MRS. AJIBOLA TOKUNBOH LEWIS v. LAMIDI LAWAL OBAWOLE
(2010)LCN/3656(CA)
In The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
On Thursday, the 25th day of March, 2010
CA/L/323/2008
RATIO
ACTION: WHETHER A STATEMENT OF CLAIM SUPERCEDES THE WRIT OF SUMMONS
It is well settled that a statement of claim supercedes the writ of summons and must itself disclose a good cause of action. However in order for the statement of claim to supercede the writ, the statement of claim must state what is being claimed and not merely “as per the writ of summons.” See Enigbokan v. A.I.I. (Nig) Ltd (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 348) 1.
It was held in the same case of Enigbokan (Supra) that since it is accepted to be the law that a statement of claim supercedes the writ of summons, if some form of relief is claimed in the writ, but not in the statement of claim, it will be taken that so much of the claim is abandoned. In other words, any claim made in the writ which is not claimed in the statement of claim is taken to have been abandoned.
Finally in Stone v. Stone (2000) FWLR (Pt. 24) 1424 at 1438 paragraph C – D, it was held:-
“If a plaintiff omits to ask for, in his statement of claim, any relief of remedy claimed in the writ, he will be deemed to have abandoned that claim.” If these authorities were known by the trial Judge, the Appellant’s claim as enunciated in the writ would have been struck out since they were deemed abandoned. However, the trial Court decided to spare these claims on the writ aforesaid which writ was further amended. Since the lower Court spared them, I will also not strike the claims out. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A
LAND LAW: MEANING OF TRESPASS
Trespass is an unwarranted or unjustifiable entry or intrusion by one person upon land in possession of another. See Dantsoho v. Mohammed (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt.817) 457. Trespass therefore is interference with possession. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A
LAND LAW: WHO IS TRESPASS TO LAND ACTIONABLE TO
It is settled law that trespass to land is actionable at the suit of the person in possession of the land. See Echere v. Ejirike (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 232) 1597); All FWLR (Pt.232) 1597); Akunyili v. Ejidike (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 381.
Any form of possession, is sufficient to maintain an action for trespass against a wrong doer so long as it is clear and exclusive. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A
WORDS AND PHRASES: MEANING OF EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION
Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition defines Exclusive possession at page 565 as follows:-
“Exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit and not for another.”
See W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Holmes, 131 Texas Reports 365.
Exclusive possession therefore clearly means that the right to deal with the land lies only with the grantee and all others are prohibited or shut out from dealing with the land. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A
LAND LAW: THE DOCTRINE OF FORFEITURE IN RELATION TO CUSTOMARY TENANCY
The breaches that lead to forfeiture are sometimes referred to as misconduct or misbehavior. Forfeiture therefore is the usual mode of determining a customary tenancy. The real basis of the misconduct or misbehavior which renders tenancy liable to forfeiture is the challenge to the title of the overlord. This may be by alienation of part of the land under claim of ownership, refusal to pay the tribute due or indeed direct denial of overlord’s title by setting up a rival title in the customary tenant himself.
In Okpala v. Okpu (Supra) at pages 206-207, paragraphs E-C, Tobi, JSC cited several cases where the Apex Court held that the real foundation for misbehavior which involves forfeiture is the challenge to the overlord’s title to the land in dispute.
See Dokubo v. Manuel (1967) 1 All NLR 113; Onotaire v. Binite (1984) 12 SC 19; Onial v. Onyia (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 514; Makinde v. Akinwale (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 643) 435.
The Supreme Court in Ishola-Williams v. Hammond (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 48 held that Section 14 (1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act does not apply to covenants against assignment, alienation, sub-letting or parting with possession of demised premises or any part thereof. Forfeiture under customary law does not invite the application of Conveyancing and Law of Property Act. PER PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A
JUSTICE
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
IBRAHIM M MUSA SAULAWA Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO Justice of The Court of Appeal of Nigeria
Between
MRS. AJIBOLA TOKUNBOH LEWISAppellant(s)
AND
LAMIDI LAWAL OBAWOLE
(For himself and on behalf of Obawole Family)Respondent(s)
PAUL ADAMU GALINJE, J.C.A: (Delivering the Leading Judgment):By a writ of summons dated 25th of November, 1993, the Appellant herein claimed the following reliefs:-
1. N500,00:00 damages for trespass committed by the defendants on the plaintiffs property at Ifako which land is accurately delineated in the plan annexed to the deed of partition dated the 10th day of March, 1976 and registered as No. 20 at page 20 in volume 1547 of the Lands Registry in the office at Lagos.
2. An injunction restraining the Defendants, their servants or agents from continuing such trespass.
This writ was filed along with a statement of claim dated 25th of November, in which the Appellant claimed as per her writ of summons. The procedure where a party claims as per the writ of summons in a statement of claim is unacceptable in law. It is well settled that a statement of claim supercedes the writ of summons and must itself disclose a good cause of action. However in order for the statement of claim to supercede the writ, the statement of claim must state what is being claimed and not merely “as per the writ of summons.” See Enigbokan v. A.I.I. (Nig) Ltd (1994) 6 NWLR (Pt. 348) 1.
It was held in the same case of Enigbokan (Supra) that since it is accepted to be the law that a statement of claim supercedes the writ of summons, if some form of relief is claimed in the writ, but not in the statement of claim, it will be taken that so much of the claim is abandoned. In other words, any claim made in the writ which is not claimed in the statement of claim is taken to have been abandoned.
Finally in Stone v. Stone (2000) FWLR (Pt. 24) 1424 at 1438 paragraph C – D, it was held:-
“If a plaintiff omits to ask for, in his statement of claim, any relief of remedy claimed in the writ, he will be deemed to have abandoned that claim.” If these authorities were known by the trial Judge, the Appellant’s claim as enunciated in the writ would have been struck out since they were deemed abandoned. However, the trial Court decided to spare these claims on the writ aforesaid which writ was further amended. Since the lower Court spared them, I will also not strike the claims out.
The Amended writ of summons is dated 4th day of March, 2005 and filed the same date. The claims endorsed on this writ are hereby set out as follows:-
1. N500,000:00 damages for trespass committed by the defendants on the plaintiffs property at Ifako which land is accurately delineated in the plan annexed to the deed of partition dated the 10th day of March, 1976 and registered as No. 20 at page 20 in volume 1547 of the Lands Registry in the office at Lagos.
2. An injunction restraining the Defendants, their servants or agents from continuing such trespass.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO CLAIM 1 & 2
3. Possession of the said property.
4. Relief from forfeiture of the lease Agreement dated 1st July, 1895 and Registered as No. 49, at page 156, in volume 27 of the Register of Deeds kept at the Lagos State Lands Registry Lagos.
In her ruling delivered on the 2nd March, 2005 in which the application for amendment of the writ of summons dated 25th of November, 1993 was granted, the trial Judge made the following order:-
“Prayer 1 is therefore granted whilst prayer 2 is refused as learned counsel for the Defendant shall comply with Order 24 Rule 6 of the 2004 Rules of Court. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Amended Writ of Summons and Amended Statement of claim shall be filed and served within 7 days from today.”
I searched in the record and I failed to see an Amended Statement of claim. It is therefore my conclusion that none was filed.
The Respondent’s statement of defence and counter claim is dated 15th April, 1994 and filed on the 13th April, 1994, at page 7 of the Record of Appeal the Respondent’s counter-claimed as follows:-
“1. An order for forfeiture of the said lease;
2. Possession of the said land;
3. Perpetual injunction restraining the plaintiff, her servants, agents, privies, tenants, whomsoever, howsoever from remaining on or entering the land.”
The Appellant filed a reply to the statement of Defence and Defence to counter claim dated 30th November, 2000. This was amended and further amended. The final amended reply to statement of defence and defence to counterclaim is dated and filed on the 16th October, 2003. Issues having been joined, the suit was set down for hearing. During the trial the Appellant testified in proof of his case and called one other witness while the Respondent gave evidence in proof of his case and in addition called one witness. Thereafter learned counsel for the respective parties addressed the Court. In a reserved and well considered judgment, Phillips J. dismissed the claims of the Appellant and granted the Respondent’s counterclaim as follows:-
“In conclusion therefore I find that the claimant has not proved her claims which fail and are dismissed. The Defendants have satisfied this Court that they are entitled to the claims in the counter claim before this Court and so these claims are granted.”
It is against this decision that the Appellant has appealed to this Court. His notice of appeal dated 21st February,2008 and filed on the same date contains three grounds of appeal which I reproduce hereunder without their particulars.”
i. The learned trial Judge erred in law in refusing to grant the Appellant’s claim for damages for trespass on the basis that the Appellant was not in exclusive possession of the land.
ii. The learned trial Judge erred in law in dismissing the Appellant’s claim for relief against forfeiture of the lease Agreement dated 1st July, 1895 (Exhibit 1) and granting the Respondent’s counter claim for forfeiture of the said lease.
iii. Judgment is against the weight of evidence.”
In line with the relevant rules of this Court, parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument which were adopted by their respective counsel. On the 16th February, 2010. At page 3 of the Appellant’s brief of argument dated and filed on the 6th of June, 2008, the following issues for determination of this appeal are formulated thus:-
“i. Is the Claimant/Appellant entitled to Damages for trespass and an injunction restraining the Defendants/Respondents from further trespassing on the said land?
ii. Are the Defendants/Respondents entitled to an order forfeiting the lease Agreement dated 1st July, 1895 (EXHIBIT P1) or is the Claimant/Appellant entitled to possession of the said property and relief from forfeiture?
The Respondent”s brief is dated 6th November, 2008 and filed on the 11th November, 2008. At page 1 paragraph 1.9, the following two issues are also formulated for the determination of this appeal, to wit:-
“(i) Whether or not the Appellant proved that she had exclusive possession of the land in dispute.
(ii) Whether or not the defendant was entitled to a grant of the reliefs sought in his counter claim.”
The Appellant filed a reply brief on the 1st of December, 2008.
Before I consider parties argument in this appeal, I want to make it abundantly clear that parties before this Court are either Appellant (s) or Respondent(s) in appeal or Applicant or Respondent in application. Such titles like Plaintiff or Defendant are foreign to the proceedings of this Court when it is sitting as a Court of Appeal. The 2nd issue formulated by the Respondent does not seem to concern the parties before this Court as it relates to Defendant instead of Respondent. For a proper identification of parties, correct names should be used.
Mr. J. A. Kester, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned trial Judge was wrong in dismissing the Appellant’s claim for damages for trespass and injunction on the basis that the Appellant failed to prove that she was in possession of the land, because the Respondent did admit on the face of the pleadings that the Appellant and her predecessor in title had always been in undisturbed possession of the land and this was never in issue or in dispute between the parties.
In a further argument, learned counsel submitted that the Respondent having admitted that the Appellant was in possession and having admittedly disturbed the Appellant’s possession under the lease agreement dated 1st July, 1895 (EXHIBIT P1) without lawful justification, the Appellant is entitled to Damages for trespass and injunction restraining the Respondents from further trespassing on the said land. Learned counsel contended that trespass is a wrong against possession. In aid, learned counsel cited page 183 of the Nigerian Law of Torts, by Gilbert Kodilinye and the authorities in Owe v. Oshinbajo (1965) 1 All NLR 72 at 76 paragraphs E-G where the Supreme Court, per Coker, JSC stated as follows:-
“… having found that the plaintiff was in possession when the defendant entered on the land (clearly shown by the pleadings of the parties to be the same as shown on Exhibit C) the plaintiff is entitled to judgment for damages for trespass and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from further trespassing on the land…”
Learned counsel also cited in aid the following authorities:-
1. Apamadari v. The State (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 493) 289 at 296.
2. Ibrahim v. Mohammed (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 437) 453 at 469-470.
3. Olagbemiro v. Ajagungbade III (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 136) 37.
4. Oluwi v. Eniola (1957) NWLR 339.
Finally learned counsel submitted that the learned trial Judge erred in ignoring not only the evidence of PW1, but more importantly the admission of the Respondents to the effect that the Appellant was in possession of the land thereby wrongly finding that the Appellant had not proved possession and dismissing her claim on this basis.
Mr. Olufemi Awojide, learned counsel for the Respondent who settled Respondent’s brief of argument submitted that for the Appellant to maintain an action in trespass, he must prove exclusive possession of the land over which the suit is brought and not merely invoking undisturbed or peaceful possession. To buttress this submission, learned counsel cited Yekini Adedokun v. Chief Olajide Keji & Ors (2005) 4 MJSC 172 at 184 paragraph G; Echere v. Ezirike (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 323) 1597). Learned counsel contended that what the Respondent admitted at paragraph 13 of the Amended Statement of Claim is undisturbed and peaceful possession by the Appellant, but not exclusive possession and that is a confirmation that the Respondent did not disturb the peaceful enjoyment of the land in dispute by the Appellant and her predecessors in title. This according to the learned counsel is consistent with the covenant of peaceful enjoyment entered into by the original parties to exhibit P1. Finally, learned counsel submitted that the Appellant failed to prove that she had exclusive possession of the land in dispute in order to maintain an action in trespass to the land. Further reliance is placed on Fagunwa v. Adibe (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 226) 340 at 360; Ngene v. Igbo (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 131 at 143, and Obijuru v. Ozims (1985) 9 14 SC (Pt.1) 142 at 200. In conclusion learned counsel urged this court to affirm the judgment of the lower Court.
On this issue, the learned trial Judge at page 116 paragraph 2 line 26 held as follows:-
“The claimant therefore in the light of these documents cannot seriously claim to have been in exclusive possession of the land as at 1993 as each of these Deeds of lease is dated between the years 1980-1981 which means that she has been sharing the land with strangers put there by one of her uncles for many years before the alleged breaking of the fence took place.”
Paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 13 of the Appellant’s statement of claim state that the Plaintiff and her predecessor in title had either being in exclusive or undisturbed possession of the land in dispute. For the avoidance of doubt, the paragraphs aforesaid are hereunder reproduced as follows:-
“4. The property in dispute became vested in the plaintiff under and by virtue of the deed of partition mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof and the plaintiff has since the partition been in exclusive possession exercising acts of possession on the said property.
6. The said Z. A. Williams went into possession and exercised numerous acts of possession on the whole area of land without any disturbances from any quarter.
8. The plaintiff pleads that the said Eleanor Williams went into possession and by her will dated 21st day of June, 1926 devised the lease hold property given her by her husband to her daughter Remilekun Taylor and her heirs male.
13. The plaintiff pleads that she and her predecessors in title had been in undisturbed possession of their land.”
The Respondents in their statement of defence admitted paragraphs 6 and 13 of the statement of claim, but denied paragraph 4 of the statement of claim. For paragraph 8 of the statement of claim, the Respondent set out the following averment at paragraph 4 of the statement of defence as follows:-
“The Defendant refer to paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the statement of claim and aver that all transactions referred to therein are by the lease of 1895 prohibited except the consent of the Defendants was sought and obtained.”
In support of her averment, the Appellant at page 17 of the record testified in her evidence in chief as follows:-
“After my father’s death, I fenced the land. I went into possession and continued farming. In 1976 the land was partitioned between my uncle and myself. Yes, there was a Deed of partition in that regards. Yes, I obtained a Certified True Copy of the Deed of the Partition…
I fenced my own portion of the land after the partition. From 1976-1993, I enjoyed ownership and possession of the land.”
DW1 agreed that in 1895, the Appellants rented the farm land from the ancestors of the Respondent and were paying yearly rents. It was their failure to pay rent coupled with the fact that they sold some part of the land, they acted in breach of the rent agreement. The Respondents entry into the land was to take over possession because of the breach of the agreement.
Trespass is an unwarranted or unjustifiable entry or intrusion by one person upon land in possession of another. See Dantsoho v. Mohammed (2003) 6 NWLR (Pt.817) 457. Trespass therefore is interference with possession.
It is settled law that trespass to land is actionable at the suit of the person in possession of the land. See Echere v. Ejirike (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 232) 1597); All FWLR (Pt.232) 1597); Akunyili v. Ejidike (1996) 5 NWLR (Pt. 449) 381.
Any form of possession, is sufficient to maintain an action for trespass against a wrong doer so long as it is clear and exclusive.
Black’s Law Dictionary 6th Edition defines Exclusive possession at page 565 as follows:-
“Exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit and not for another.”
See W. T. Carter & Bro. v. Holmes, 131 Texas Reports 365.
Exclusive possession therefore clearly means that the right to deal with the land lies only with the grantee and all others are prohibited or shut out from dealing with the land. It is very clear from the averment at paragraph 4 of the statement of Defence and the evidence of PW1 at page 28 of the record that the Appellants had no exclusive dominion over the land. Their stay on the land was subject to the payment of rents to the Respondents. PW1 said at page 28 lines 13-16 thus:-
“It is not true that we have defaulted in paying our rents. My late father also told me of the benefit of paying the pepper corn rents. After 1973 when my father died my uncle took over the paying of the rents and they reported back to us at family meeting.”
In an action for trespass, once the Plaintiff can establish his possession, even if he be a trespasser, the Defendant can only justify his entry on the land by showing a better title. See Amusa Alii Owe v. J. O. Oshinbajo (1965) All N.L.R 74 at 78 paragraph 3. In the present case, there is evidence that the Appellant is a traditional tenant to the Respondent and that apart from failure to pay rents, the Appellant sold part of the land contrary to the agreement of 1985. The evidence of sale which is supported by Exhibits D1-D4 has not been effectively rebutted by the Appellant. It follows therefore that the Appellant committed certain acts that gave the Respondent room for interfering with the Appellant’s possession. The acts of the Appellant had put his possession of the land in jeopardy and such possession was liable to forfeiture.
Apart from the Appellant’s failure to abide completely with the forms of the agreement of 1895, the allegation that he built fence around the land and same was broken through by thugs sponsored by the Respondent was not established. This is what the learned trial Judge said on this issue:-
“She has claimed that her fence was broken by the Defendants, but has offered no evidence in proof of the fact that any fence existed at all on the land in dispute. She also testified that she was farming on the land with some others, but none of these farmers or people who were on the land with her has come forward to testify… I find the evidence of PW2 inadequate on this issue of possession as from his evidence he only went there when his uncle came to Lagos from Warri he was not really frequent visitor to the land”
Learned trial Judge then concluded thus:-
“On this issue therefore I find the evidence of the claimant inadequate to sustain an action in trespass as she has not satisfied this Court that she was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute.”
I agree with the learned trial Judge that the Appellant did not prove that he was in exclusive possession of the land in dispute.” I therefore resolve the first issue for determination of the appeal against the Appellant and the ground of appeal upon which it is formulated is dismissed.
Now I will proceed to consider the second issue for the determination of this appeal. Even at the risk of repetition, I reproduce same hereunder as follows:-
“Are the Defendants/Respondents entitled to an order forfeiting the lease Agreement dated 1st July 1895 (EXHIBIT P1) or is the Claimant/Appellant entitled to possession of the said property and relief from forfeiture?
Mr. Kester, learned counsel for the Appellant in his argument submitted that the Respondent’s counterclaim for forfeiture cannot be granted because he has not complied with S.14 (1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881. Learned counsel submitted that the Appellant denied selling land to 3rd party as the sale represented by Exhibit D1-D4 was by her uncles and the Appellant had done nothing that will provoke forfeiture.
Learned counsel cited Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt.4) 587; Odofin v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt. 229) 350. In a further argument, learned counsel submitted that where the statutory formalities/conditions precedent have not been complied with, the leasor’s action for forfeiture will fail.
In aid the following authorities are cited thus:-
1. Hill & Redmans “Law of Landlord & Tenant” 17th Edition Vol. 12 page 462.
2. Plymouth Corporation v. Harvey (1971) 1 All E. R, 623.
Mr. Olufemi Awojide, learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that S. 14(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881 is inapplicable in this case. I agree with him. In Okpala v. Okpu, (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 183, the Supreme Court enumerated the breaches that will result in forfeiture of tenancy to include the following:-
1. Going beyond the area granted.
2. Alienation of portion or parcel of the land to third parties without the consent of the grantor.
3. Refusal or failure to pay tribute or rent to the Leasor.
4. Putting up permanent structures on the land without the consent of the leasor.
5. Putting up competing interest on the land which is adverse to the interest of the leasor.
6. Denial of the leasor’s title to the land not originally allocated to them.
In the instant case there was evidence which was clearly put before the trial Court that the Appellant had not only failed to pay rent, but sold some part of the land which is evidenced by Exhibits D1-D1.
The learned trial Judge was therefore right to have granted the prayer for forfeiture as expressed in the Respondent’s counterclaim. The breaches that lead to forfeiture are sometimes referred to as misconduct or misbehavior. Forfeiture therefore is the usual mode of determining a customary tenancy. The real basis of the misconduct or misbehavior which renders tenancy liable to forfeiture is the challenge to the title of the overlord. This may be by alienation of part of the land under claim of ownership, refusal to pay the tribute due or indeed direct denial of overlord’s title by setting up a rival title in the customary tenant himself.
In Okpala v. Okpu (Supra) at pages 206-207, paragraphs E-C, Tobi, JSC cited several cases where the Apex Court held that the real foundation for misbehavior which involves forfeiture is the challenge to the overlord’s title to the land in dispute.
See Dokubo v. Manuel (1967) 1 All NLR 113; Onotaire v. Binite (1984) 12 SC 19; Onial v. Onyia (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 99) 514; Makinde v. Akinwale (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 643) 435.
The Supreme Court in Ishola-Williams v. Hammond (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 48 held that Section 14 (1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act does not apply to covenants against assignment, alienation, sub-letting or parting with possession of demised premises or any part thereof. Forfeiture under customary law does not invite the application of Conveyancing and Law of Property Act.
For all I have said here, I find myself in agreement with the decision of the lower Court when the Respondent’s counterclaims were granted. Accordingly therefore the 2nd issue for determination is resolved in favour of the Respondent and the ground(s) upon which it is formulated is hereby dismissed.
Having resolved the two issues in favour of the Respondent, this appeal shall be and it is hereby dismissed for lacking in merit. The Respondent shall be entitled to the cost of this appeal which I assess at N30, 000:00 against the Appellant.
IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.C.A.: Having read, before now, the lead judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Galinje, J.C.A, the submissions of the learned counsel in the respective briefs thereof vis-a-vis the record of appeal as a whole, I concur with His lordship’s reasoning and conclusion reached therein, to the effect that the instant appeal is lacking in merit.
Hence, the appeal is hereby dismissed by me, with N30,000:00 as cost to the Respondent.
REGINA OBIAGELI NWODO, J.C.A.: I have had the advantage of reading in draft the lead Judgment of my learned brother, Galinje J.C.A just delivered and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the Appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
My learned brother had exhaustively dealt with all the relevant issues raised in the appeal and resolved same. I therefore have nothing useful to add.
This appeal is dismissed as it is devoid of merit and abide by the consequential orders made in the lead Judgment including the order as to cost.
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Appearances
Mr. T. A. KesterFor Appellant
AND
Mr. Olufemi AwojideFor Respondent
