AYOOLA v. THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL MERIT AWARD & ORS (2022)

AYOOLA v. THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL MERIT AWARD & ORS

(2022)LCN/16327(CA)

In The Court Of Appeal

(ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION)

On Friday, February 25, 2022

CA/A/47/2020

Before Our Lordships:

Stephen Jonah Adah Justice of the Court of Appeal

Peter Olabisi Ige Justice of the Court of Appeal

Danlami Zama Senchi Justice of the Court of Appeal

Between

PROFESSOR GBOLAGADE AYOOLA APPELANT(S)

And

1. THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL MERIT AWARD 2. PROFESSOR E. M. ESSIEN (Chairman, Governing Board Of The Nigerian National Merit Award) 3. THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATION 4. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION RESPONDENT(S)

RATIO

THE DUTY OF AN APPELLANT WHO COMPLAINS THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS PERVERSE FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE OR PROPER EVALUTAON OF EVIDENCE

The law is settled that an Appellant who complains that the decision of the trial Court is perverse for lack of adequate or proper evaluation of oral and documentary evidence, must prove or establish that the Court of first instance made improper use of opportunity of seeing the witnesses testifying before him. He must show that there was misapplication of oral and documentary evidence placed before the lower Court. He must endeavour to prove that the lower Court failed to ascribe probative value to the evidence led or that wrong inferences were drawn leading to wrong conclusions or miscarriage of justice making it imperative for the Appellate Court to intervene and reevaluate the oral and documentary evidence. See
1. CHIEF JAMES O. OLONADE & ANOR VS. H.B SOWEIMO (2014) 14 NWLR (PART 1428) 472 AT 495 G- H TO 496 per M. D. MOHAMMED who said:-
“Firstly, evaluation of relevant and material evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified. Where the trial Court unquestionably evaluate the evidence and justifiably appraises the Facts, as it has been manifestly shown to have been done in the instant case it is not the business of the lower Court, an appellate Court, to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. The application of this trite principle by the lower Court cannot, certainly, be a basis for the reversal of the Court’s decision. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91; Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 565) 226 and Sha v. Kwan (2000) 5 SC 178 (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 670) 685.
Secondly, in a civil matter such as this, the Court decides the case on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. The trial Court does this by first deciding which evidence it accepts from each of the parties, putting the accepted evidence adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the imaginary scale and that of the defendant on the other side of the scale weighing them together. The Court then decides which side’s evidence is heavier, not by the number of witnesses called by either party or on the basis of the one being oral and the other being documentary, but by the quality or probative value of the evidence be it oral and/or documentary. See Fagbenro v. Arobadi (2006) 7 NWLR (PT. 978) 172.”
2. MRS ELIZABETH IRABOR ZACCALA VS MR KINSLEY EDOSA & ANOR (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1616) 528 AT 545 B – D per M. D. MUHAMMAD, JSC who said:
“It is trite that the trial Court is vested with the primary duty of evaluating evidence and ascribing probative value to same. This primacy in the Court’s responsibility arises out of the fact of the advantage it has of seeing and, from observation of the witnesses, making impressions as they testified. Thus where the trial Court fails to bring the advantage to play in evaluating the evidence of the witnesses or where being documents, as in the instant case, the issue of credibility is not at play, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to re-appraise the evidence and make correct inferences.
See Atoyebi & Anor v. The Governor of Oyo State Ors (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 290, Dakat v. Dashe (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 46 and Ajibulu v. Ajayi (2013) LPELR-21860 (SC): (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1392) 483.”
3. CHIEF NYA EDIM EKONG VS CHIEF ASUQUO E. OTOP & 7 ORS (2014) 11 NWLR (PART 1419) 459 AT 573 F – H per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“It is trite that all documents tendered before a Court at the trial of a case is part and parcel of the evidence to be considered in the determination of issues before the Court. Such documents usually referred to as exhibits are subject to scrutiny and to be tested for credibility and weight by the trial Court. Where the trial Court fails to examine documents tendered before it, an appellate Court is in a good position to evaluate such exhibits. See Ayeni v Dada (1978) 3 SC 35; Bamgboye v Olarewaju (1991) 22 NSCC (Pt. 1) 501; (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 132. I think since Exhibit C was tendered before the trial Court and was part of the record of appeal before the Court below the Justices of that Court were eminently qualified to draw such inferences as they found fit and proper so to do.”
It must however be borne in mind that it is not every slip or error by a lower Court that will lead to a reversal of the lower Court’s decision unless the findings of the said Court are not supported by oral and documentary evidence on record. PER IGE, J.C.A.

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE SUSPENSION OF AN EMPLOYEE

THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

The law is settled that in the interpretation of any law, subsidiary legislation, instrument, Legal Rules of Court or other Rules, the Statute or law, the document being construed must be given their ordinary grammatical meanings in order to do justice to the parties involved and to respect the real meaning and the intendment of the makers of the law, instrument or document which calls for interpretation. See PDP VS. HON. (DR) HARRY N. ORANEZI & ORS (2018) 7 NWLR (PART 1618) 245 at 257 H to 258A per M. D. MUHAMMAD, JSC.
“Now, a cardinal principle of interpretation we must not forget, which learned appellant’s counsel however seems to ignore, is that provisions of a statute, an instrument or indeed pleadings should not be read in isolation of the other parts of the statute, instrument or pleadings. In order to determine the intendment of the makers of the statute, instrument or pleadings, same should be read as a whole. Thus a clause in any of these must be construed together and with reference to the context and other clauses in the statue, instrument or pleadings in ensuring the discovery of a consistent meaning of the whole, here, the pleading being considered. See Oyeyemi v. Commissioner for Local Government (Kwara State) (1992) 2 SCNJ 266 at 280; (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 661 and Artra Industry Nigeria Limited v. NBC (1998) 3 SCNJ 97 at 115; (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 357.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS CAN REWRITE THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PARTIES TO AN AGREEMENT
The duty of the Court is to interpret the contract as contained in the instrument made by the parties on their own volition. The Court cannot rewrite the contract between the parties. See:
1. GABRIEL ADEKUNLE OGUNDEPO & ANOR VS THOMAS ENIYAN OLUMESAN (2011) 8 NWLR (PART 1278) 54 AT 70 C – D per FABIYI, JSC who held:
“I need to still point out at this stage that it is not the business of a Court to re-write parties contract for them. The duty of the Court is to interpret the contract as contained in the instrument made by the parties on their own free volition. A Court of record should never accede to the importation of unrelated ‘grey’ areas of the law by a party to prop what is not contained in the instrument made by the parties. See Jadesimi v. Egbe (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 1 at 30; Isiyaku v. Zwingina (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 81 7) 560 at 576.”
2. UBN PLC VS ALHAJI AJABULE & ANOR (2011) 18 NWLR (PART 1278) 152 AT 185 per ADEKEYE, JSC who said:-
“In the law of contract, the law is that a written contract agreement entered into by parties is binding on them. Where there is any disagreement between the parties to such written agreement on any particular point, the only reliable evidence to resolve the claim is the written contract of the parties. The reason being that where the intention of the parties to a contract are clearly expressed in a document, the Court cannot go outside the document in search of other documents not forming part of the intention of the parties.”
3. CBN VS MRS AGNES M. IGWILLO (2007) 14 NWLR (PART 1054) 393 AT 419 A TO 420 A – C per AKINTAN, JSC who said:
“The law is settled that there are now roughly three categories of contracts of employment, viz: (a) those regarded as purely master and servant; (b) those where a servant is said to hold an office at the pleasure of the employer and those where the employment is regulated or governed by statute, often referred to as having statutory flavour. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. An employment is said to have statutory flavour when the appointment is protected by statute or laid down regulations made to govern the procedure for employment and discipline of an employee. Any other employment outside that category is governed by the terms under which the parties agreed to be master and servant. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos, supra; Ogunke v. National Steel Development Authority (1974) NWLR 128; Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47; Ideh v. University of Ilorin (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 81; Shitta-Bey v. The Federal Public Service (Pt. 265) 303; and Udo v. Cross River State Newspaper Corporation (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116.” PER IGE, J.C.A.

PETER OLABISI IGE, J.C.A. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Cross-Appellant as Claimant had approached the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Abuja Division, on 14th June, 2016, and claimed against the Cross-Respondents the following reliefs:-
“1. A DECLARATION that the purported suspension and termination of Claimant’s appointment as Secretary of the Nigerian National Merit Award before the expiration of his two-year tenure of office vide letters dated the 4th February 2016 and the 7th April, 2016 respectively is a breach of the principles of natural justice, the terms and conditions of the appointment of the Claimant and is therefore irregular, wrongful, illegal, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect whatsoever;
2. AN ORDER setting aside the letters of suspension and termination of the Claimant’s appointment as Secretary of the Nigerian National Merit Award dated the 4th February, 2016 and the 7th April, 2016 respectively;
3. AN ORDER directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant the sum of N43,645,582.75 being the outstanding salary arrears and allowances based on the approved scale applicable to the chief executive officer/executive secretary of a Grade A Parastatal of the Federal Government for his two year tenure of office.
4. A DECLARATION that pasting the query of 16th February, 2016 by the 1st and 2nd Defendants in a public place is wrongful, illegal and violated the extant public service rules.
5. AN ORDER directing the 1st and 2nd Defendants to issue a formal letter of apology to the Claimant for pasting the said query in a public place.
6. Damages in the sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira only) for the embarrassment caused the Claimant as a result of pasting the said query in a public place.”

The matter proceeded to trial. At the end of the trial the learned trial Judge gave a considered judgment on the 30th day of October, 2019 and granted the following reliefs in favour of the Cross-Appellant/Claimant:-
“For avoidance of doubt, the claimant case succeeds but only this far:
i. It is hereby declared that the purported termination of Claimant’s appointment as Secretary of the Nigerian National Merit Award before the expirations of his two year tenure of office vide letter dated the 7th April, 2016 is a breach of the principles of the terms and conditions of the appointment of the Claimant and is therefore irregular, wrongful, illegal, null, void and of no effect whatsoever;
ii. By order of this Court, the letter of termination of the Claimant’s appointment as Secretary of the Nigerian National Merit Award dated the 7th April, 2016 is hereby set aside.
iii. The Defendants shall to pay the Claimant all such salaries and allowances due to the claimant from the date last paid until the end of his contract 7th April, 2016.
iv. Cost of this suit is put at N300,000.00 payable within 30 days thereafter interest shall attach.
v. This is the Court’s judgment and it is hereby entered.”

The Cross-Appellant was aggrieved by part of the judgment and has by his Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal dated 27th September, 2021, filed on 29th September, 2021 deemed filed on 11th October, 2021 cross-appealed to this Court on four grounds which without their particulars are as follows:-
“2. PART OF THE DECISION APPEALED AGAINST
That part which held, inter alia, that-
a. “That being the case that part of the Claimants relief seeking a declaration that the Claimant’s suspension is irregular, wrongful, illegal, unconstitutional, null, void and of no effect whatsoever and an order that the letter of suspension be set aside fails and cannot be granted, that part of relief (i) and (ii) fail and is dismissed.”
b. “As to the issue of whether the claimant is not entitled to the salary of a Category A parastatal the Claimant has not put before the Court any evidence of the salary he was paid or any circular listing him as a Chief executive, this issue is resolved against the Claimant as it is not substantiated to the satisfaction of this Court.”
c. “Reliefs (iv) (v) and (vi) relates to defamation. Now the claimant has not put forward any particulars of defamation neither has he presented any evidence of actual publication to enable the Court make a proper determination of same. In addition, the Claimant has not told the Court how he arrived at 100 million Naira damages, these reliefs not been substantiated/hereby fail.”
3. GROUNDS OF CROSS-APPEAL
Ground 1
The learned trial Judge erred in law in failing to nullify the suspension of the 1st Respondent/Cross-Appellant from the position of Secretary of Nigerian National Merit Award by the Appellants/Cross-Respondents despite the overwhelming evidence that his suspension was irregular and violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to fair hearing.
Ground 2
The learned trial Judge erred in law when despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary he held as follows:
“As to the issue of whether the claimant is not entitled to the salary of a Category A parastatal the Claimant has not put before the Court any evidence of the salary he was paid or any circular listing him as a Chief executive, this issue is resolved against the Claimant as it is not substantiated to the satisfaction this Court”, which error has occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice.
Ground 3: Error in Law
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held as follows:
“Reliefs (iv) (v) and (vi) relates to defamation. Now the claimant has not put forward any particulars of defamation neither has he presented any evidence of actual publication to enable the Court make a proper determination of same. In addition, the Claimant has not told the Court how he arrived at 100 million naira damages, these reliefs not been substantiated thereby fail”, and this occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
Ground 4: Error in Law
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he ordered as follows:
“The Defendants shall to pay the Claimant all such salaries and allowances due to the claimant from the date last paid until the end of his contract 7th April, 2016”, and this occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
4. RELIEFS SOUGHT FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL
i. An order allowing the Cross-Appeal and nullifying the Cross-Appellant’s suspension as being wrongful, irregular and in breach of his right to fair hearing.
ii. An order allowing the Cross-Appeal and granting the Cross-Appellant’s claim as per reliefs (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of his Complaint and Statement of Facts.

The Cross-Appellant’s Brief of Argument dated 27th September, 2021 was filed on 29th September, 2021 and deemed properly filed on 10th November, 2021. The 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents’ Brief of Argument dated 4th day of October, 2021 was filed on 6th October, 2021 and deemed properly filed on 11th October, 2021.

The appeal was heard on 29th November, 2021 when the learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant and 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents adopted their respective Brief of Argument.

The learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant, BABAJIDE BABATUNDE, ESQ distilled four issues for determination of the Cross-Appeal as follows:-
“1. Whether the trial Court was right not to have nullified the suspension of the Cross-Appellant from his position as Secretary of Nigerian National Merit Award despite evidence of irregularity and breach of fair hearing by the 1st & 2nd Cross-Respondents (Ground 1 of Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal):
2. Whether the trial Court was right in holding that Cross-Appellant failed to prove the salary he was paid and failed to prove his entitlement to the salary of a chief executive (Ground 2 of Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal);
3. Whether the trial Court was right in holding that Cross-Appellant’s reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) of his Complaint relate to defamation which he failed to prove. (Ground 3 of Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal).
4. Did Cross-Appellant’s contract or tenure of office end on 7th April 2016? (Ground 4 of Amended Notice of Cross-Appeal).”
The 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents’ learned Counsel ABDULWAHAB MUHAMMED, SAN also formulated four issues for determination of the Cross-Appeal viz:-
“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents can validly suspend the Cross-Appellant from office in line with his terms and conditions of employment (Distilled from ground 1 of the Notice of Cross-Appeal).
2. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he held that the Cross-Appellant failed to prove his entitlement to the salary of Chief Executive (Distilled from ground 2 of the Notice of Cross-Appeal).
3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right when he refused to grant Cross-Appellant’s reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) on grounds that he failed to plead any particulars of defamation neither did he lead any evidence in proof actual publication. (Distilled from ground 3 of the Notice of Appeal).
4. Whether the slip in the judgment of the Honourable Court wherein the learned Judge stated that the Cross-Appellant tenure of office expired on 7th April, 2016 can form basis of any complaint on appeal (Distilled from ground 4 of the Notice of Appeal).”

The Cross-Respondents’ issues clearly overlapped with the issues nominated for determination by the Cross-Appellant. The Cross-Appeal will therefore be considered on the issues raised for determination by the Appellant’s learned Counsel.

On issue 1 as to whether the lower Court was right in holding that the Appellant was validly suspended, the learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant submitted that the lower Court erred in law in failing to nullify the suspension from office of the Cross Appellant by the 1st and 2nd Respondents. It is the submission of the Cross-Appellant’s learned Counsel that the suspension of the Cross-Appellant did not follow strictly the procedure contained in Rule 030406 of the Public Service Rules. He quoted the said Rules to submit that there was nothing before the trial Court whether in form of an investigation or a report which established a prima facie case of serious misconduct against the Cross-Appellant in that Exhibit C5 which suspended Cross-Appellant made no reference to any investigation or report. He made reference to page 480(F) of the record whereat he said DW2 admitted that the Appellant was not suspended on the basis of audit report. He relied on the case of AMASIKE V REGISTRAR-GENERAL, CORPORATE AFFAIRS COMMISSION (2006) 3 NWLR (PART 965) 462 AT 500 to submit that the 1st and 2nd Respondents acted mala fide in placing Cross-Appellant on suspension.

The learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant also submitted that the 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents made serious allegation of misconduct against the Cross-Appellant in Exhibit C5 but failed to afford Cross-Appellant of opportunity of fair hearing in that he was not given opportunity to make his defence to the said allegation. He relied on Rule 030302 of Public Service Rules and the case of OLATUNBOSUN V NIGERIAN INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH COUNCIL (1988) 3 NWLR (PART 80) 25 AT 52.

The learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant accused the lower Court of improper evaluation of the evidence before it in that it proceeded on the footing that Section 4(a) of the NNMA Act empowered the 1st and 2nd Respondents to exercise disciplinary authority over the Cross-Appellant including power to suspend without inquiring into whether it is in consonance with the provisions of Public Service Rules, Rule 030406 thereof. He urged this Court to interfere and reevaluate what he described as the perverse conclusion. He relied on the case of OKOLO V UZOKA (1978) 4 SC 77 and ABUSAMWAN V MERCHANTILE BANK (NIG) (NO. 2) (1987) 3 NWLR (PART 20) 20. He urge this Court to resolve issue 1 in Cross-Appellant’s favour.

In response to the above submissions under issue 1, the learned senior Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents submitted that the Cross-Appellant’s suspension is consistent with his Conditions of Service with the 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents whom he said validly suspended the Cross-Appellant pursuant to powers bestowed on them under Section 4(2)(a) of the Nigerian National Merit Award Act and Rules 030406 of the Federal Government Public Service Rule and Exhibit C3 which is the Letter of Appointment of the Cross-Appellant. That the onus is on the Cross Appellant to point out the Conditions of Service of Cross Appellant’s Employment that was breached. He relied on the finding of the lower Court on the issue of suspension on pages 503 – 504 of the record to further submit that the position of the lower Court is unassailable. He relied on the cases of AMODU V AMODE & ANOR (1990) 5 NWLR (PART 150) PAGE 356 and ONYEUKWU V FBN PLC (2015) LPELR – 24672 (CA).

On whether the Cross-Appellant was afforded fair hearing, learned Silk submitted that there is no such condition precedent. He relied on the following cases:-
1. LONGE V FBN PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (PART 1189) 1;
2. AYEWA V UNIJOS (2000) 6 NWLR (PART 659) 142;
to submit that that the query dated 4th February, 2016 given to Cross-Appellant clearly stated the serious misconduct alleged against the ross Appellant relying on pages 37 – 38 of the record and the cases of MIAPHEN V UNIJOS CONSULTANCY LTD (2013) LPELR 21904 CA and AJULUCHUKWU V THE STATE (2014) 13 NWLR (PART 1425) 641. He urged the Court to resolve issue 1 against the Cross-Appellant.

On issue 2 as to whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that Cross-Appellant failed to place before the Court any evidence of how he arrived at salaries claimed from the Cross-Respondents stated that the lower Court did not advert its mind to paragraphs 23, 25 and 54 of Statement of Facts and Exhibit D9 thus making the wrong finding.

As to whether the Cross-Appellant proved his claim for salary of a Chief Executive, learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant submitted that the idea of circular listing Cross-Appellant as a Chief Executive was an issue introduced as extraneous matter to the evidence before the lower Court without affording the Cross-Appellant opportunity of being heard. That both parties are ad idem that the Cross Appellant was Secretary of NNMA and that that is a Grade “A” Parastatal of Federal Government. He relied on Exhibit C3 which he said spelt out the powers, functions and responsibilities of Cross-Appellant and that this “pointed to the irresistible inferences that they were executive in nature”.

That the DW2 admitted that the Cross-Appellant was in charge of day to day management of 1st and 2nd Respondents’ affairs on page 480(EO) of the record. He also relied on Exhibits C14 and C15 and the fact that DW3 had sought the approval to implement the salary and allowances of Cross-Appellant in line with salaries and allowances of Chief Executives in FG Parastatals. He opined that the lower Court drew wrong inferences and thus arrived at wrong conclusions. He urged this Court to intervene and right the wrong. He relied also on Exhibit C9 and the cases HIGHGRADE MARITIME SERVICES LTD. V FBN LTD (1991) 1 NWLR (PART 167) 290 and ONWUKA V OMOGUI (1992) 3 NWLR (PART 230) 393.

He urged the Court to resolve issue 2 in Cross-Appellant’s favour and grant relief (iii) of his claims to him.

Reacting to argument of the Cross-Appellant under issue 2, the learned senior Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents contended that in determining the issue recourse must be had to the documents containing his Terms and Conditions of Service. That as per Exhibit C3 which is the Appointment Letter of the Cross-Appellant, he was employed as SECRETARY AND NOT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the NNMA. That the status of Cross-Appellant is as contained in Exhibit C3 on page 23 of the record. He relied on the case of ORGAN & ORS V NLNG LTD & ANOR (2013) 16 NWLR (PART 138) AT 506. He submitted that the submissions of Cross-Appellant on the entitlement to salaries and allowances of a Chief Executive is vain and baseless relying on the case of INTEGRATED FINANCE LTD V NPA & ANOR (2019) LPELR – 4932. That it is the NNMA Act Section 4(2) thereof that provides for the method of determining the power to fix his remuneration and powers to hire and fire the Cross-Appellant. That it was upon this that the National Salaries, Income & Wages Commission wrote a letter to the Cross Appellant contained on page 193 of the record directing that the Secretary of NNMA should be placed on the same salary and allowances of a Director on GL 17 in the Federal Public Service.

He relied also on the case of SCOA NIG. PLC V IFEBUZOH (2018) LPELR – 46784 CA to contend that the parties to this appeal are bound by the Terms and Conditions of Service of the Cross-Appellant. He urged this Court to resolve issue 2 against the Cross-Appellant.

On issue 3 as to the findings of lower Court that reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) of his claim relate to defamation which Cross-Appellant failed to prove, learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant referred this Court to paragraphs 7, 18 and 19 of the record as containing enough facts and evidence in support of reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) of the reliefs sought.

According to the Cross-Appellant, his reliefs are not rooted in tort of defamation but on wrongful pasting of query dated 16/2/2016 and addressed to him, Exhibit C6, in a wrong place as according to the Appellant there is no such provisions enabling pasting of query in a public place.

He submitted that the 1st and 2nd Respondents admitted pasting the query as contended. That the facts were proved. He also submitted that the lower Court failed to follow the maxim “ubi jus ibi remedium” to grant the reliefs. He relied on the cases of ARULOGUN V COP (2016) LPELR – 40190 CA and BELLO V A.G. OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (PART 45) 828.

He accused the trial Judge of failing to consider the relief for the sum of N10 million Naira damages claimed. That this Court has powers to assess damages due to the Cross-Appellant pursuant to Section 15 of Court of Appeal Act relying on the cases of DUMBO V IDUAGBOE (1983) 2 SC 14 and EDIAGBONYA V DUMEZ (1989) 3 NWLR (PART 31) 753. He urged the Court to resolve issue 3 in Cross-Appellant’s favour.

In his own submission on issue 3 touching and concerning reliefs (iv), (v) and (vi) on the grounds of failure of adequate pleading of any particulars of defamation and evidence of publication, the 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents’ learned Senior Counsel stated he was taken aback and that it is necessary to examine what constitutes defamation vis-a-vis the pleadings of the parties and relief sought on that head by the Cross-Appellant. He called in aid the case of CHILKIED SECURITY SERVICES & DOG FARMS LTS V SCHLUMBERGER (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2018) 3-4 SC (PART 1) sic AT PAGES 24 – 27 D – A.

That a perusal of the Cross-Appellant’s paragraphs 38, 39 and 40 of Cross-Appellant’s Statement of Facts shows he was claiming for damages for defamation. He relied on the case of AKINTERINWA & ANOR V OLADUNSOYE (2000) 6 NWLR (PART 659) 92. That no evidence was led to prove the assertion of the Cross-Appellant. That the lower Court was right in its decision. He relied on the cases of OLOGE & ORS V NEW AFRICA HOLDINGS LTD (2013) 17 NWLR (PART 1384) 449 and ESENOWO V UKPONG & ANOR (1999) 6 NWLR (PART 608) PAGE 611 to contend that Cross-Appellant failed to prove publication and those who read the pasted query. He submitted that no libel or defamation was established. He urged the Court to resolve the issue against the Appellant.

Lastly on issue 4 as to whether the Cross-Appellant’s contract or tenure of office ended on 7th April, 2016, the learned Counsel to the Cross-Appellant stated that there was evidence before the trial Court to establish that the Cross-Appellant’s appointment took effect from 5th May, 2014 for the initial period of two years. He relied on paragraphs of the Statement of Facts and Exhibit C3, his Letter of Appointment. That by simple mathematical calculation, Cross-Appellant’s tenure of office was to end on 5th May, 2016. He therefore submitted that the Cross-Appellant’s outstanding salary and allowances ought to be calculated and paid until his tenure ended on 4th May, 2016 and not on 7th April, 2016 as wrongly stated by lower Court according to the Appellant’s learned Counsel. He urged the Court to resolve issue 4 in Cross-Appellant’s favour.

Responding to the above submission on issue 4, the learned senior Counsel to the 1st and 2nd Respondents stated that what happened was a slip and not an error in law. He relied on the case of ALAO V ACB LTD (2000) LPELR – 4088C.

That what Cross-Appellant ought to have done was simply to have applied to trial Court to correct the slip instead of making it a ground of appeal. He relied on the case of RACE AUTO SUPPLY CO. LTD V AKIB (2006) 13 NWLR (PART 997) 333. He further submitted that it is not every error or slip that will result in setting aside a lower Court’s judgment unless an Appellant shows a miscarriage of justice. He relied on the case of IPINLAIYE ‘II’ V. OLUKOTUN (1996) 6 NWLR (PART 453) 148. He urged this Court to resolve issue 4 in 1st and 2nd Respondents’ favour and consequently dismiss the Cross-Appeal.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUES
The grouse of the Cross Appellant is that the lower Court failed to properly examine the case postulated on Cross-Appellant’s pleadings coupled with the oral and documentary evidence given before the lower Court when the trial Court failed to hold:
1. That the suspension of the Cross-Appellant was wrong.
2. That the Cross-Appellant proved the salary claimed or his entitlement to it.
3. That the Cross-Appellant proved entitlement to reliefs iv, v and vi of reliefs sought before the lower Court.
4. Correctly on when the tenure of office of the Cross-Appellant as Claimant would end.

The law is settled that an Appellant who complains that the decision of the trial Court is perverse for lack of adequate or proper evaluation of oral and documentary evidence, must prove or establish that the Court of first instance made improper use of opportunity of seeing the witnesses testifying before him. He must show that there was misapplication of oral and documentary evidence placed before the lower Court. He must endeavour to prove that the lower Court failed to ascribe probative value to the evidence led or that wrong inferences were drawn leading to wrong conclusions or miscarriage of justice making it imperative for the Appellate Court to intervene and reevaluate the oral and documentary evidence. See
1. CHIEF JAMES O. OLONADE & ANOR VS. H.B SOWEIMO (2014) 14 NWLR (PART 1428) 472 AT 495 G- H TO 496 per M. D. MOHAMMED who said:-
“Firstly, evaluation of relevant and material evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of the trial Court which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified. Where the trial Court unquestionably evaluate the evidence and justifiably appraises the Facts, as it has been manifestly shown to have been done in the instant case it is not the business of the lower Court, an appellate Court, to substitute its own views for the views of the trial Court. The application of this trite principle by the lower Court cannot, certainly, be a basis for the reversal of the Court’s decision. See Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91; Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 565) 226 and Sha v. Kwan (2000) 5 SC 178 (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 670) 685.
Secondly, in a civil matter such as this, the Court decides the case on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. The trial Court does this by first deciding which evidence it accepts from each of the parties, putting the accepted evidence adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the imaginary scale and that of the defendant on the other side of the scale weighing them together. The Court then decides which side’s evidence is heavier, not by the number of witnesses called by either party or on the basis of the one being oral and the other being documentary, but by the quality or probative value of the evidence be it oral and/or documentary. See Fagbenro v. Arobadi (2006) 7 NWLR (PT. 978) 172.”
2. MRS ELIZABETH IRABOR ZACCALA VS MR KINSLEY EDOSA & ANOR (2018) 6 NWLR (PART 1616) 528 AT 545 B – D per M. D. MUHAMMAD, JSC who said:
“It is trite that the trial Court is vested with the primary duty of evaluating evidence and ascribing probative value to same. This primacy in the Court’s responsibility arises out of the fact of the advantage it has of seeing and, from observation of the witnesses, making impressions as they testified. Thus where the trial Court fails to bring the advantage to play in evaluating the evidence of the witnesses or where being documents, as in the instant case, the issue of credibility is not at play, the appellate Court is in as good a position as the trial Court to re-appraise the evidence and make correct inferences.
See Atoyebi & Anor v. The Governor of Oyo State Ors (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 290, Dakat v. Dashe (1997) 12 NWLR (Pt. 531) 46 and Ajibulu v. Ajayi (2013) LPELR-21860 (SC): (2014) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1392) 483.”
3. CHIEF NYA EDIM EKONG VS CHIEF ASUQUO E. OTOP & 7 ORS (2014) 11 NWLR (PART 1419) 459 AT 573 F – H per OKORO, JSC who said:-
“It is trite that all documents tendered before a Court at the trial of a case is part and parcel of the evidence to be considered in the determination of issues before the Court. Such documents usually referred to as exhibits are subject to scrutiny and to be tested for credibility and weight by the trial Court. Where the trial Court fails to examine documents tendered before it, an appellate Court is in a good position to evaluate such exhibits. See Ayeni v Dada (1978) 3 SC 35; Bamgboye v Olarewaju (1991) 22 NSCC (Pt. 1) 501; (1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 184) 132. I think since Exhibit C was tendered before the trial Court and was part of the record of appeal before the Court below the Justices of that Court were eminently qualified to draw such inferences as they found fit and proper so to do.”
It must however be borne in mind that it is not every slip or error by a lower Court that will lead to a reversal of the lower Court’s decision unless the findings of the said Court are not supported by oral and documentary evidence on record.

The Cross-Appellant tendered the letter of employment Exhibit C3 which states thus:-
“THE PRESIDENCY
THE GOVERNING BOARD
NIGERIAN NATIONAL MERIT AWARD SECRETARIAT
Ref: 8358/S.28/1
Date: 23rd June, 2014
Merit House:
Plot 22, J. T. Aguiyi Ironsi Street,
Maitama, Abuja.
Email: nnmaabuja@gmail.com
Website: www.nnma.gov.ng
Prof. G. B. Ayoola,
President,
Farm and Rural Infrastructure Foundation,
No. 1, Gbolayade Ayoola Close,
Sangan/Ayigbiri,
Ojoo,
Ibadan
Dear Prof. Ayoola,
OFFER OF APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY TO THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL MERIT AWARD (NNMA)
On behalf of the Governing Board of the Nigerian National Merit Award (NNMA), it is my pleasure to appoint you as the Secretary of the Nigerian National Merit Award, for the initial period of 2 (two) years, subject to renewal, as to be determined by the Board.
The Nigerian National Merit Award (NNMA) was established in 1979 by Decree No. 53, as amended by the Nigerian National Merit Award Act No. 96 of 1992 to award the Nigerian National Order of Merit (NNOM) Award to deserving citizens of Nigeria at home and in Diaspora for academic and intellectual attainments that contribute to national endeavours in Science, Medicine, Engineering/Technology, and the Humanities, including Arts and Culture and other fields of human endeavour. The NNOM is an order of dignity that entitles recipients to use the designation “Nigerian National Order of Merit (NNOM)” after their names; receiving a cash prize, a certificate and medal, as well as other privileges as are enjoyed by recipients of high Levels of National Honours.
The functions of the Board are to;
(i) conduct the Award on the NNOM in accordance with the Act;
(ii) institute measures designed to promote intellectual and academic excellence among Nigerians for this purpose and liaise with academic professional and research institutions in Nigeria;
(iii) manage the Nigerian National Merit Award Endowment Fund; and
(iv) do such other things which in the opinion of the Board are necessary to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of NNMA under the Act.
As Secretary to the Governing Board, you are the Head of the NNMA Secretariat, operating its structure and supervising the administrative and other functions of all staff as directed by the Board. You will serve as Chief Accounting Officer responsible to the Board on all matters and serve as the direct link to the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation. You are to ensure that the NNMA Secretariat remains a lean and efficient platform for efficiently assisting the Board in identifying, recognizing and rewarding Nigerians who have distinguished themselves in academic excellence and outstanding intellectual achievements in the fields of Science, Technology, Medicine, Humanities, Arts and Culture and any other fields of human endeavour.
Your appointment is with effect from 5th May, 2014 and your condition of service will be in line with existing rules and provisions within the federal public service.
Kindly indicate your acceptance on this offer under the conditions stipulated by signing and returning a copy of this letter.
Yours sincerely,
Sgd 29/09/2014
Professor F. S. Idachaba, NNOM, D. Sc. (Honoris Causa), OFR Chairman, Governing Board of the Nigerian National Merit Award (NNMA)

Now with respect to whether the Cross Appellant was properly suspended pending when he would be investigated the learned trial Judge made it clear and I agree with him that an employer has unfettered powers to suspend an employee within the context of his Conditions of Employment. The learned trial Judge also relied on the Nigerian National Merit Award Act Section 4(2)(a) thereof which provides that the Board in relation to an employee thereof shall have power to exercise disciplinary control (including Cross-Appellant) over such employee.

The Cross-Appellant pleaded that much in paragraph 15 of his Statement of Facts as follows:-
“15. The Claimant avers that his appointment and conditions of service are regulated by the Public Service Rules as stated in his letter of appointment and indicated in the enabling Act of the NNMA.”

This is a direct acknowledgment that the Appellants have powers to discipline the Cross-Appellant including the power to suspend him. Suspension is not the same as guilt of allegations leveled against the Cross-Appellant.

Suspension of an employee is to ensure that the employer will have opportunity to investigate the allegations against the employee unhindered and without undue interference from the employee being investigated. The suspension is not a dismissal of the employee. It is an instruction to the employee to step aside until it is determined whether he is culpable of allegations against him. Where the employee is cleared he will be recalled to his duties. See BERNARD OJEIFO LONGE V FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (PART 1189) 1 AT 35D – 36E per OGUNTADE, JSC who said:-
“In University of Calabar v. Esiaga (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 719 at 723, the Court of Appeal discussing the nature of the consequences of suspension of an employee reasoned:
“The word ‘suspension’ means a temporary privation or deprivation cessation or stoppage of or from the privileges and rights of a person. The word carries or conveys a temporary or transient disciplinary procedure which keeps away the victim or person disciplined from his regular occupation or calling either for a fixed or terminal period or indefinitely. The disciplinary procedure gives the initiator of the discipline a period to make up his mind as to what should be done to the person facing the discipline. Although in most cases, suspension results in a disciplinary action it is not invariably so. There are instances when the authority decides not to continue with the matter. This could be because the investigations did not result in any disciplinary conduct.”
Also in Boston Sea Fishing Co. v. Ansell (1986-90) All ER 65 of the Court said:-
Mr. Ansell was dismissed and I think his dismissal from the position which he held must be taken to date from the meeting on October, and not from the day in September when he was suspended by the board because suspension is very different from dismissal. When a man is suspended from the office he holds, it is merely a discretion that “so long he holds the office and until he is legally dismissed he must not do anything in the discharge of the duties which under your office you ought to do towards your employer” (italics mine)
I think, with respect, that the Court below completely misunderstood the import of suspension. Admittedly an employer suspending his employee may impose terms of the suspension but in a general sense suspension of an employee from work only means the suspension of the employee from performance of the ordinary duties assigned to him by virtue of his office. Suspension is not a demotion and does not entail a diminution of rank, office or position.
Certainly, it cannot import a diminution of the rights of the employee given to him under the law. To accept as the Court below did that suspension of the plaintiff would deny him the protection afforded him under Section 266 is to confer the right on the defendant to vary the status of the plaintiff without complying with the procedure laid down for doing so. The defendant cannot first suspend the plaintiff without notice to him of the meeting at which the suspension was discussed and agreed and then turn round to say that the suspension had removed the necessity to give him the notice as mandatorily required under Section 266(1) of C.A.M.A. The Court cannot grant to a litigant the right to disobey the law under any artifice or guise.”
At page 77 – 78 ADEKEYE, JSC said:-
“Suspension is usually a prelude to dismissal from an employment. It is a state of affairs which exists while there is a contract in force between the employer and the employee, but while there is neither work being done in pursuance of it nor remuneration being paid. Suspension is neither a termination of the contract of employment nor a dismissal of the employee. It operates to suspend the contract rather than terminate the contractual obligations of the parties to each other. See Wallwork v. Fielding (1922) 2 KB Pg. 66 Bird v. British Celanese Ltd, (1945) 1 KB pg. 336 University of Calabar v Esiaga (1999) 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) pg. 719.
It was however held in the case of Amadiume v. Ibok (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) pg. 158 that the suspension of a servant or an employee when necessary cannot amount to a breach of the servant or employee’s fundamental or common law rights.”

The Cross-Appellant relied on Public Service Rule 030406 to contend that since Exhibit C5 did not mention of any investigation report and thus the suspension is invalid.
The provisions of the said Rule 030406 are:-
“030406 – Suspension should not be used as a synonym for interdiction. It shall apply where a prima facie case, the nature of which is serious, has been established against an officer and it is considered necessary in the public interest that he/she should forthwith be prohibited from carrying out his/her duties. Pending investigation into the misconduct, the Federal Civil Service Commission or the Permanent Secretary/Head of Extra-Ministerial Office (if within his/her delegated powers) shall forthwith suspend him/her from the exercise of the powers and functions of his/her office and from the enjoyment of his/her emolument.”

The law is settled that in the interpretation of any law, subsidiary legislation, instrument, Legal Rules of Court or other Rules, the Statute or law, the document being construed must be given their ordinary grammatical meanings in order to do justice to the parties involved and to respect the real meaning and the intendment of the makers of the law, instrument or document which calls for interpretation. See PDP VS. HON. (DR) HARRY N. ORANEZI & ORS (2018) 7 NWLR (PART 1618) 245 at 257 H to 258A per M. D. MUHAMMAD, JSC.
“Now, a cardinal principle of interpretation we must not forget, which learned appellant’s counsel however seems to ignore, is that provisions of a statute, an instrument or indeed pleadings should not be read in isolation of the other parts of the statute, instrument or pleadings. In order to determine the intendment of the makers of the statute, instrument or pleadings, same should be read as a whole. Thus a clause in any of these must be construed together and with reference to the context and other clauses in the statue, instrument or pleadings in ensuring the discovery of a consistent meaning of the whole, here, the pleading being considered. See Oyeyemi v. Commissioner for Local Government (Kwara State) (1992) 2 SCNJ 266 at 280; (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 226) 661 and Artra Industry Nigeria Limited v. NBC (1998) 3 SCNJ 97 at 115; (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 357.”

I am of the solemn view that there is nothing in Rule 030406 suggesting that there must be a report of a Panel or Committee before the Cross-Appellant could be suspended.

There is no magic in the words “prima facie”. It only means “based on what first seems to be true, although it may be proved false later’ according to OXFORD ADVANCED DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH 9TH EDITION PAGE 1219.

The lower Court was right in its conclusion that the suspension was validly invoked against the Cross-Appellant and that reliefs I and II as claimed by the Cross-Appellant were rightly dismissed.

On whether the finding of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the Claimant is not entitled to salary of a category ‘A’ Parastatal on the ground that no evidence of salary he was paid or any circular produced in that behalf was placed before the lower Court, was right. I am of the view that in order for the Cross-Appellant to dislodge the finding of the lower Court, he has a bounden duty to show that he pleaded the salary he was earning in his position and appointment as Secretary to the Nigerian National Merit Award (NNMA). There is no document produced or tendered by the Cross-Appellant to substantiate his allegation that he was not paid his commensurate salaries and emoluments. Exhibit C3 tendered by him specifically appointed him as Secretary of 1st Appellant and not as a Professor in the service of the 1st Appellant to earn the same salary with Chief Executive Officers in what he called category “A” Parastatal.

The Cross-Appellant by various acts and letters went behind its establishment to seek for salary that is higher than the position of Secretary he was appointed without success.

The Cross-Appellant did not even tender his payslip to enable the lower Court have the benefit of his salaries and no document was tendered to prove the elevated salaries the Cross-Appellant arrogated to himself. Parties are bound by the terms and conditions of the employment agreement or contract between them. In this, the Cross-Appellant is bound by the terms and conditions governing his employment. The Court cannot read into any of the documents or correspondences between the parties anything that is not contained in them. The submissions of the Cross-Appellant’s learned Counsel is therefore a veiled invitation to construe documents relating to Cross-Appellant’s employment contrary to the known principles of interpretation of contractual documents. The lower Court was right in not acceding to the absurd demands of the Cross-Appellant in terms of salaries and allowances outside the documents of his employment. This Court will also not be a party to it.

The duty of the Court is to interpret the contract as contained in the instrument made by the parties on their own volition. The Court cannot rewrite the contract between the parties. See:
1. GABRIEL ADEKUNLE OGUNDEPO & ANOR VS THOMAS ENIYAN OLUMESAN (2011) 8 NWLR (PART 1278) 54 AT 70 C – D per FABIYI, JSC who held:
“I need to still point out at this stage that it is not the business of a Court to re-write parties contract for them. The duty of the Court is to interpret the contract as contained in the instrument made by the parties on their own free volition. A Court of record should never accede to the importation of unrelated ‘grey’ areas of the law by a party to prop what is not contained in the instrument made by the parties. See Jadesimi v. Egbe (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 827) 1 at 30; Isiyaku v. Zwingina (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt. 81 7) 560 at 576.”
2. UBN PLC VS ALHAJI AJABULE & ANOR (2011) 18 NWLR (PART 1278) 152 AT 185 per ADEKEYE, JSC who said:-
“In the law of contract, the law is that a written contract agreement entered into by parties is binding on them. Where there is any disagreement between the parties to such written agreement on any particular point, the only reliable evidence to resolve the claim is the written contract of the parties. The reason being that where the intention of the parties to a contract are clearly expressed in a document, the Court cannot go outside the document in search of other documents not forming part of the intention of the parties.”
3. CBN VS MRS AGNES M. IGWILLO (2007) 14 NWLR (PART 1054) 393 AT 419 A TO 420 A – C per AKINTAN, JSC who said:
“The law is settled that there are now roughly three categories of contracts of employment, viz: (a) those regarded as purely master and servant; (b) those where a servant is said to hold an office at the pleasure of the employer and those where the employment is regulated or governed by statute, often referred to as having statutory flavour. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599. An employment is said to have statutory flavour when the appointment is protected by statute or laid down regulations made to govern the procedure for employment and discipline of an employee. Any other employment outside that category is governed by the terms under which the parties agreed to be master and servant. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos, supra; Ogunke v. National Steel Development Authority (1974) NWLR 128; Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47; Ideh v. University of Ilorin (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 81; Shitta-Bey v. The Federal Public Service (Pt. 265) 303; and Udo v. Cross River State Newspaper Corporation (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116.”
On page 433A – E, OGBUAGU, JSC also had this to say:-
“It must always be borne in mind and this is also settled firstly that where a contract (which includes contract of employment), involves several documents, the trial Court can only determine the issues before it, on the basis of the documents including letters relating to the contract and the conduct of the parties. See the cases of The Attorney-General of Kaduna State v. Atta (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 38) 785 C.A and Leyland (Nig.) Ltd. v. Dizengoff W. A. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 134) 610 at 620.
Secondly, where a contract is in writing, any agreement which seeks to vary the original agreement, must itself, be in writing. This is exactly what happened in the circumstances of this case where the condition of releasing of the respondent to the 1st appellant was that the 1st appellant, shall accept the respondent as employed and transferring his service from one bod to another body. See the cases of John Holt d Co. (Liverpool) Ltd v. Stephen Late (1938) 15 NLR 14 and Bijou (Nig.) Ltd. v. Osidarohwo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 249) 643 at 649. Again, a contract which must in law be in writing, can only be varied by an agreement in writing.

See the case of Morris v. Baron & Co. (1918) A.C. 1 at 39. Also settled, is that in the interpretation of a contract involving several documents, the documents must be read together. See the cases of Royal Exchange Assurance (Nig.) Ltd. & 4 Ors v. Aswani Textile Industries Ltd. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 639 at 669 C.A.” (Underlined mine)

It is the duty of the Appellant to prove his case by leading credible evidence in support of his pleaded case. There is no document or contract of employment from which to infer entitlements to the salaries and allowances he claimed.

There is no evidence oral or documentary before the Court to show that the Cross-Appellant who was appointed as Secretary to the 1st Appellant was entitled to be paid salary of a category ‘A’ Parastatal Chief Executive Officer. The claim amounts to gold digging. The lower Court rightly dismissed the claims of Cross-Appellant to such unsubstantiated salaries or allowances.

In respect of issue 3 pertaining to reliefs (iv) (v) and (vi) claiming that it was wrong for the Cross-Respondents to paste query of 16th February, 2016 and seeking letter of apology and sum of N10,000,000 (Ten Million Naira), I agree with the lower Court that the claims are in the form of libel or defamation which is rooted or situated in tort. The Cross-Appellant has not shown any basis for the said claims or reliefs. They were rightly refused by the lower Court.

Consequently, issue 1, 2 and 3 formulated for the determination of the Cross-Appeal are hereby resolved against the Cross-Appellant.

On issue 4 as to the slip committed by the learned trial Judge when he held that the Defendants now Cross-Respondents shall pay the Claimant all such salaries and allowances due to the Claimant from the date last paid ‘until the end of contract 7th April, 2016, the Cross- Respondent’s learned Silk agreed there was a slip in that aspect of the relief granted in favour of the Cross-Appellant.

I am of the view that the decision on that aspect of the judgment is a mere slip.

Issue 4 is resolved in Cross-Appellant’s favour.

For avoidance of doubt, the Cross-Appellant’s appeal succeeds ONLY in respect of issue 4.

The only thing resolved in Cross-Appellant’s favour is that the Cross-Appellant is to be paid such salaries and allowances due to him from the date he was last paid his entitlement by 1st and 2nd Cross-Respondents until 4th May, 2016.

The judgment of the lower Court delivered on 30/10/2019 is HEREBY AFFIRMED save as stated above that Cross-Appellant is ONLY entitled to be paid from when his salary was stopped by 1st Respondent till 4th May, 2016.
Parties to bear their respective costs.

STEPHEN JONAH ADAH, J.C.A.: I was privileged to read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Peter Olabisi Ige, JCA.

I am in agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion reached thereat. I adopt it as mine.

I abide by the consequential orders as made in the lead judgment.

DANLAMI ZAMA SENCHI, J.C.A.: I am opportuned to read the judgment in the Cross-Appeal of my learned brother, PETER OLABISI IGE, JCA just delivered and I agree with his finding and conclusion that issues 1, 2 and 3 for determination of the Cross-Appeal are resolved against the Cross-Appellant and in favour of the Cross-Respondents. Issue four (4) is hereby resolved in favour of the cross-Appellant and against the 1st & 2nd Respondents. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower Court delivered on 30/10/2019 to the effect that the Cross-Appellant is only entitled to be paid from when his salary was stopped by the 1st Respondent till the 4th May, 2016 is hereby affirmed.

No award as to costs.