RUTH ADEHWE AWETO v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA(2018)

RUTH ADEHWE AWETO v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

(2018) LCN/4742(SC)

In The Supreme Court of Nigeria

On Friday, the 26th day of January, 2018

SC.584/2015

RATIO

WHETHER BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISION OF SECTION 251(3) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION ,THE FEDERAL HIGH COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF MATTERS OVER WHICH IT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 251 (1)

Section 251 (1)(a) and (p) of the 1999 Constitution provides as follows:- “251 (i) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters – (a) Relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party; (p) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any or its agencies.” It is true that the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan is an agency of the Federal Government. The exclusive jurisdiction donated to the Federal High Court is in respect of civil causes and matters relating to those items set out in Subsection (1)(a-s) of Section 251 of the Constitution. Section 251(3) of the same Constitution is very clear. It provides as follows:- “251 (3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.” The word Exclusive is clearly absent in Section 251 (3) of the 1999 Constitution. I therefore agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent where he stated in argument that if the framers of the Constitution had intended that the Federal High Court should have exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters relating to the revenue of the Federal Government of Nigeria, they would have said so in clear words. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

WHETHER BY THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 174 (1) AND 286 (1)(B) OF THE 1999 CONSTITUTION AND SECTIONS 6 AND 26 (2) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 2000 THE ICPC CAN VALIDLY PROSECUTE CRIMINAL OFFENCES UNDER ITS ACT

In the case of Attorney General of Ondo State vs The Attorney General of the Federation, the Attorney General of Ondo State, by an originating summons filed at the Supreme Court, asked for among other reliefs the following:- 1. A determination of the question whether or not the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him can lawfully initiate legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of any of the criminal offences created by any of the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other related Offences Act 2000. 2. A declaration that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 is not in force as law in Ondo State. 3. A determination that it is not lawful for the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him to initiate legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of the criminal offences purported to be created by the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offence Act, 2000. The full Court of this Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that, by virtue of Section 174 (1) and 286 (1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) can lawfully initiate or authorise the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court other than a Court martial in any state of the Federation in respect of offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. At page 419 paragraphs A – B, their Lordships had this to say:- “The Attorney-General of the Federation derives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred …… nor can he be prevented from exercising his functions on the grounds that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular state in Nigeria. Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose any such limitation.” See The State vs Ilori (1983) 1 SCNLR 94. Section 6 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences says among other things that it shall be the duty of the ICPC to prosecute offenders. However, Section 26 (2) of the same Act provides inter alia that every prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation. It follows therefore that any criminal case initiated by the ICPC, is infact initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

WHETHER ADMITTED FACTS REQUIRE NO FURTHER PROOF

The law is settled beyond any argument that admitted facts require no further proof. See NNPC vs Klifco (Nig.) Ltd (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1255) 209; Ikare Community Bank vs. Ademuwagun (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.924) 275; Ogolo vs. Fubara (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 231; Adeleke v. Aserifa (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.30) 575; Nonye vs. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 110. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

POSITION OF THE LAW ON THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS THAT MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY THE PROSECUTION TO SUCCEED IN SECURING A CONVICTION AGAINST AN ACCUSED OF AN OFFENCE BORDERING ON CONTRAVENTION OF SECTION 17(1)(C) OF THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT, 2000

Section 17 (i)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 provides as follows:- “17 (i) any person who corruptly (a)…….. (b)…….. (c) knowingly gives to any agent, or being an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal or any other person, is guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five years imprisonment.” From the provision of Section 17 (1)(c) which I have reproduced hereinabove, for the prosecution to succeed, it must prove that the accused knowingly deceived his principal or intended to deceive his principal by presenting a document in which the principal is interested in and that the document contains false material. A man’s intention can only be established by circumstances and facts leading to the commission of the crime for which he is charged. It is very difficult to know what a man intends without resorting to chains of events that culminated into the acts complained of. It is only God and perhaps the devil whose powers are beyond human comprehension that will know a man’s intention. Intent is defined in Wager vs Pro C.A 603 F, 2d 1005 as a mental attitude which can seldom be proved by direct evidence, but must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. Also in State vs Gantt 26 NC, App. 554 intent is defined as a state of mind existing at the time a person commits an offence and may be shown by act, circumstances and inferences deducible therefrom. See State v. Evans 219 Kan 548 P.2d 772, 777. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C.

WHETHER THERE IS JURISDICTION IN THE HIGH COURT OF A STATE TO TRY THE AN OFFENCE CHARGED UNDER THE CORRUPT PRACTICES AND OTHER RELATED OFFENCES ACT 2000 HAVING REGARD TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 251(1)(P) AND (3) CFRN AND WHETHER THE

…this Court is mindful of Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (2002) 6 SC (Pt.1) wherein the call to invalidate the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 failed. This Court applying the blue pencil rule, struck down Sections 26(3) and 35 and declared the rest of the Act unaffected and valid. This Court per Uwais CJN held that Section 26(3) and 35 of Act were unconstitutional and therefore null and void. See also Doherty v. Balewa (1963)2 SC NLR 256; A.G. Abia State and 36 Ors v. A.G. Federation (2002) 3 SC 106 at 199-200 per Ogundare JSC. It follows that there is nothing necessitating a review of the decision of A.G. Ondo State v A.G. Federation(supra) as cited above. That being the case, the respondent herein as prosecution was well situated under the said ICPC Act 2000 to initiate the charge, proceed and conclude the prosecution of the appellant. In this regard, I shall quote the relevant sections thereof thus:- Section 61(3) of the ICPC Act provides; “The Chief Judge of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall by order under his hand designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud or other related offences arising under this Act or any other laws prohibiting fraud, bribery or corruption; a Court or Judge so designated shall not, while being so designated, hear or determine any other cases provided that all cases of fraud, bribery or corruption pending in any Court before the coming into effect of this Act shall continue to be heard and determined by that Court.” While Section 26(2)provides; “Prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation, or any person of Authority to whom he shall delegate his authority, in any superior Court of record so designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of the Federation Capital Territory, Abuja under Section 61(3) of this Act; and every prosecution for an offence under this Act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption, fraud or any other related offence shall be deemed to initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation.” It is clear therefore that the High Court of the various States and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) are empowered to entertain such prosecutions under the ICPC Act. Taking the provisions of the ICPC Act 2000 and co-relating them with Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), what comes clear is that the Federal High Court does not have the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matters on the ICPC Act, rather it shares the jurisdiction with the State High Court or the High Court of FCT and this as explained in Section 251 (3) of the 1999 CFRN. For effect I shall quote the section and related subsections as follows:- Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:- “(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction that maybe conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the EXCLUSION of any other Court in civil cases and matters.” (a) Relating to the revenue of Federal Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Government is a party.” While Section 251(3) Provides; “The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal cases and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection(1) of this Section.” In this case in hand, the two Courts below properly interpreted the law as they approached that duty of interpretation having in focus that the terms are plain without ambiguity and so nothing else was asked for but to accord the meaning of the words upon the ordinary and surrounding circumstance. In that way, the interpretation was made in order to uphold the purpose expected for the society at large and intendment of the law makers. See Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.761) 31-32 per Uwaifo JSC. PER MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

JUSTICES

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

SIDI DAUDA BAGE Justice of The Supreme Court of Nigeria

Between

RUTH ADEHWE AWETO Appellant(s)

AND

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA Respondent(s)

PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): The Appellant herein and one Mr. Adekanye Komolafe were provost and bursar respectively of Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan. They were arraigned before the Oyo State High Court, Ibadan charged with offences bordering on contravention of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000. During the trial, the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered several documents in evidence. The Appellant and her co-accused testified in their defence and called additional four witnesses.

At the end of the trial and in a reserved and considered judgment, the Appellant and her co-accused were each convicted under counts 5, 6, 7 and 8 and sentenced to one year imprisonment on each count. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

The Appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court. Being aggrieved, she appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ibadan, where her appeal was dismissed. She has now brought this appeal. Her amended Notice of Appeal dated 28th September, 2015 and filed on the same date contains nine grounds of appeal.

Parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument. The Appellant’s brief of argument, settled by Oluwasina Ogungbade Esq., of counsel to the appellant was filed on the 28th September, 2015. Learned counsel initially submitted three issues for determination of this appeal. However, when the appeal came up for hearing, learned counsel withdrew the first issue for determination of this appeal. The two issue left are hereunder reproduced as follows:-
1. Whether the High Court of Oyo State had the jurisdiction to try the Appellant for the offences charged particular regard being had to the combined effects of the provisions of Sections 251(1)(p) and 251(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended)
2. Whether in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent in the preparation of the budget proposals, the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof under required for the conviction of the Appellant the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

The Respondent’s brief of argument settled by George Lawal Esq., of counsel was filed on the 24th October, 2017. Learned

counsel formulated two issues for determination of this appeal.
They read thus:-
(a) Whether or not the High Court of Oyo State had the jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged under the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 having regard to the provisions of Sections 251 (1)(p) and 251(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
(b) Whether the Prosecution had proved corrupt intent as an ingredient of the offence created under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 to ground a convention.

Appellant filed a reply brief on 30th October, 2017. Before I delve into the submissions of learned counsel, I wish to set out in brief the facts that gave rise to this appeal, which are in my view simple and straight forward. The Appellant herein was the provost of Federal Cooperative College Ibadan. Mr. Adekanye Komolafe was the bursar of the same college. The two of them prepared and submitted nominal rolls and Budget proposals for the staff of the college for 2006, wherewith they presented 41 casual staff as permanent staff.

As a result of such presentation to the Federal Government, the sum of N7,041,861.15 was released every year as salaries and emoluments for the 41 casual staff, whereas the actual amount that was paid to the causal staff was N3,690,000.00 only.

In arguing the second issue, which is now the first issue, by virtue of the withdrawal of the first issue, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that Section 251 (3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria confers criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction under Section 251 (1) of the same Constitution. According to the learned counsel, one of the areas over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction are matters involving the administration, management and control of the Federal Government and its agencies. It is the view of the learned counsel that the conduct forming the basis of the charge against the Appellant was in the performance of her duty as the provost of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan, an agency of the Federal Government, as such only the Federal High Court could validly try the offences

alleged to have been committed as reflected on the charge.

Constitution. Section 251(3) of the same Constitution is very clear. It provides as follows:-
“251 (3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.”
The word Exclusive is clearly absent in Section 251 (3) of the 1999 Constitution. I therefore agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent where he stated in argument that if the framers of the Constitution had intended that the Federal High Court should have exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters relating to the revenue of the Federal Government of Nigeria, they would have said so in clear words.
In the case of Attorney General of Ondo State vs The Attorney General of the Federation, the Attorney General of Ondo State, by an originating summons filed at the Supreme Court, asked for among other reliefs the following:-
1. A determination of the question whether or not the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him can lawfully initiate legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of any of the

criminal offences created by any of the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other related Offences Act 2000.
2. A declaration that the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 is not in force as law in Ondo State.
3. A determination that it is not lawful for the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by him to initiate legal proceedings in any Court of law in Ondo State in respect of the criminal offences purported to be created by the provisions of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offence Act, 2000.
The full Court of this Court after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that, by virtue of Section 174 (1) and 286 (1)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation or any person authorized by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) can lawfully initiate or authorise the initiation of criminal proceedings in any Court other than a Court martial in any state of the Federation in respect of offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000. At page 419 paragraphs A – B, their Lordships had this to say:-
“The Attorney-General of

the Federation derives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred …… nor can he be prevented from exercising his functions on the grounds that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular state in Nigeria. Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose any such limitation.” See The State vs Ilori (1983) 1 SCNLR 94.
Section 6 of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences says among other things that it shall be the duty of the ICPC to prosecute offenders. However, Section 26 (2) of the same Act provides inter alia that every prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be deemed to be initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation. It follows therefore that any criminal case initiated by the ICPC, is infact initiated by the Attorney-General of the Federation.
It will appear that the learned counsel for the Appellant has either failed to understand the decision in Attorney-General Ondo State vs Attorney-General Federation (supra) or he has deliberately brought this issue to

test the patience of this Court. If learned counsel wants the Court to depart from its decision, he has not properly placed his wishes before this Court. For this Court has clearly stated that the State High Courts and the FCT High Court which are designated by the Chief Judges under Section 61 (3) of the Act for hearing of cases bordering on offences created by the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, have the requisite jurisdiction to hear such cases. In the instant case, the High Court of Oyo State has jurisdiction to hear this case. The Lower Court was therefore right to so hold. Issue one is therefore resolved against the Appellant. The 9th ground of appeal upon which this issue was formulated is hereby dismissed.

The 3rd issue for determination, which is now the 2nd issue is whether in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent in the preparation of the budget proposals, the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof required for the conviction of the Appellant under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Act 2000 The Appellant was accused of having made false representation in

the budgetary proposals of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan for the year 2006 with the intention that her principal, the Federal Government of Nigeria would act on those false representations. Specifically the Appellant was accused of presenting 41 casual staff of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan as permanent staff as a result of which the Federal Government released the sum of N7,041,816.15 as the benefits and emoluments of the said staff, when in reality they were as casual staff entitled to N3,690,000.00 only.

The Appellant’s defence as reflected in the Appellant’s brief of argument are reproduced hereunder as follows:-
(i)That the 41 casual staff had already been interviewed by the Respondent preparatory to their conversion to permanent staff and that the decision to include them as permanent staff was based upon the recommendation of the interview panel.
(ii) That prior to her assumption of office as the provost of the college, the said 41 casual staff had already been represented via Exhibit 83 (the handover note of her predecessor in office) to the Respondent as permanent staff.
(iii) That the proposed conversion

was delayed owing to policy of the government on employment.
(iv) There was a short fall of staff salary of over N9,000.00 million in 2004.
(v) That the difference between the amount released by the Federal Government as emolument of the casual staff and the amount actually paid to them was used to defray the short fall in staff salary from 2004.

By the Appellant’s defence as reproduced above, the Appellant admitted that the 41 casual staff which she represented in the budget were yet to be converted to permanent staff as at the time the budget proposals were submitted to the Federal Government. She also admitted that she was aware that Exhibit 83, the handover note did not disclose the true status of the 41 casual workers, and that is why they were subjected to interview with a view to converting them to permanent staff. Finally she admitted that the difference between the actual money paid to the 41 casual staff and the money received from the Federal Government was used to offset outstanding salaries of other staff, which is not the purpose for which the money was requested for in the budget. All these admissions were not disclosed to the

Federal Government when the budget proposals were submitted.

The facts admitted by the Appellant represent the allegation against her for which she was arraigned before the trial Court. The law is settled beyond any argument that admitted facts require no further proof. See NNPC vs Klifco (Nig.) Ltd (2011) 10 NWLR (Pt.1255) 209; Ikare Community Bank vs. Ademuwagun (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt.924) 275; Ogolo vs. Fubara (2003) 11 NWLR (Pt.831) 231; Adeleke v. Aserifa (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt.30) 575; Nonye vs. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt.101) 110.

Learned counsel for the Appellant argued forcefully that the learned trial Judge failed to advert to the fact that the defences so enumerated negated any corrupt intention on the part of the appellant. According to the learned counsel, the Court of Appeal incorrectly held that the prosecution established the required mensrea for a conviction on the offence charged. In a further argument, learned counsel submitted that the Lower Court was wrong to have affirmed the conviction of the Appellant when the evidence led before the trial Court negated any corrupt intention.

Section 17 (i)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other

Related Offences Act 2000 provides as follows:-
“17 (i) any person who corruptly
(a)……..
(b)……..
(c) knowingly gives to any agent, or being an agent knowingly uses with intent to deceive his principal, any receipt, account or other document in respect of which the principal is interested and which contains any statement which is false or erroneous or defective in any material particular, and which to his knowledge is intended to mislead his principal or any other person, is guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to five years imprisonment.”
From the provision of Section 17 (1)(c) which I have reproduced hereinabove, for the prosecution to succeed, it must prove that the accused knowingly deceived his principal or intended to deceive his principal by presenting a document in which the principal is interested in and that the document contains false material. A man’s intention can only be established by circumstances and facts leading to the commission of the crime for which he is charged. It is very difficult to

know what a man intends without resorting to chains of events that culminated into the acts complained of. It is only God and perhaps the devil whose powers are beyond human comprehension that will know a man’s intention. Intent is defined in Wager vs Pro C.A 603 F, 2d 1005 as a mental attitude which can seldom be proved by direct evidence, but must ordinarily be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred. Also in State vs Gantt 26 NC, App. 554 intent is defined as a state of mind existing at the time a person commits an offence and may be shown by act, circumstances and inferences deducible therefrom. See State v. Evans 219 Kan 548 P.2d 772, 777. From the facts of this case, the Appellant and the Bursar of the college knew that the 41 casual staff were not permanent staff. This is clearly admitted by the Appellant who said because of that knowledge, they interviewed the 41 casual staff with a view to converting them to permanent staff.
I therefore do not see the rationale behind learned counsel’s argument that the prosecution failed to prove that the Appellant had the necessary intention to commit the offence for which she was charged. The

Court of Appeal was right when it affirmed the decision of the trial Court. Section 17(1)(c) does not suggest that money lost as a result of the receipt or misrepresentation must be recovered from an accused before she could be found guilty of the offence. Mere deception and presentation of false and erroneous or defective material by a person with intent to mislead his principal or any other person is enough. The omission of the word corruptly from the reproduction and consideration of the provision of Section 17 (1)(c) by the Court of Appeal has not affected the quality of its judgment.

I have also read through the reply brief and I have found that it contains argument canvassed in the Appellant’s brief of argument. The essence of a reply brief is not to reopen argument already canvassed. It is to reply to new issues that have arisen in the Respondent’s brief of argument. Learned counsel for the Appellant has not convinced me to overturn the decision of the Lower Court on this issue, which I resolve against the Appellant.

Having resolved the two issues submitted for the determination of this appeal against the Appellant, this appeal shall be and it is

hereby dismissed.
The decision of the Lower Court is accordingly affirmed.

MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.: I agree with the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Paul Adamu Galinje JSC and to register that support, I shall make some remarks.

This is an appeal against the judgment of Ibadan Division of the Court of Appeal or Court below or Lower Court delivered on the 14th July, 2015 which affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant by the High Court of Oyo State for violations of provision of the corrupt practices and other related offences Act 2000. Dissatisfied with the said judgment of the Court below the appellant has come before the Supreme Court of Appeal.

FACTS BRIEFLY STATED
The appellant’s conviction was consequent upon an amended eight counts charge bordering on the violation of Section 17(1) (c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (hereinafter referred to as “The ICPC Act 2000″). The appellant was Provost of the Federal Cooperative College, Ibadan and she was charged alongside one Adekanye Komolafe who was the bursar of the said institution. They were

essentially charged for misleading their principal, the Federal Government of Nigeria by claiming that some casual staff of the institution were permanent staff and monies were released to the school for payment of their emoluments as permanent staff in 2005 and 2006 when in fact they were paid as casual staff. In proving its case, the prosecution called five witnesses and tendered several exhibits, while the appellant called four witnesses.

At conclusion of trial, the appellant was convicted on counts 5, 6, 7 and 8 and sentenced to 1 year imprisonment on each count. The appellant was discharged and acquitted on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. The appellant dissatisfied with that decision, lodged an appeal before the Ibadan Division of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal after careful consideration found that the prosecution proved its case against the appellant and consequently affirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court. It is this decision of the Court of Appeal that the appellant has appealed to this Honourable Court.

On the 1st day of November, 2017 date of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant adopted her brief of argument

filed on 28th September, 2015 and deemed filed on 27th April, 2016 and a reply brief filed on the 30th October, 2017 and deemed filed on 1st November, 2017. The appellant raised three issues but abandoned Issue 1 at the hearing which was struck out. The two extant issues therefore are:-
ISSUE TWO
Whether the High Court of Oyo State had jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged particular regard being had to the combined effects of the provisions of Sections 25(1)(p) and 251(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) (Ground 9).
ISSUES THREE
Whether in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent in the preparation of the Budget proposals, the prosecution successfully discharged the burden of proof required for the conviction of the Appellant under the provisions of Section 17(1) (c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000

George Lawal, Chief Legal Officer of the ICPC adopted the respondent’s brief of argument filed on 24th October, 2017 and deemed filed on 1st November, 2017. He crafted two issues for determination which are as follows:-
a. Whether or not the High

Court of Oyo State had the jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged under the Corrupt Practices and Other Offences Act 2000 having regard to the provisions of Section 251(1)(P) and 251(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
b. Whether the prosecution had proved corrupt intent as an ingredient of the offence created under the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Offences Act 2000 to ground a conviction.

I shall utilise the issues as crafted by the appellant for ease of reference.

ISSUES 2 & 3
These raises the question whether the Oyo State High Court has jurisdiction to try the appellant on the offences charged regard being had to the combined effect of Sections 251(1)(P) and (3) of the CFRN and if in the absence of proof of a corrupt intent the prosecution discharged the burden of proof required for the conviction of the appellant under Section 17(1)(C) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000.

Learned counsel for the appellant in advancing the argument for their position contended that the Oyo State High Court lacked the jurisdiction to try the

appellant on the offence she was charged with and the Court of Appeal moving to affirm the decision convicting her as the jurisdiction is that of the Federal High Court sequel to Section 251(3) CFRN. This is because the appellant was acting in her capacity as Provost of the Federal Co-operative College Ibadan, a Federal High Court could validly try for the commission of the offences alleged to have been committed as stated on the charge. He cited NDLEA v Omudina (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381)589; George v. FRN (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt.1399) 1.

Going on further, learned counsel for the appellant stated that the learned trial judge failed to avert to the fact that the defence of the appellant negated any corrupt intention on the part of the appellant. That the Court below incorrectly held that the prosecution established the required mens rea for a conviction on the offence charged and so the affirmation by the Court below of the conviction was erroneously done as the evidence led at the trial Court negated any corrupt intention. He referred to Section 17(1)(c) of the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000; Njoku v State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt.1339) 548.<br< p=””

</br<

He stated further the omission of the word corruptly from the Court of Appeal reproduction of the Provisions of Section 17(1)(C) vitiated the proceedings as the fundamental right to fair hearing of the appellant was breached. He referred to Otapo v Sunmonu (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.58) 587; Iwuoha V. Okoroike (1996) 2 NWLR (Pt.429) page 231.

That the Court below was wrong when it held the defence of the appellant could not avail her as what she did amounted to an infraction of the provisions of Section 22(5) of the ICPC Act.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there was jurisdiction in the Oyo State High Court. That the appellant is in effect asking the Court to depart from its decision in Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (2002) 6SC (Pt.1). He cited Section 61(3) of the ICPC Act.

For the respondent it was also contended that the omission on the face of the charge of the word ‘corruptly’ did not derogate from the quantum of credible evidence adduced by the respondent in proving its case to the effect that the appellant’s conduct and the fact that appellant knew

the act was criminal as well as the accused and that she was not misled as to the charge against her.

That there is no basis for this Court to tamper with the concurrent findings of the Court below since the findings were not perverse and they were supported by the evidence. The cases of Esangbedo v State (1998) 1 ACLR 109; Corporal Nicholas Okoh v Nigerian Army 109 at 115, were referred to.

The stance of the appellant on which this appeal is anchored is captured thus:-
(i) The failure of the learned trial judge to record the arraignment of the appellant contravenes the provisions of Section 36 of the Constitution and Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
(ii) By virtue of the combined effect of Section 251(1) and 251(3) and the facts of this case, the High Court of Oyo State lacked the jurisdiction to try the appellant for the offences charged.
(iii) The Court of Appeal was in error when it found that the prosecution established the mens rea for a conviction under the offence created in Section 17(1)(c) of the ICPC Act 2000.
(iv) If the Court of Appeal had not inadvertently omitted the word “corruptly” from its reproduction

and consideration of the provisions of Section 17(1)(c), it would not have come to the conclusion that the prosecution established the mens rea necessary for a conviction under the said section.

The reaction of the respondent is that the Supreme Court should not tamper with the concurrent findings of fact of the Court below as same were neither perverse nor illegal in the circumstance.

On the question whether there is jurisdiction in the High Court of Oyo State to try the appellant for offences charged under the Corrupt Practices And Other Related Offences Act 2000 having regard to the provisions of Section 251(1)(P) and (3) CFRN, this Court is mindful of Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation & 35 Ors (2002) 6 SC (Pt.1) wherein the call to invalidate the Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Act 2000 failed. This Court applying the blue pencil rule, struck down Sections 26(3) and 35 and declared the rest of the Act unaffected and valid. This Court per Uwais CJN held that Section 26(3) and 35 of Act were unconstitutional and therefore null and void. See also Doherty v. Balewa (1963)2 SC NLR 256; A.G. Abia State

and 36 Ors v. A.G. Federation (2002) 3 SC 106 at 199-200 per Ogundare JSC.
It follows that there is nothing necessitating a review of the decision of A.G. Ondo State v A.G. Federation(supra) as cited above. That being the case, the respondent herein as prosecution was well situated under the said ICPC Act 2000 to initiate the charge, proceed and conclude the prosecution of the appellant. In this regard, I shall quote the relevant sections thereof thus:-
Section 61(3) of the ICPC Act provides;
“The Chief Judge of a State or the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall by order under his hand designate a Court or judge or such number of Courts or judges as he shall deem appropriate to hear and determine all cases of bribery, corruption, fraud or other related offences arising under this Act or any other laws prohibiting fraud, bribery or corruption; a Court or Judge so designated shall not, while being so designated, hear or determine any other cases provided that all cases of fraud, bribery or corruption pending in any Court before the coming into effect of this Act shall continue to be heard and determined by that Court.”
While Section

26(2)provides;
“Prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation, or any person of Authority to whom he shall delegate his authority, in any superior Court of record so designated by the Chief Judge of a State or the Chief Judge of the Federation Capital Territory, Abuja under Section 61(3) of this Act; and every prosecution for an offence under this Act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption, fraud or any other related offence shall be deemed to initiated by the Attorney General of the Federation.”
It is clear therefore that the High Court of the various States and the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) are empowered to entertain such prosecutions under the ICPC Act.
Taking the provisions of the ICPC Act 2000 and co-relating them with Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), what comes clear is that the Federal High Court does not have the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the matters on the ICPC Act, rather it shares the jurisdiction with the State High Court or the High Court of FCT and this as explained in Section 251 (3) of the 1999 CFRN. For effect

I shall quote the section and related subsections as follows:-
Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides:-
“(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction that maybe conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the EXCLUSION of any other Court in civil cases and matters.”
(a) Relating to the revenue of Federal Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the Government is a party.”
While Section 251(3) Provides;
“The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal cases and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection(1) of this Section.”
In this case in hand, the two Courts below properly interpreted the law as they approached that duty of interpretation having in focus that the terms are plain without ambiguity and so nothing else was asked for but to accord the meaning of the words upon the ordinary and surrounding

circumstance.
In that way, the interpretation was made in order to uphold the purpose expected for the society at large and intendment of the law makers.
See Fawehinmi v. Inspector General of Police (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt.761) 31-32 per Uwaifo JSC.

The appellant had made quite a fuss on the omission of the word ‘corruptly’ on the face of the charge which learned counsel had contended vitiated the proceedings as stipulated in the provisions of Section 17(1)(c) of the ICPC Act.

This position now pushed forward by the appellant was not a matter in contention nor determination at the Court of Appeal and so this Court can only keep within the limits of what was before the Court of Appeal except for when leave is sought for and granted to raise the new issue which did not happen herein. In the judgment at the trial Court the word ‘corruptly’ was well stated when the Section 17(1)(c) of the ICPC Act was referred to evaluating the evidence and arriving at the decision. That the Court below made the omission in its consideration which can only be taken as a typographical error or omission which has not gone to the root of the matter before that Court and

no evidence of a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Again for emphasis, the appellant cannot at this stage claim to have been misled on what he faced at the trial Court where the charge fully stated the infractions and the word ‘corruptly’ in place.

Again to be said is that assuming the word ‘corruptly’ was omitted on the face of the charge at the trial stage, it would not derogate from the quantum of credible evidence adduced by the respondent in proving its case. This is because the mens rea of the offence was well deduced from the act of the appellant who knew that what she was doing was criminal as the input of casual workers as permanent staff which was false pointed to the corrupt intent embedded in the entire transaction. The intent was easily deducible and was gleaned from the evidence adduced.

Indeed this is one of those occasions where the apex Court is well advised to keep its peace and flow along with the concurrent findings of fact of the two Courts below since there was nothing perverse or a finding not backed by evidence. I rely on Esangbedo v State (1998) 1 ACLR 109; Corporal Nicholas Okoh v Nigerian Army LER 2017

pages 109 at 115.

In conclusion, from the foregoing and the better reasoned lead judgment, I see no merit in this appeal which I too dismiss.

I abide by the consequential orders made.

KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, J.S.C.: I read before now the illuminating judgment of my learned brother, Galinje JSC and I agree with him that if the framers of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) had wanted to vest the Federal High Court with exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters affecting the revenue of the Federal Government they would have stated so clearly in Section 251 (3) of the Constitution which states:-
“251(3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by Subsection (1) of this Section.” (underlining mine for emphasis.)
By using the phrase “shall also have” implies sharing the jurisdiction with other Courts; otherwise the subsection should have read: The Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in criminal causes and matters relating to the revenue of the

Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any of its agencies is involved.” In A-G Ondo State v. A-G. Federation (2002) 6 SC (Pt.1) 1 (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt.772) 222 a full panel of this Court laid to rest the question whether State High Courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal offences created by the National Assembly wherein it was held that:-
“The Attorney-General of the Federation derives his powers under Section 174 of the Constitution as an agency of the Federal Government. The law is well established that the Court cannot control the manner he exercises his powers so conferred — nor can he be prevented from exercising his function on the ground that his jurisdiction does not extend to any particular State in Nigeria. Section 174 of the Constitution does not impose such limitation” See: The State v. Ilori (1983) 1 SC NLR 94. The decision in A.G. Ondo v. A.G. Federation supra has debunked the argument by learned counsel for the appellant that since the conduct forming the basis of the charge against the appellant was in the performance of her duty as the provost of the Federal Co-operative College, Ibadan, an agency of

Federal Government, it is the Federal High Court that could validly try the offences alleged to have been committed by her. It is for this reason and the more comprehensive reasons contained in the judgment of my learned brother, Galinje JSC that I dismissed the appeal. The decision of the Lower Court is further affirmed. The case is remitted to the Federal High Court for the appellant to enter into her defence. The case should be expeditiously handled.

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.: I have had a preview of the judgment just handed out by my learned brother – Galinje, JSC. I agree with the reasons therein advanced to arrive at the conclusions contained in the lead judgment that the appeal be dismissed.

SIDI DAUDA BAGE, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother Paul Adamu Galinje, JSC, just delivered. I agree entirely with the reasoning and conclusion reached. I do not have anything to add. The appeal lacks merit, and it is accordingly dismissed by me. Judgment of the Court of Appeal Ibadan Division is hereby affirmed.

Appearances:

O.O. Ogungbade, Esq. with him, Toyese Owoade and O. A. Adenipekun For Appellant(s)

George Lawal, Esq. with him, K. K. Anabraba For Respondent(s)

Appearances

O.O. Ogungbade, Esq. with him, Toyese Owoade and O. A. Adenipekun For Appellant

AND

George Lawal, Esq. with him, K. K. Anabraba For Respondent