988) 2 NWLR (PT. 77) 413. The Plaintiff must prove his title to the land and this he has to do by tracing title to his ancestors both orally in Court. See also the case of EGWA vs. EGWA (2007) 1 NWLR [PT. 1014] 71, 87 – 88, R. 2, cited by learned Respondent’s Counsel and in a case wherein the Court held that a Plaintiff who traced his root of title, has established his title through traditional evidence.

At page 350 of the Records, the Appellants’ DW2 expressly admitted that the Respondents own “Edeagu” land. By this admission, the Appellants now took on an additional burden of proving that the Respondents’ “Edeagu” land is different from the “Edeagu” land now in dispute. This was a burden, which the Appellants obviously could not discharge. Based on the foregoing, this Court is of the clear view that the Respondents established their traditional title to the land in dispute by traditional evidence through unbroken chain of succession to the title of the land in dispute.

On the question of whether there was an illiterate who swore his deposition before a person who was not a Commissioner of Oath in this case and if so, whether that very fact by itself invalided his testimony in Court? At page 50 of the printed records there it is pasted the Statement on Oath of PW3 showing that it was signed (not thump-printed) and sworn to on the 15th day of August, 2007 before the Commissioner of Oaths who signed the same and stamped it with the High Court stamp. A closer look will also show that there is nothing in PW3’s Statement on Oath that shows that he is an illiterate. For this reason, the PW3’s Statement on Oath is presumed by law to be regular under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011. This presumption was not in any way rebutted by the Appellants and did not in any way show that the said Statement of PW3 was sworn before any other person than the Commissioner of Oath who signed it at the High Court of Anambra State, Awka Division. This Court, in agreement with the submissions of Respondents’ Counsel hereby finds and hold that the Appellants’ claim on the subject is vacuous and it is hereby discountenanced.

In the final analysis, this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be cost of N200,000.00 in favour of the Respondents against the Appellants.

CHIOMA EGONDU NWOSU-IHEME, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, F. O. OHO, JCA.

He dealt extensively with the issues raised in the appeal and I adopt his reasoning and conclusion, which represent my views.
I also dismiss this appeal and endorse the order as to costs made by OHO, JCA in the lead judgment.

PATRICIA AJUMA MAHMOUD, J.C.A.: I had a preview of the leading judgment of my learned brother, FREDRICK OHO, JCA and I entirely agree with the reasons given therein by him for dismissing the appeal. I too will dismiss the appeal. I abide by my learned brother’s order for costs.

Appearances:

C. CHUMA OGUEJIOFOR, ESQ. For Appellant(s)

DR. EDWIN S. OBIORAH For Respondent(s)