ABUBAKAR v. FRN
(2020) LCN/4903(SC)
In The Supreme Court
On Friday, January 10, 2020
SC.776/2017
Before Our Lordships:
Olabode Rhodes-Vivour Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Chima Centus Nweze Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Amiru Sanusi Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Ejembi Eko Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Uwani Musa Abba Aji Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
Between
GAMBO ABUBAKAR APPELANT(S)
And
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA RESPONDENT(S)
RATIO
THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHEN A PLEA OF GUILTY IS SAID TO BE VALID
As it is well-known, a plea of guilty is valid, if made in a very unambiguous and unequivocal way; and the same is received by a trial Court or Tribunal not labouring under the misapprehension of what the law is all about, Nkie v. F.R.N. (2014) LPELR -22877 (SC) 25, E-F; (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 305; Amanchukwu v. F.R.N. (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 475; Okewu v. FRN (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 254) 858, (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 327; Kpoobari v. F.R.N.(2016) LPELR -40010 (SC) 16 -17, (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1528)81. PER NWEZE, J.S.C.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON THE ARRAIGNMENT OF AN ACCUSED PERSON
The fundamental issue in the matter of arraignment is that the charge or information shall be read over and explained to the accused person in the language the understands before the plea is taken. The most appropriate time for taking any objection to the plea of an accused person which is in contravention of the constitutional and procedural provisions is before trial- see Egbedi v. The State (1981) 11- 12 SC 98. This does not preclude taking objection, thereafter as Kajubo v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 721 and Eyorokoromo v. State (1979)6-9 SC 3 and other cases conclusively decided. Precious time is saved by an early intervention and justice will be done if the objection is sustained. PER NWEZE, J.S.C.
THE POSITION OF LAW ON WHEN THE PLEA OF AN ACCUSED PERSON IS TO BE TAKEN
It is trite law that to give a plea is for an accused person to formally respond personally to a criminal charge, either of “guilty”, “not guilty” or “no contest”. See Elijah Ameh Okewu v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) 4 SCM 118; (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt.1305)327. There is no doubt that the plea of an accused person must be taken by the trial Court before his trial commences. This is in obedience to and in compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, where the trial Court failed to take the plea of an accused person before he is tried, the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be declared a nullity. What it means is that the accused person could not have been said to be properly arraigned and this is fatal to the prosecution’s case. See Per Ariwoola, JSC in Adeyemi v. State (2013) LPELR-20337(SC), (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 78. PER SANUSI, J.C.A.
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C. (Delivering the Leading Judgment): My Lords, this is one of those appeals, disingenuously, agitated by counsel with full knowledge of its futility. I will explain this further in the course of this short judgment.
The appellant was arraigned before Allagoa, J., at the Federal High Court, Jos Division, on July 29, 2011. Together with one Dauda Abubakar, they faced a three-count charge of offences contrary to, and punishable under Section 518 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap. C38 Laws of the Federation, 2004 and Section 15 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004.
Following the appellant’s not guilty plea, (he was the second accused person], the case went on trial – a trial which ended in his conviction and sentence. Having lost his appeal at the Court of Appeal, Jos Division, on the sole ground of improper arraignment at the trial Court, he, finally, approached this Court with the same complaint of improper arraignment. Against this background, it would not serve any useful purpose detailing the factual background.
For the purpose of the sole issue in this appeal, only the record of proceedings on page 79 of the record would suffice. The record reads thus:
Court: read the charge.
Charge is read to the accused persons in English Language and interpreted from English to Hausa and the accused persons acknowledge they understand the charge.
To Count 1, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
To Count 11, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
To Count 111, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
As already indicated above, having lost his appeal at the Court of Appeal, Jos Division, on the sole ground of improper arraignment at the trial Court, he finally approached this Court with the same complaint of improper arraignment. His sole issue was framed thus:
Whether from the record of proceedings, there was a proper arraignment of the appellant before his trial, conviction and sentence by the trial Court for the lower Court to have affirmed same?
Arguments on the Sole Issue
Appellant’s Contention
At the hearing of this appeal on October 17, 2019, Steve Onyechi Ononye, learned counsel for the appellant, adopted the brief filed on November 9, 2017. His arguments on paragraphs 4.1 to 4.9, pages 4 to 7 of the said brief, centred on the alleged impropriety of the arraignment of the appellant. He cited Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 80, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.
He also cited such cases like Yerima v. State (2010)14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 25, 44-45; Okoli v. State (2012)1 NWLR (Pt. 1281) 385,400; Yusuf v. State (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279) 853, 879 – 880; Kayode v. State (2008)1 NWLR (Pt. 1068) 281, 302; Odeh v. F.R.N.(2008)13 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 1, 35; Yakubu v. State (2012) 12 NWLR(Pt. 1313) 131. He urged the Court to set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant.
Respondent’s Arguments
On his part, Edoka Onyeke, learned counsel for the respondent, adopted the respondent’s brief filed on December 5, 2017. He devoted paragraphs 4.1 – 4.16, pages 4 – 16 to this issue. In sum, he contended that once an accused person pleads to a charge before the Court without any objection, it presupposes that he understands the charge preferred against him. He cited several cases. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal. Resolution of the Sole Issue
As it is well-known, a plea of guilty is valid, if made in a very unambiguous and unequivocal way; and the same is received by a trial Court or Tribunal not labouring under the misapprehension of what the law is all about, Nkie v. F.R.N. (2014) LPELR -22877 (SC) 25, E-F; (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 305; Amanchukwu v. F.R.N. (2009) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1144) 475; Okewu v. FRN (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 254) 858, (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 327; Kpoobari v. F.R.N.(2016) LPELR -40010 (SC) 16 -17, (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1528)81.
I will reproduce the views of Karibi-Whyte, JSC, in Idemudia v. State (1999) LPELR -1418 (SC), (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) 202 in extenso to demonstrate that this Court has, consistently, laid down guidelines for proper arraignment. According to His erudite Lordship:
A valid trial is posited on the fact of a valid arraignment. An arraignment is ad rationem ponere, that is, calling on the accused (person) to reckoning for the allegations of the offences against him. The laws of this country have made adequate provision for the protection of the interest of the accused (person) and the citizens in the proper administration of justice. Accordingly the Court before whom an accused person is required to appear for reckoning in respect of allegations of offences, is required to observe certain constitutional and procedural requirements. There is the constitutional requirement in Section 33(6) (a), and the provision of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law …
The common feature in (the) provisions is the use of the expression ‘shall’ to define the duty required. Thus, expressing in mandatory terms, the obligation of the Court to observe the requirements prescribed towards ensuring a valid arraignment. It does appear from the (said) provisions that every person charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence. Thus, there is a duty on the Court to observe that:
(a) The accused is brought before it unfettered, unless it sees cause to order otherwise.
(b) To read and explain to the accused arraigned the charge against him in the language he understands.
(c) Satisfy itself that the charge had been read and explained to the accused in the language he understands. The correct observation of and compliance with these provisions by the Court on arraignment has been one of constant difficulty and occasionally of irritation. Counsels (sic) to appellants have often criticized the practice adopted by judges in determining what transpired on arraignment. There is no doubt that an appellate Court can only proceed on what is apparent on the record. This is so where the record can ex facie disclose compliance as, required by law.
A literal interpretation of the above provisions will clearly require that on arraignment, the Court should state that the accused (person) was brought before it unfettered. That the charged was read and explained to him in the language he understands. This will be even where the accused (person) understood the English language, the language of the Court by which the charge was read to him. The Court will be expected to record that the accused understood what was read and explained to him. The Court should also record its satisfaction of the exercise of the procedure on arraignment.
It is not disputed that it is perfectly useful and necessary for the Court to record the fact of arraignment and that the charge was read to the accused in the language he understands where this is different from the language of the Court, which is English language. Where the accused person understands the language with which the charge was read it becomes unnecessary to record that fact specifically. It seems to me not possible for the Court to know whether the accused understood the charge read it explained to him. Even though he may appear to do so. It is good practice to ask the accused the question whether he understood the charge as read and explained, and to record his answer. It does not seem to me that the omission to do so by itself merely could constitute a non-compliance with the constitutional and procedural requirements, unless it is the lack of understanding of the read that is apparent from the record of the trial. Finally the satisfaction of the Court on the compliance with the procedure on arraignment is not to me a requirement which need be express on the record. It is a requirement for the guidance of the trial Court which should feel satisfied that the procedure has been complied with …
As comprehensive as these requirements are they appear to ignore the situations where the accused is defended by counsel, who is entitled to take objection in limine for the no-observance of these conditions. The three requirements prescribed must co-exist.
The fundamental issue in the matter of arraignment is that the charge or information shall be read over and explained to the accused person in the language the understands before the plea is taken. The most appropriate time for taking any objection to the plea of an accused person which is in contravention of the constitutional and procedural provisions is before trial- see Egbedi v. The State (1981) 11- 12 SC 98. This does not preclude taking objection, thereafter as Kajubo v. State (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 721 and Eyorokoromo v. State (1979)6-9 SC 3 and other cases conclusively decided. Precious time is saved by an early intervention and justice will be done if the objection is sustained.
There appears to be a fairly rigid and inflexible approach to the question of non-compliance with the enabling provisions for arraignment. It is conceded that the conditions have been designed and formulated for the protection of the accused and preservation of the constitutional rights of the citizen. Equally, the Courts should not ignore the nature of the rights protected and the preservation of the Courts in the discharge of their sacred and solemn duty to do justice. There is clearly observable the distinction between a matter of procedure that affects substantial justice in the trial of a case and a matter of procedure which in no way affects the justice of the trial of the case. In the latter case it will not affect the trial. It would seem to me that the mandatory provision of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Law which requires that the charge be read and explained to the accused is complied with if there is evidence on the record to show that the accused understood the charge and was in no way misled by the absence of explanation ex facie. It is conceded that the subsequent validity of the procedure rests on the validity of the plea on arraignment. However. where there is counsel in the case defending an accused person, the taking of the plea by the Court it ought to be presumed in favour of regularity namely that even if it was not stated on the record, the charge had been read and explained to the accused on arraignment before the plea was taken omnia praesumuntur rite etsolemniter esse acta. Accordingly, in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption prevails. See also Section 150(1) Evidence Act. It does not seem to me that the requirement that the judge should be satisfied that the charge has been read and explained to the accused is one which need to appear on the record and the non-appearance of which affects the justice of the case. It is good practice to so indicate. It is sufficient on the record as a whole if it could be gathered that the accused understood the nature of the charge.
The essential purpose of the enabling provisions is to ensure not only that the accused person understands the charge against him but also appreciates its nature before his plea is taken – see Effiom v. The State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 507. (Italics supplied for emphasis)
This Court has maintained this position ever since. As I had occasion to observe in Blessing v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2015) LPELR – 24689 (SC) 58 – 60, (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1475)1 observations I adopt as part of my reasons in this judgment:
It is rather strange that up till now, this Court is still being inundated with appeals woven around the interpretation of the requirements of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, even in the face of an avalanche of its decisions on these requirements. Only some of these will be cited here, Josiah v. State (1985)1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 125; (1985)1 SC 406; Kajubo v. State(1988)1 NWLR (Pt. 73) 721, 731; (1988)3 SCNJ (Pt.1) 1179; Ebem v. State (1990)7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 113; Idemudia v. State (1999)5 SCNJ 47; Onuoha Kalu v. The State (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 583) 531; Erekanure v. The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 385; Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) LPELR -20184 (SC); (2013) 9 NWLR(Pt. 1359) 300: Sharfal v. The State (1992) LPELR-3038 (SC) 11.
Others include: Ogunye v. The State (1999)5 NWLR (Pt. 548, 567; Ewe v. The State (1992) LPELR -1179(SC), Dibie v. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 30; Lufadeju and Anor v. Johnson (2007) LPELR – 1795(SC), Olabode v. The State (2009) LPELR-2542 (SC), Amako v. The State (1995) LPELR – 451 (SC), Olabode v. The State (2009) LPELR-2542 (SC), Amako v. The State (1995) LPELR-451 (SC); Josiah v. The State (1985) 1 SC 400, 416, Eyorokoromo v. The State (1979)8-9 SC 3; Dibie v. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 30, 61-62; Edibo v. The State (2007) LPELR -1012(SC); Adeniji v. The State (2001) LPELR-126 (SC); Madu v. The State (2012) LPELR-7867 (SC); Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 548, 555; Rufai v. The State (2001) LPELR-2963 (SC); Effiom v. The State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 507; Adeniji v. The State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 57) 809; Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) LPELR-20184 (SC); Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 548, 567.
I have deliberately, set out only a handful of these decisions (there are, indeed, many more of such decisions) to expose the futility of canvassing an issue, such as the appellant’s issue [ ], which this Court, as shown above, has dealt with on numerous occasions. I refuse to entertain the misgiving that the inclusion of this hackneyed question, as an issue in this appeal, was a deliberate attempt to put the consistency of this Court’s reasoning to test.
My Lords, as I indicated at the outset of this judgment, this is one of those appeals, disingenuously, agitated by counsel with full knowledge of its futility. With respect, the submission of the learned appellant’s counsel that the trial Court did not follow the correct procedure in arraigning the appellant is a submission which, embarrassingly, betrays his misconception of the attitude of this Court to this question of arraignment. As this Court pointed out in Okoro v. The State (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 181:
The provision of the law should not be stretched to a point of absurdity by reading into it that the Judge must record that the charge was explained to the accused(person) to his satisfaction before taking his plea. It will be impeaching the integrity of the Judge to do that, as no Judge will take the plea of an accused (person) if he is not satisfied that the charge was read and explained to the accused (person) to his satisfaction. (Italics supplied for emphasis)
I, therefore, with humility implore all counsel who have the advantage of practising at this rare altitude of the Court’s hierarchy to, carefully, read these cases before irritating this Court their appeals that are dead on arrival. These case are: Ebem v. State(1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 160) 113; Idemudia v. State (1999) 5 SCNJ 47,(1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) 202; Onuoha Kalu v. The State (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 583) 531, Erekanure v. The State (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.294) 385; Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) LPELR -20184 (SC), (2013)9 NWLR (Pt. 1359) 300; Sharfal v. The State (1992) LPELR -3038(SC) 11; (1992) 7 NWLR (Pt. 255) 510.Others include: Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.604) 548, 567; Ewe v. The State (1992) LPELR-1179 (SC); (1992)6 NWLR (Pt. 246) 147; Dibie v. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt.1038) 30; Lufadeju and Anor. v. Johnson (2007) LPELR -1795(SC); (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1037) 535; Olabode v. The State (2009)LPELR-2542 (SC); (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 254; Amako v.The State (1995) LPELR – 451 (SC); (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 11;Olabode v. The State (2009) LPELR-2542 (SC); (2009) 11 NWLR(Pt. 1152) 254; Amako v. The State (1995) LPELR – 451 (SC);(1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 11; Josiah v. The State (1985) 1 SC 400,416; (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 125; Eyorokoromo v. The State (1979)8-9 SC 3; Dibie v. The State (2007) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1038) 30, 61-62;Edibo v. The State (2007) LPELR-1012 (SC); (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt.1051) 306; Adeniji v. The State (2001) LPELR-126 (SC); (2001)13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 375; Madu v. The State (2012) LPELR -7867(SC); (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 405; Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 548, 555; Rufai v. The State (2001) LPELR-2963(SC); (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 718; Effiom v. The State (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 507; Adeniji v. The State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 57)809; (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 375; Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013)LPELR – 20184 (SC); (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 300; Ogunye v. The State (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 548, 567.
I find no merit in this appeal. Accordingly, I hereby enter an order dismissing it. Appeal dismissed.
OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.: I have had the advantage of reading in advance the leading judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Nweze, JSC. I agree with the reasoning therein, and the conclusion that this appeal should be dismissed.
AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.: I have had the benefit of perusing before now, the judgment just rendered by my noble lord C.C. Nweze, JSC. The facts of the case have been ably summaried in his lead judgment hence there is no need to repeat them here.
The fulcrum of this appeal is centred on alleged improper arraignment of the appellant before the trial Court in breach of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 80, Laws of the Federation. The bone of contention in this appeal relates to arraignment of the appellant as accused before the trial Court. The printed record clearly records with regard to arraignment as below:-
“Charge is read, to the accused person in English Language and interpreted from English to Hausa and accused person (sic) acknowledged (sic) they understand the charge.”
It is worthy of note, that the accused persons were represented by counsel of their choice. The learned defence counsel did not deem it proper to complaint on the manner or form of arraignment perhaps because he felt that there was nothing irregular about the arraignment. The learned counsel also did not challenge the record for whatever reason or reasons.
To my mind, the manner of arraignment of the appellant is in strict compliance with the provisions of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The complaint of the appellant in arraignment can simply be dismissed with waive of hand and is of no moment at all. Thus, for these few remarks and for the detailed reasons given in the lead judgment of my learned brother, C. C. Nweze, JSC which I entirely agreed with, I shall also dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed.
EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.: This Court is indeed very liberal. It is liberal to a fault and at its own expense; so much so that lawyers do not even think twice before formulating and presenting nauseatingly frivolous appeals, that smack of abuse of Court’s process, before it.
This frivolous appeal is one of such instances of abuse of Court’s process that now is the bane of the Court. The Court is congested and it is congested by the misguided adventures by lawyers like the appellant’s counsel.
On 10th June, 2010 when the appellant was arraigned in Court and his plea was taken on the three counts he was represented by a team of no less three lawyers led by A. S. Garba, Esq. One Mr. Ayika Dan was the interpreter appointed by the Court to interpret the proceedings to the appellant. The minutes of the proceedings for the date show clearly –
Charge is read to the accused persons in English Language and interpreted from English to Hausa and the accused person acknowledge they understand the charge.
The defence never once protested about the manner of his clients’ arraignment, including the taking of their pleas to all the charges. The arraignment haven been shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, the presumption is that formal requisites for its validity had been duly complied with Section 168(1) Evidence Act, 2011.
The record of appeal is neither challenged nor disputed. The appellate Court proceeds only on what is apparent on the record. The record in this appeal ex facie discloses that the arraignment of the appellant substantially complied with the due process of law. It also reveals that the appellant’s counsel did not, in limine, object to the procedure at the arraignment.
Nweze, JSC, in Blessing v. FRN (2015) LPELR – 24689 (SC)58, (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1475) 1 had lamented that strangely, “this Court is still being inundated with appeals woven around the interpretation of the requirements of Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act, even in the face of an avalanche of its decisions on these requirements.” This is what makes this appeal a clear case of abuse of Court’s process. It goes beyond mere counsel’s “misconception of the attitude of this Court to this question of arraignment”.
The counsel is apparently behaving like the French Bourbons – who learnt nothing, who forgot everything. It is a clear abuse of Court’s process for counsel to waste the precious time of the Court and, of course, the respondent to present to the Court an issue over which the attitude of the Court is well known. Apart from it being futile, it is a reprehensible conduct.
No lawyer as an officer of the Court, is permitted to do anything that adversely affects the administration of justice Rule 30 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners (RPC) 2007. By Rule 32(3)(j) of the same RPC a counsel, before any Court, is enjoined to eschew the promotion of a case which to his knowledge is false. I say no more.
This appeal, as adjudged by my learned brother, Chima Centus Nweze, JSC, does not have any substance. It is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C.: I read in advance the judgment of my learned brother, Nweze, JSC, and agree fully with it that the appeal fails.
The appellant’s grouse is that of wrong or improper arraignment following his conviction and sentence at the trial Court. His issue before this Court is:
Whether from the record of proceedings, there was a proper arraignment of the appellant before his trial, conviction and sentence by the trial Court for the lower Court to have affirmed same.
By the record on page 79, the arraignment of the appellant went thus:
Charge is read to the accused persons in English Language and interpreted from English to Hausa and the accused persons acknowledged they understand the charge.
To count I, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
To count II, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
To count III, first and second accused persons plead not guilty as charged.
Although the record shows that the appellant with his co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge in a block rather than individually, a plea of guilty or not guilty, where made unambiguously and clearly with understanding of the accused person, is valid, and the Court will take it as reflecting the mind of the accused person standing trial unfettered and understanding the process of his trial without undue advantage taken against him by the Court or the prosecution. Per Sidi Dauda Bage, JSC in Adama v. State (2017) LPELR – 42266(SC); (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt.1605) 94, in a strikingly similar scenario nailed the matter thus:
“The charge having been read over and explained to both accused persons in English language and each of them pleaded not guilty thereto, I find it difficult to conceive how the arraignment of the accused persons can be faulted. Without doubt, it would have been preferable for the learned trial judge to have recorded the plea of each of the accused persons separately in the direct speech. However, failure to do this cannot be fatal to their plea so long as the charge was read over and over and explained to them, whether jointly or separately, and they both understood the same and each of them individually entered his plea thereto. It would not matter, whether the Court’s record which described the event was written in direct or reported speech … The authorities do not say that it must be recorded that the charge was read and explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the Court (as claim by the appellant) before proceeding to record his plea thereto. Without doubt, it is good practice for the trial Court to record that “the charge was read and fully explained to the accused to the satisfaction of the Court” but I do not think the failure to record will render the trial a nullity.”
It is trite law that to give a plea is for an accused person to formally respond personally to a criminal charge, either of “guilty”, “not guilty” or “no contest”. See Elijah Ameh Okewu v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012) 4 SCM 118; (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt.1305)327. There is no doubt that the plea of an accused person must be taken by the trial Court before his trial commences. This is in obedience to and in compliance with Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Therefore, where the trial Court failed to take the plea of an accused person before he is tried, the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be declared a nullity. What it means is that the accused person could not have been said to be properly arraigned and this is fatal to the prosecution’s case. See Per Ariwoola, JSC in Adeyemi v. State (2013) LPELR-20337(SC), (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt.1340) 78.
In the instant appeal, the plea of not guilty by the appellant whether individually or in block was taken in English and interpreted to Hausa without objection and the trial continued unhindered till the conviction and sentence of the appellant. Since the chips were down for him, he chose now to contest his arraignment before the trial Court. The fundamental issue in the matter of arraignment is that the charge or information shall be read over and explained to the accused person in the language he understands before the plea is taken. The most appropriate time for taking any objection to the plea of an accused person which is in contravention of the constitutional and procedural provisions is before trial. Precious time is saved by an early intervention and justice will be done if the objection is sustained. See Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC in Idemudia v. State (1999) LPELR-1418(SC), (1997) 7 NWLR (Pt. 610) 202.
This appeal, albeit belated, is to cry over spilt milk as it lacks both in substance and technicality. In order words, apart from the fact that the arraignment of the appellant was properly done smacking no misapprehension and injustice done to the appellant, it is equally dead on arrival.
I therefore join my brother to hold that this appeal has no merit and is hereby dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Appearances:
Steven Onyechi Ononye For Appellant(s)
Edoka Dox Onyeke For Respondent(s)
