KELLY v. STATE
(2022)LCN/5060(SC)
In The Supreme Court
On Friday, March 04, 2022
SC.CR/279/2020
Before Our Lordships:
Musa Dattijo Muhammad Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Chima Centus Nweze Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Uwani Musa Abba Aji Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Adamu Jauro Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
ARUMEGBA KELLY APPELANT(S)
And
THE STATE RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO:
WHAT MUST BE ESTABLISH TO SECURE THE CONVICTION OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
It is indeed settled that for the respondent to secure conviction in respect of the charge of unlawful possession of Firearms pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, it must prove:-
(i) That the appellant is found in possession of firearms.
(ii) That the firearms is within the meaning the provided by Act.
(iii) That the appellant has no licence to possess the firearms.
See THE STATE V. FEMI OLADOTUN(2011) LPELR – 3226 (SC), BELLO OKASHETU V. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40611 (SC) and ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED V. THE STATE (2019) LPELR – 47044 (SC).
It is clear from the foregoing decisions of this Court that the intent of the legislature in Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act is, once a person is shown to be in possession of firearms and has no licence permitting him to be in possession, he is liable. By Section 11(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, “Firearms” includes any gun.
-PER MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH A HIGHER COURT CAN INTERFERE WITH THE CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF TWO LOWER COURTS
It is an established practice of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of two lower Courts, unless in exceptional circumstances. The only recognized exceptional circumstances, in line with precedent, include:
(a) when the findings are perverse;
(b) when the findings are not supported by the available evidence; and
(c) when the concurrent findings have occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant, Lanre v State [2019] 3 NWLR (pt. 1660) 506; Samaila v State [2021] 5 NWLR (pt. 1770) 562; Lawali v State [2019] 4 NWLR (pt. 1663) 457; Mbang v The State [2013]7 NWLR (pt. 1352) 48; Ike v Ugboaja [1993] 6 NWLR (pt. 301) 569; Ejinima v State [1991] 6 NWLR (pt.200) 627; Mbenu v State [1988] 3 NWLR (pt.84) 615; Kale v Coker [1982] 12 SC 252; Woluchem v Gudi [1981]5 SC 291, 326.
In the instant appeal, the concurrent findings were backed by available evidence that were credible. There was evidence on record, particularly, the testimonies of PW2 and PW3, which the trial Court believed, that the appellant was found to be in possession of a locally- made pistol and a cartridge. The appellant did not raise any objection when he was identified as the owner of the firearm, at the scene where he was apprehended. -PER CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.
DUTY OF COURT TO ASCRIBE PROBATIVE VALUE TO AN EVIDENCE DURING TRIAL
In MOHAMMED V. STATE (2020) LPELR-52451(SC) Pg. 27-28, paras. F-C, this Court held thus:
“The primary duty of ascribing probative value to the evidence at the trial, upon proper evaluation of the totality of the evidence, devolves exclusively on the trial Court that had the opportunity of hearing and watching the witnesses testify. The appellate Court, it is trite, will not usurp that function.”
In this case I can find no error in the evaluation of evidence and conclusions of the trial Court and affirmation of same by the Court below. The conviction of the Appellant by the trial Court based substantially on the evidence of the two arresting officers- PW2 and PW3 is definitely not perverse. I agree entirely with the findings of fact of the two lower Courts that the appellant was guilty of unlawful possession of firearms. -PER HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.
WHAT MUST BE ESTABLISHED TO SUCCEED IN A CHARGE OF UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
To succeed against an accused person in a charge of unlawful possession of firearms, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the following essential elements beyond reasonable doubt:
1. That the accused person was found in possession of firearm;
2. That the firearm is within the meaning of the Act; and
3. That the accused person has no licence to possess the firearm.
See BILLE V. STATE (2016) LPELR-40832 (SC);
OKASHETU V. STATE (2016) LPELR-40611 (SC).
The law punishes unlawful possession simpliciter. In other words, as long as the accused person is found in possession of a firearm, it is immaterial whether he intends to use it or whether it belongs to someone else. In the case at hand, assuming the Appellant was truly unaware of the contents of the black nylon in which the gun was found, the lack of knowledge would not have availed him.
The offence is a strict liability offence. As long as the accused person is found in possession of a firearm and the three aforementioned ingredients are present, he is guilty for the offence of unlawful possession of firearms. See MOHAMMED V. STATE (2019) 11 NWLR (PT. 1682) 41; STATE V. OLADOTUN (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1256) 542. The Appellant herein having been found in possession of a firearm within the meaning of the Act and without a licence permitting him to possess the firearm, the trial Court was right to have found him guilty as charged and the lower Court rightly affirmed his conviction and sentence. -PER ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.
MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): My lords, this appeal being against concurrent findings of fact(s), we need to remind ourselves that the Court, especially where the findings turn on the credibility of witnesses, hardly intervenes. However, where the findings are shown to be perverse the Court will, all the same, reverse the findings. See SUNDAY V. STATE (2017) LPELR-42259 (SC), WOLUCHEM & ORS V. CHIEF GUDI & ORS (1981) 5 SC 291, CHINWEDU V. MBAMALI & ORS (1980) 3-4 SC 31, AJIBOYE V. FRN (2018) LPELR – 44468 (SC) and ATOLAGBE V. SHORUN (1985) LPELR-592 (SC).
A decision, a finding, is said to be perverse if it does not draw from the evidence on record and/or where the Court wrongly apply legal principles to correctly ascertained fact(s) and by so doing occasion injustice. See QUEEN V. OGODO (1961) 2 SC 366, MOGAJI V. ODOFIN (1978) 4 SC 91 and BARRISTER CHIDI NOBIS-ELENDU V. INEC & ORS (2015) 6 SCM 117 at 134.
In the instant appeal, are the findings of the two lower Courts perverse to warrant our intervention?
The appellant, alongside one other person, was arraigned at, tried and convicted by the Ekiti State High Court, hereinafter referred to as the trial Court, for being in unlawful possession of firearms contrary to Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. His appeal against the trial Court’s judgment dated 16th March 2017, was filed on 4th May 2017 at the Ekiti Division of the Court of Appeal hereinafter referred to as the lower Court. The appeal was dismissed on the 5th day of December 2019 by the lower Court.
Dissatisfied, the appellant has, by a notice filed on 18th December 2019, further appealed to this Court.
Of the two issues the appellant distilled in his brief settled by Ikechukwu Uwanna, Esq., the most apposite and on which basis the appeal will be determined reads:-
“Was the lower Court right to uphold the decision of the trial Court in view of the totality of evidence before it?”
The similar issue formulated in the respondent’s brief settled by Julius Ajibare, Esq., as arising for the determination of the appeal is:-
“Whether the Court below was not right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Court that the Respondent, considering the totality of evidence adduced before the trial Court, proved the one-count charge of unlawful possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt against the Appellant”.
On the lone issue, it is argued in the brief, which learned appellant’s counsel adopted as their argument for the appeal, that the trial Court’s decision which the lower Court affirmed, is founded on the trial Court’s wrong reliance on appellant’s purported extra-judicial statement. Referring inter-alia to SUBERU V. THE STATE (2010) LPELR-3120 (SC), ADELUMOLA V. STATE (1988) LPELR-119 (SC), learned appellant’s counsel submits that appellant’s extra-judicial statement that has not been subjected to the test of truth cannot constitute the basis of his conviction: The lower Court, it is submitted, is in no position to affirm the trial Court’s erroneous finding.
Beyond the extra-judicial statements of the appellant and his co-accused, the testimonies of the three witnesses the respondent led, it is further submitted, do not sustain the trial Court’s conviction and sentence as affirmed by the lower Court. PW1, the investigating police officer, was not at the scene of arrest of the appellant where the confession of his being in unlawful possession of exhibits A and B was made. The extra-judicial statements of PW2 and PW3 that the appellant and his co-accused had confessed to being owners and in possession of the weapons were never tendered at trial. Neither the extra-judicial statements of the other passengers, including the driver of the vehicle the weapons were recovered from, nor their evidence were tendered or led in Court. Citing SALE V. STATE (2016) 3 NWLR (PT 1499) 392 at 415, STATE V. NNOLIM (1994) 5 NWLR (PT 345) 394 at 406 and SECTION 167(D) OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 2011 learned counsel contends that respondent’s failure to avail the trial Court these vital evidence is fatal to the trial Court’s decision as affirmed by the lower Court. The constitutional requirement that the offence the appellant is charged be proved beyond reasonable doubt having not been met, concurrent as the findings of the two Courts on appellant’s guilt are, being perverse, it is urged, should be set-aside and the appeal allowed.
In answer to the appellant’s arguments, learned respondent’s counsel asserts that the evidence on record does not support appellant’s position. Appellant’s denial that he had not made the extra-judicial statement the trial Court admitted in evidence does not render the statement inadmissible. Relying on IDOWU V. STATE (2000) FWLR (PT 16) 2672, AIGUOREGHIAN V. STATE (2004) ALL FWLR (PT 195) 716, NWAEBONYI V. STATE (1994) 5 NWLR (PT 343) 138, learned counsel submits that all the trial Court needed to do about the statement is to decide the weight to attach to it. The appellant recorded exhibit C, his statement, himself. He never led any evidence, it is further contended, to show that the statement was not what he recorded or that at the time he recorded the statement he was of unsettled mind. Appellant’s retraction from the statement as recounted in HASSAN V. STATE (2001) 6 NWLR (PT 709) 286, learned counsel submits, remains an afterthought.
The testimonies of PW1 and more so PW2 and PW3, learned counsel further submits, contain facts which the trial Court finds and the lower Court rightly affirms, establish appellant’s guilt for the charge. PW2 and PW3 in their evidence directly linked the appellant with the gun recovered from the vehicle they stopped and searched while on patrol duty on the fateful day. The driver of the vehicle, in answer to the enquiry made by PW2 as to the owner of the black nylon that contained the pistol, pointed at the appellant. Appellant at that point, it is submitted, neither denied the driver’s assertion nor offered any explanation. The appellant cannot now be heard to suggest that these facts have not established the offence under Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act Laws of the Federation 2004. Referring inter-alia to NWACHUKWU V. STATE (2002) FWLR (PT 123) 312, OSENI V. STATE (2011) 6 NWLR (PT 1242) 138 and STATE V. OLADOTUN (2011) ALL FWLR (PT 586) 399 at 410 in support of his submissions, learned respondent’s counsel urges that the lone issue be resolved against the appellant and the unmeritorious appeal dismissed.
I cannot agree more.
It is indeed settled that for the respondent to secure conviction in respect of the charge of unlawful possession of Firearms pursuant to Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special provisions) Act Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004, it must prove:-
(i) That the appellant is found in possession of firearms.
(ii) That the firearms is within the meaning the provided by Act.
(iii) That the appellant has no licence to possess the firearms.
See THE STATE V. FEMI OLADOTUN(2011) LPELR – 3226 (SC), BELLO OKASHETU V. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40611 (SC) and ABUBAKAR MOHAMMED V. THE STATE (2019) LPELR – 47044 (SC).
It is clear from the foregoing decisions of this Court that the intent of the legislature in Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act is, once a person is shown to be in possession of firearms and has no licence permitting him to be in possession, he is liable. By Section 11(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, “Firearms” includes any gun.
At page 31 of the record of appeal, PW2’s evidence thereat inter-alia reads:-
“On 8/7/2015 I led a patrol team along Ise/Orun, Emure Road at about 11.30 am. When a passenger vehicle from Emure side was approaching I stopped the vehicle. The driver parked, I started to interview the passengers inside the vehicle. One of the passengers excused himself to ease himself and allowed him. One passenger, by name Arumegba Kelly was sitting down with the driver in front. I interviewed him and when I read the body language I decided to search the vehicle. In the process I opened the pigeon hole of the vehicle, I saw a black nylon wrapped. I asked the driver the owner of the black nylon. He pointed at the first defendant as the owner. When I opened it I discovered a locally made Pistol and a Cartridge I immediately placed him under arrest.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
PW3 reinforces the foregoing in his testimony at pages 33- 34 of the record thusly:-
“l remember 8/7/15. On that day I was among the team of NDEA operative on a moorised patrol led by Balami Ojbidah (PW2) along Ise/Emure road. At a point on the road we stopped and searched a vehicle (taxi) coming from Emure with six passengers, we asked the driver to come down that we wanted to conduct a search… In the front seat, where the 1st accused was sitting, PW2 opened the pigeon hole and saw a black polythene bag containing a pistol (locally made) with cartridge. PW2 asked the driver the owner of the polythene bag. The driver said the nylon bag belonged to the 1st accused. The 1st accused was arrested and we went further to search the vehicle.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
Under cross examination, PW3 persisted as follows:-
“…As security agent I understand what investigation is all about. I was present when PW2 stopped the taxi… The 1st defendant confirmed that the black nylon bag belonged to him.
…Exhibit A is what we recovered from the pigeon hole.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
The trial Court in relation to the evidence led by the prosecution, firstly held at page 78 of the record as follows:-
“In my view, it is difficult for the defendants to have denied ownership of the gun, cartridge and axe which were recovered from them because the evidence adduced by the prosecution without doubt adequately linked the defendants with the gun and other items found with them. I say this because the defendants according to the evidence proffered in the case were not the only people in the vehicle and no reason was advanced by the defendants why the witnesses would want to implicate them. PW2 said the driver pointed to the 1st defendant as the owner of the black nylon bag that contained the gun. There is no evidence that the 1st defendant raised any objection when the driver pointed to him as the owner of the load. First defendant did not protest when the driver who was in a better position to identify and link the load in his vehicle with the passengers he carried pointed to him. It is too late in the day for the 1st defendant to deny ownership of the gun. PW2 was neither cross-examined on the fact that the driver pointed to the 1st defendant nor that the 1st defendant denied same and protested. It only shows that the evidence given by the PW2 in his evidence in-chief was true and accepted by the defendants as evidence of what transpired at the spot where the 1st defendant was arrested.” (underlining supplied for emphasis).
The Court at page 81 of the record after further evaluation of the evidence led inferred as follows:-
“From the evidence of PW2, the locally made gun and cartridge were found in a black nylon kept in the pigeon hole of the vehicle which PW2 said the driver pointed to the 1st defendant as the owner. I believe the evidence of PW2 and PW3 which is in consonance with the facts and circumstances of the case. I reject the evidence of the 1st and 2nd defendants that they …have anything to do with the firearm found with them. The defence put up by them in Court, which runs counter to their statements particularly the statement of 1st defendant to the Police appears to me to be an afterthought. I reject it.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
On the appellant’s extra-judicial statement, learned appellant counsel insists has swayed the mind of the trial Court, the Court’s finding in relation to the statement, exhibit C, at page 82 of the record reads:-
“The first defendant had raised the issue of involuntariness of his statement to the police in his evidence before the Court when he said he was tortured and forced to make the statement. In my view, the alleged confessional statement is not confessional and that probably account for the reason why the learned counsel for the 1st defendant did not raise objection at the point of tendering the statement. Even if the statement is confessional, the position of the law is that the question of the voluntariness of a confessional statement is tested at the time the statement is sought to be tendered in evidence.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
The trial Court at page 85 of the record concludes thus:-
“The defendants who denied having in their possession the gun found with them did not in any way justify their possession of the gun by producing their licence to hold the gun. The defendants having failed to produce their licence which authorized them to possess the gun legally, I hold the view that the prosecution has proved that the defendants have no licence to possess the firearms. The prosecution has therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt all the ingredients of unlawful possession of firearms against the defendants.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis).
The lower Court’s affirmation of the trial Court’s foregoing findings is what the appellant contends is perverse.
I completely disagree!
It is very glaring from the trial Court’s findings, as herein earlier reproduced, that appellant’s conviction for unlawful possession of firearms is founded entirely on the evidence of PW2 and PW3 the Court found credible. The conviction does not evolve from the extra-judicial statement of the appellant the Court adjudge not to be confessional. It is trite that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to it is the primary duty of the trial Court. Where the task, as in the instant case, turns on the credibility of the witnesses, the appellate Court is invariably handicapped. Since it was the trial Court that heard, saw and watched the demeanour of the witnesses, it is incumbent to respect the Court’s conclusions from the exercise except where they are demonstrated to be perverse. See CHIEF SAMUSIDEEN AFOLABI AYORINDE & ORS V. CHEF HASSAN SONGUNRO & ORS (2012) LPELR-7808 (SC) and CPC V. INEC (2011) LPELR-8257 (SC).
In the instant case, the trial Court which decision the lower Court affirmed having creditably discharged its primary duty in evaluating the evidence led by parties before it, its decision as affirmed cannot be interfered with. I so hold.
The sole issue in the appeal is resolved against the appellant and the unmeritorious appeal resultantly dismissed. The concurrent findings of the two Courts below are hereby further affirmed.
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.: I have had the privilege of reading the leading judgment of my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC. I agree with the reasons and conclusion.
It is an established practice of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of two lower Courts, unless in exceptional circumstances. The only recognized exceptional circumstances, in line with precedent, include:
(a) when the findings are perverse;
(b) when the findings are not supported by the available evidence; and
(c) when the concurrent findings have occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the appellant, Lanre v State [2019] 3 NWLR (pt. 1660) 506; Samaila v State [2021] 5 NWLR (pt. 1770) 562; Lawali v State [2019] 4 NWLR (pt. 1663) 457; Mbang v The State [2013]7 NWLR (pt. 1352) 48; Ike v Ugboaja [1993] 6 NWLR (pt. 301) 569; Ejinima v State [1991] 6 NWLR (pt.200) 627; Mbenu v State [1988] 3 NWLR (pt.84) 615; Kale v Coker [1982] 12 SC 252; Woluchem v Gudi [1981]5 SC 291, 326.
In the instant appeal, the concurrent findings were backed by available evidence that were credible. There was evidence on record, particularly, the testimonies of PW2 and PW3, which the trial Court believed, that the appellant was found to be in possession of a locally- made pistol and a cartridge. The appellant did not raise any objection when he was identified as the owner of the firearm, at the scene where he was apprehended.
At the trial, the appellant made no efforts to adduce evidence to show that he had licence to possess such a gun or that he was authorized by law to possess the firearms. The burden was on him to establish that such possession was legally permitted, as such was a fact peculiarly within his exclusive knowledge, Taiye v State [2018] 17 NWLR (pt. 1647] 115; Bille v State [2016] 15 NWLR (pt. 1536) 363; State v Oladotun [2011] 10 NWLR (pt. 1256) 542.
Having failed to prove so at trial, I am of the firm view that the trial Court rightly held that the offence of illegal possession of firearms was proved against him and convicted him accordingly. The lower Court was also right in affirming the findings of the trial Court.
The appellant, by his brief of argument, has not shown this Court how the findings of both lower Courts were perverse or have offended any known principle of law. There is nothing before this Court to show how and in what way the judgment of the trial Court was perverse, or any of its attributes present in this judgment, nor did they occasion a miscarriage of justice to the appellant. The conclusions reached by both lower Courts are hereby further reaffirmed.
It is for these, and the fuller and more elaborate reasons in the leading judgment, that I too, shall enter an order dismissing this appeal for being unmeritorious.
Appeal dismissed.
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.: I was privileged with a draft copy of the lead judgment by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo, Muhammad, JSC, just delivered and I agree with him that the concurrent findings of the two Courts below be affirmed and dismiss the Appellant’s appeal.
The Appellant was charged and subsequently convicted to 10 years imprisonment by the trial Court and affirmed by the lower Court for unlawful possession of firearms contrary to Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. He seeks for determination before this Court thus, “was the lower Court right to uphold the decision of the trial Court in view of the totality of evidence before it?”
It is in evidence that PW2 and PW3 while on patrol duty stopped a vehicle and after searching same, recovered a gun a black nylon, which the car’s driver pointed at the Appellant as the possessor thereof, which accusation the Appellant never denied.
Although the Appellant argued that the failure to avail the Court the extra judicial statements of the driver, PW2, PW3 and other passengers in the vehicle, was fatal to the Respondent’s case, it is trite that every case must stand on its peculiar footings.
The trial Court, which had the singular opportunity of hearing and watching the demeanour and credibility of the Appellant, believed and was swayed that he committed the offence with which he was charged. On appeal, this was affirmed.
My learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC, reviewed same, and is of same opinion that the offence has been directly and overwhelmingly proved against the Appellant. I have nothing to add but to endorse the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.
This appeal is consequently dismissed.
HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.: I have read the judgment just delivered by my learned brother MUSA DATTIJO MUHAMMAD JSC. I agree with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion that the appeal has no merit. In this appeal against the concurrent findings of facts of the two Courts below, the appellant was found in possession of firearms by law officers who caught him transporting them. The arguments of learned Appellant’s counsel complaining of irrelevant considerations in the determination of the appeal by the Court below are completely misconceived. The evaluation of the evidence at trial and ascribing probative value to each piece of evidence to determine the guilt of a defendant is the primary duty of the trial Court.
In MOHAMMED V. STATE (2020) LPELR-52451(SC) Pg. 27-28, paras. F-C, this Court held thus:
“The primary duty of ascribing probative value to the evidence at the trial, upon proper evaluation of the totality of the evidence, devolves exclusively on the trial Court that had the opportunity of hearing and watching the witnesses testify. The appellate Court, it is trite, will not usurp that function.”
In this case I can find no error in the evaluation of evidence and conclusions of the trial Court and affirmation of same by the Court below. The conviction of the Appellant by the trial Court based substantially on the evidence of the two arresting officers- PW2 and PW3 is definitely not perverse. I agree entirely with the findings of fact of the two lower Courts that the appellant was guilty of unlawful possession of firearms.
The findings and conclusions are not perverse in the circumstances of this case. The judgment of the Court below is affirmed. Appeal dismissed.
ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.: I had the privilege of reading in draft the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Musa Dattijo Muhammad, JSC. I am in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein, to the effect that the appeal is unmeritorious and ought to be dismissed.
The Appellant was charged with the offence of unlawful possession of firearms contrary to Section 3(1) of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. To succeed against an accused person in a charge of unlawful possession of firearms, the prosecution is duty bound to prove the following essential elements beyond reasonable doubt:
1. That the accused person was found in possession of firearm;
2. That the firearm is within the meaning of the Act; and<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px;”></br<>
3. That the accused person has no licence to possess the firearm.
See BILLE V. STATE (2016) LPELR-40832 (SC);
OKASHETU V. STATE (2016) LPELR-40611 (SC).
The law punishes unlawful possession simpliciter. In other words, as long as the accused person is found in possession of a firearm, it is immaterial whether he intends to use it or whether it belongs to someone else. In the case at hand, assuming the Appellant was truly unaware of the contents of the black nylon in which the gun was found, the lack of knowledge would not have availed him.
The offence is a strict liability offence. As long as the accused person is found in possession of a firearm and the three aforementioned ingredients are present, he is guilty for the offence of unlawful possession of firearms. See MOHAMMED V. STATE (2019) 11 NWLR (PT. 1682) 41; STATE V. OLADOTUN (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1256) 542. The Appellant herein having been found in possession of a firearm within the meaning of the Act and without a licence permitting him to possess the firearm, the trial Court was right to have found him guilty as charged and the lower Court rightly affirmed his conviction and sentence.
On the whole, I too find no merit in this appeal and same is equally dismissed. The judgment of the Court below affirming the Appellant’s conviction and sentence is hereby affirmed.
Appearances:
IKECHUKWU UWANNA, ESQ. For Appellant(s)
JULIUS AJIBARE, DPP, EKITI STATE For Respondent(s)